diff options
author | Michael Bestas <mkbestas@lineageos.org> | 2021-07-10 21:26:34 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Michael Bestas <mkbestas@lineageos.org> | 2021-07-10 21:26:34 +0300 |
commit | 3c741a8b469c522434e6841d8618702303fd6a21 (patch) | |
tree | f95f59bb8f761500862e72b98f9b266ecfdcc82e /net/mac80211 | |
parent | d46db1f472cf55742a7a2db10218cdcc084e0daf (diff) | |
parent | b5f0035416310da3ccfaf160e6d856c294ec3bf5 (diff) |
Merge branch 'android-4.4-p' of https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common into lineage-18.1-caf-msm8998
This brings LA.UM.9.2.r1-03400-SDMxx0.0 up to date with
https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/ android-4.4-p at commit:
b5f0035416310 Merge 4.4.274 into android-4.4-p
Conflicts:
include/linux/spi/spi.h
Change-Id: I3daac7891ee93c70ffe08b7e70b77e8b2989af67
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211')
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 36 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/iface.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/key.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/key.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/rx.c | 155 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/wpa.c | 12 |
8 files changed, 185 insertions, 71 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index 602ee7f3cd0c..3a91f32d1eda 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -51,12 +51,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local; #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM 8 #define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM 18 -/* IEEE 802.11 (Ch. 9.5 Defragmentation) requires support for concurrent - * reception of at least three fragmented frames. This limit can be increased - * by changing this define, at the cost of slower frame reassembly and - * increased memory use (about 2 kB of RAM per entry). */ -#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4 - /* power level hasn't been configured (or set to automatic) */ #define IEEE80211_UNSET_POWER_LEVEL INT_MIN @@ -85,18 +79,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local; #define IEEE80211_DEAUTH_FRAME_LEN (24 /* hdr */ + 2 /* reason */) -struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { - struct sk_buff_head skb_list; - unsigned long first_frag_time; - u16 seq; - u16 extra_len; - u16 last_frag; - u8 rx_queue; - bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ - u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ -}; - - struct ieee80211_bss { u32 device_ts_beacon, device_ts_presp; @@ -236,8 +218,15 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_data { */ int security_idx; - u32 tkip_iv32; - u16 tkip_iv16; + union { + struct { + u32 iv32; + u16 iv16; + } tkip; + struct { + u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN]; + } ccm_gcm; + }; }; struct ieee80211_csa_settings { @@ -835,9 +824,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data { char name[IFNAMSIZ]; - /* Fragment table for host-based reassembly */ - struct ieee80211_fragment_entry fragments[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX]; - unsigned int fragment_next; + struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags; /* TID bitmap for NoAck policy */ u16 noack_map; @@ -2077,4 +2064,7 @@ extern const struct ethtool_ops ieee80211_ethtool_ops; #define debug_noinline #endif +void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache); +void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache); + #endif /* IEEE80211_I_H */ diff --git a/net/mac80211/iface.c b/net/mac80211/iface.c index cf9b11eff3d6..dceaad91c1e0 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/iface.c +++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c @@ -1083,16 +1083,12 @@ static void ieee80211_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev) */ static void ieee80211_teardown_sdata(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) { - int i; - /* free extra data */ ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, false); ieee80211_debugfs_remove_netdev(sdata); - for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) - __skb_queue_purge(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list); - sdata->fragment_next = 0; + ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sdata->frags); if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif)) mesh_rmc_free(sdata); @@ -1788,8 +1784,7 @@ int ieee80211_if_add(struct ieee80211_local *local, const char *name, sdata->wdev.wiphy = local->hw.wiphy; sdata->local = local; - for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) - skb_queue_head_init(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list); + ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sdata->frags); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdata->key_list); diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c index 91a4e606edcd..a2050d5776ce 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.c +++ b/net/mac80211/key.c @@ -646,6 +646,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, struct sta_info *sta) { struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; + static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0); struct ieee80211_key *old_key; int idx = key->conf.keyidx; bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE; @@ -680,6 +681,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key, key->sdata = sdata; key->sta = sta; + /* + * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed + * key and fragment cache attacks. + */ + key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color); + increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key); diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h index 9951ef06323e..9ac5c00dbe80 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/key.h +++ b/net/mac80211/key.h @@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key { } debugfs; #endif + unsigned int color; + /* * key config, must be last because it contains key * material as variable length member diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 1618c96674a4..37ff31ef3b6c 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -1739,19 +1739,34 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return result; } +void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++) + skb_queue_head_init(&cache->entries[i].skb_list); +} + +void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++) + __skb_queue_purge(&cache->entries[i].skb_list); +} + static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry * -ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, +ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache, unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue, struct sk_buff **skb) { struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; - entry = &sdata->fragments[sdata->fragment_next++]; - if (sdata->fragment_next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX) - sdata->fragment_next = 0; + entry = &cache->entries[cache->next++]; + if (cache->next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX) + cache->next = 0; - if (!skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list)) - __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list); + __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list); __skb_queue_tail(&entry->skb_list, *skb); /* no need for locking */ *skb = NULL; @@ -1766,14 +1781,14 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, } static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry * -ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, +ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache, unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr) { struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; int i, idx; - idx = sdata->fragment_next; + idx = cache->next; for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) { struct ieee80211_hdr *f_hdr; @@ -1781,7 +1796,7 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (idx < 0) idx = IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX - 1; - entry = &sdata->fragments[idx]; + entry = &cache->entries[idx]; if (skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list) || entry->seq != seq || entry->rx_queue != rx_queue || entry->last_frag + 1 != frag) @@ -1808,16 +1823,27 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, return NULL; } +static bool requires_sequential_pn(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc) +{ + return rx->key && + (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP || + rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 || + rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP || + rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) && + ieee80211_has_protected(fc); +} + static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { + struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache = &rx->sdata->frags; struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; u16 sc; __le16 fc; unsigned int frag, seq; struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry; struct sk_buff *skb; - struct ieee80211_rx_status *status; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb); hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data; fc = hdr->frame_control; @@ -1828,14 +1854,15 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl); frag = sc & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG; - if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) { - I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount); - goto out_no_led; - } + if (rx->sta) + cache = &rx->sta->frags; if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0)) goto out; + if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) + return RX_DROP_MONITOR; + I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_fragments); if (skb_linearize(rx->skb)) @@ -1851,20 +1878,17 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (frag == 0) { /* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */ - entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq, + entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(cache, frag, seq, rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb)); - if (rx->key && - (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP || - rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 || - rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP || - rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) && - ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { + if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) { int queue = rx->security_idx; /* Store CCMP/GCMP PN so that we can verify that the * next fragment has a sequential PN value. */ entry->check_sequential_pn = true; + entry->is_protected = true; + entry->key_color = rx->key->color; memcpy(entry->last_pn, rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); @@ -1876,6 +1900,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue])); BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN != IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); + } else if (rx->key && + (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) || + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) { + entry->is_protected = true; + entry->key_color = rx->key->color; } return RX_QUEUED; } @@ -1883,7 +1912,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) /* This is a fragment for a frame that should already be pending in * fragment cache. Add this fragment to the end of the pending entry. */ - entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(rx->sdata, frag, seq, + entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(cache, frag, seq, rx->seqno_idx, hdr); if (!entry) { I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_drop_defrag); @@ -1898,25 +1927,39 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (entry->check_sequential_pn) { int i; u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn; - int queue; - if (!rx->key || - (rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP && - rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 && - rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP && - rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256)) + if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + + /* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */ + if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) { pn[i]++; if (pn[i]) break; } - queue = rx->security_idx; - rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue]; + + rpn = rx->ccm_gcm.pn; if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); + } else if (entry->is_protected && + (!rx->key || + (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) && + !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) || + rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) { + /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even + * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a + * lost cause anyway. + */ + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key && + entry->key_color != rx->key->color && + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc)); @@ -1948,7 +1991,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) out: ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local); - out_no_led: if (rx->sta) rx->sta->rx_stats.packets++; return RX_CONTINUE; @@ -2105,13 +2147,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc) struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data; /* - * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless - * of whether the frame was encrypted or not. + * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of + * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow + * all other destination addresses for them. */ - if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && - (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || - ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr))) - return true; + if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol)) + return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) || + ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr); if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) || ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc)) @@ -2140,6 +2182,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP || sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) && !(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) && + ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol && (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) { if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest)) { /* @@ -2192,9 +2235,30 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) #endif if (skb) { + struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb); + /* deliver to local stack */ skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev); memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb)); + + /* + * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address + * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of + * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of + * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address, + * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the + * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to + * happen. + * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own + * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see + * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note + * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can + * be the PAE group address. + */ + if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol && + !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr))) + ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr); + if (rx->napi) napi_gro_receive(rx->napi, skb); else @@ -2258,6 +2322,23 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (skb_linearize(skb)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + if (rx->key) { + /* + * We should not receive A-MSDUs on pre-HT connections, + * and HT connections cannot use old ciphers. Thus drop + * them, as in those cases we couldn't even have SPP + * A-MSDUs or such. + */ + switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) { + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + default: + break; + } + } + ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr, rx->sdata->vif.type, rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom, true); diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c index c4b192e7f48f..5f2c8aeb9bd3 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c @@ -356,6 +356,8 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, sta->sdata = sdata; sta->rx_stats.last_rx = jiffies; + ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sta->frags); + sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE; /* Mark TID as unreserved */ @@ -975,6 +977,8 @@ static void __sta_info_destroy_part2(struct sta_info *sta) ieee80211_sta_debugfs_remove(sta); ieee80211_recalc_min_chandef(sdata); + ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sta->frags); + cleanup_single_sta(sta); } diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h index 15b0150283b6..b2e5928b1f7b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h @@ -324,6 +324,34 @@ struct mesh_sta { DECLARE_EWMA(signal, 1024, 8) +/* + * IEEE 802.11-2016 (10.6 "Defragmentation") recommends support for "concurrent + * reception of at least one MSDU per access category per associated STA" + * on APs, or "at least one MSDU per access category" on other interface types. + * + * This limit can be increased by changing this define, at the cost of slower + * frame reassembly and increased memory use while fragments are pending. + */ +#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4 + +struct ieee80211_fragment_entry { + struct sk_buff_head skb_list; + unsigned long first_frag_time; + u16 seq; + u16 extra_len; + u16 last_frag; + u8 rx_queue; + u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */ + is_protected:1; + u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */ + unsigned int key_color; +}; + +struct ieee80211_fragment_cache { + struct ieee80211_fragment_entry entries[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX]; + unsigned int next; +}; + /** * struct sta_info - STA information * @@ -384,6 +412,7 @@ DECLARE_EWMA(signal, 1024, 8) * @tx_stats: TX statistics * @rx_stats: RX statistics * @status_stats: TX status statistics + * @frags: fragment cache */ struct sta_info { /* General information, mostly static */ @@ -493,6 +522,8 @@ struct sta_info { struct cfg80211_chan_def tdls_chandef; + struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags; + /* keep last! */ struct ieee80211_sta sta; }; diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index cb439e06919f..921115327ec8 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) update_iv: /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ - rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32; - rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16; + rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32; + rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16; return RX_CONTINUE; @@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) key, skb->data + hdrlen, skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr, hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx, - &rx->tkip_iv32, - &rx->tkip_iv16); + &rx->tkip.iv32, + &rx->tkip.iv16); if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; @@ -553,6 +553,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, } memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); + if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) + memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); } /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ @@ -784,6 +786,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) } memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN); + if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr))) + memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN); } /* Remove GCMP header and MIC */ |