diff options
| author | David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> | 2018-01-12 11:11:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2018-01-23 19:50:13 +0100 |
| commit | eebc3f8adee0a6f43a4789ef0bf5c5b35de8cfe4 (patch) | |
| tree | de60e8bfbb5bd165302731d2cf6768d82f7ea708 /arch/x86/xen | |
| parent | f72655b837eb4320a1ffebbd0e0ebe92ce1e5314 (diff) | |
x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
commit 117cc7a908c83697b0b737d15ae1eb5943afe35b upstream.
In accordance with the Intel and AMD documentation, we need to overwrite
all entries in the RSB on exiting a guest, to prevent malicious branch
target predictions from affecting the host kernel. This is needed both
for retpoline and for IBRS.
[ak: numbers again for the RSB stuffing labels]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515755487-8524-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Razvan Ghitulete <rga@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/xen')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions