arm-cci: Get rid of secure transactions for PMU driver

Avoid secure transactions while probing the CCI PMU. The
existing code makes use of the Peripheral ID2 (PID2) register
to determine the revision of the CCI400, which requires a
secure transaction. This puts a limitation on the usage of the
driver on systems running non-secure Linux(e.g, ARM64).

Updated the device-tree binding for cci pmu node to add the explicit
revision number for the compatible field.

The supported strings are :
	arm,cci-400-pmu,r0
	arm,cci-400-pmu,r1
	arm,cci-400-pmu - DEPRECATED. See NOTE below

NOTE: If the revision is not mentioned, we need to probe the cci revision,
which could be fatal on a platform running non-secure. We need a reliable way
to know if we can poke the CCI registers at runtime on ARM32. We depend on
'mcpm_is_available()' when it is available. mcpm_is_available() returns true
only when there is a registered driver for mcpm. Otherwise, we assume that we
don't have secure access, and skips probing the revision number(ARM64 case).

The MCPM should figure out if it is safe to access the CCI. Unfortunately
there isn't a reliable way to indicate the same via dtb. This patch doesn't
address/change the current situation. It only deals with the CCI-PMU, leaving
the assumptions about the secure access as it has been, prior to this patch.

Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions