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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2017-06-23 15:08:57 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2017-06-29 12:48:50 +0200
commit1d3d0f8b7cf758136ed36b30620442d989601737 (patch)
tree0b812c7d3390e1622f7b356c5847731d7ca5f8a8 /fs/dax.c
parent22da7ca81a3aad1af021c770b578acad86d63681 (diff)
fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers
commit 98da7d08850fb8bdeb395d6368ed15753304aa0c upstream. When limiting the argv/envp strings during exec to 1/4 of the stack limit, the storage of the pointers to the strings was not included. This means that an exec with huge numbers of tiny strings could eat 1/4 of the stack limit in strings and then additional space would be later used by the pointers to the strings. For example, on 32-bit with a 8MB stack rlimit, an exec with 1677721 single-byte strings would consume less than 2MB of stack, the max (8MB / 4) amount allowed, but the pointers to the strings would consume the remaining additional stack space (1677721 * 4 == 6710884). The result (1677721 + 6710884 == 8388605) would exhaust stack space entirely. Controlling this stack exhaustion could result in pathological behavior in setuid binaries (CVE-2017-1000365). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional commenting from Kees] Fixes: b6a2fea39318 ("mm: variable length argument support") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170622001720.GA32173@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/dax.c')
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