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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2021-05-25 12:37:35 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2021-06-03 08:22:04 +0200
commit2f5500e3c8414351566777335af82e72381468f7 (patch)
tree1ea67902eb10db3f0746232e6e65cf34bedbe499 /fs/proc
parent448a1cb12977f52142e6feb12022c59662d88dc1 (diff)
proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener
commit bfb819ea20ce8bbeeba17e1a6418bf8bda91fc28 upstream. Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/ files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly exploitable behaviors. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index bd8c26a409a7..2166f24af37e 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2413,6 +2413,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
ssize_t length;
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ /* A task may only write when it was the opener. */
+ if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred())
+ return -EPERM;
+
length = -ESRCH;
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;