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authorMichael Bestas <mkbestas@lineageos.org>2021-07-10 21:26:34 +0300
committerMichael Bestas <mkbestas@lineageos.org>2021-07-10 21:26:34 +0300
commit3c741a8b469c522434e6841d8618702303fd6a21 (patch)
treef95f59bb8f761500862e72b98f9b266ecfdcc82e /net/mac80211
parentd46db1f472cf55742a7a2db10218cdcc084e0daf (diff)
parentb5f0035416310da3ccfaf160e6d856c294ec3bf5 (diff)
Merge branch 'android-4.4-p' of https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common into lineage-18.1-caf-msm8998
This brings LA.UM.9.2.r1-03400-SDMxx0.0 up to date with https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/ android-4.4-p at commit: b5f0035416310 Merge 4.4.274 into android-4.4-p Conflicts: include/linux/spi/spi.h Change-Id: I3daac7891ee93c70ffe08b7e70b77e8b2989af67
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211')
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h36
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/iface.c9
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/key.c7
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/key.h2
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/rx.c155
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/sta_info.c4
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/sta_info.h31
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wpa.c12
8 files changed, 185 insertions, 71 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index 602ee7f3cd0c..3a91f32d1eda 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -51,12 +51,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local;
#define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_HEADROOM 8
#define IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM 18
-/* IEEE 802.11 (Ch. 9.5 Defragmentation) requires support for concurrent
- * reception of at least three fragmented frames. This limit can be increased
- * by changing this define, at the cost of slower frame reassembly and
- * increased memory use (about 2 kB of RAM per entry). */
-#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4
-
/* power level hasn't been configured (or set to automatic) */
#define IEEE80211_UNSET_POWER_LEVEL INT_MIN
@@ -85,18 +79,6 @@ struct ieee80211_local;
#define IEEE80211_DEAUTH_FRAME_LEN (24 /* hdr */ + 2 /* reason */)
-struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
- struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
- unsigned long first_frag_time;
- u16 seq;
- u16 extra_len;
- u16 last_frag;
- u8 rx_queue;
- bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
- u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
-};
-
-
struct ieee80211_bss {
u32 device_ts_beacon, device_ts_presp;
@@ -236,8 +218,15 @@ struct ieee80211_rx_data {
*/
int security_idx;
- u32 tkip_iv32;
- u16 tkip_iv16;
+ union {
+ struct {
+ u32 iv32;
+ u16 iv16;
+ } tkip;
+ struct {
+ u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
+ } ccm_gcm;
+ };
};
struct ieee80211_csa_settings {
@@ -835,9 +824,7 @@ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
- /* Fragment table for host-based reassembly */
- struct ieee80211_fragment_entry fragments[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX];
- unsigned int fragment_next;
+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags;
/* TID bitmap for NoAck policy */
u16 noack_map;
@@ -2077,4 +2064,7 @@ extern const struct ethtool_ops ieee80211_ethtool_ops;
#define debug_noinline
#endif
+void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache);
+void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache);
+
#endif /* IEEE80211_I_H */
diff --git a/net/mac80211/iface.c b/net/mac80211/iface.c
index cf9b11eff3d6..dceaad91c1e0 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/iface.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/iface.c
@@ -1083,16 +1083,12 @@ static void ieee80211_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev)
*/
static void ieee80211_teardown_sdata(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
{
- int i;
-
/* free extra data */
ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, false);
ieee80211_debugfs_remove_netdev(sdata);
- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++)
- __skb_queue_purge(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list);
- sdata->fragment_next = 0;
+ ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sdata->frags);
if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif))
mesh_rmc_free(sdata);
@@ -1788,8 +1784,7 @@ int ieee80211_if_add(struct ieee80211_local *local, const char *name,
sdata->wdev.wiphy = local->hw.wiphy;
sdata->local = local;
- for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++)
- skb_queue_head_init(&sdata->fragments[i].skb_list);
+ ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sdata->frags);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdata->key_list);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 91a4e606edcd..a2050d5776ce 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -646,6 +646,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
struct sta_info *sta)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
+ static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
int idx = key->conf.keyidx;
bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
@@ -680,6 +681,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
key->sdata = sdata;
key->sta = sta;
+ /*
+ * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed
+ * key and fragment cache attacks.
+ */
+ key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);
+
increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index 9951ef06323e..9ac5c00dbe80 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
} debugfs;
#endif
+ unsigned int color;
+
/*
* key config, must be last because it contains key
* material as variable length member
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 1618c96674a4..37ff31ef3b6c 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -1739,19 +1739,34 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
return result;
}
+void ieee80211_init_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++)
+ skb_queue_head_init(&cache->entries[i].skb_list);
+}
+
+void ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cache->entries); i++)
+ __skb_queue_purge(&cache->entries[i].skb_list);
+}
+
static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *
-ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache,
unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue,
struct sk_buff **skb)
{
struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
- entry = &sdata->fragments[sdata->fragment_next++];
- if (sdata->fragment_next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX)
- sdata->fragment_next = 0;
+ entry = &cache->entries[cache->next++];
+ if (cache->next >= IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX)
+ cache->next = 0;
- if (!skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list))
- __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list);
+ __skb_queue_purge(&entry->skb_list);
__skb_queue_tail(&entry->skb_list, *skb); /* no need for locking */
*skb = NULL;
@@ -1766,14 +1781,14 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
}
static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *
-ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
+ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache,
unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq,
int rx_queue, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr)
{
struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
int i, idx;
- idx = sdata->fragment_next;
+ idx = cache->next;
for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX; i++) {
struct ieee80211_hdr *f_hdr;
@@ -1781,7 +1796,7 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
if (idx < 0)
idx = IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX - 1;
- entry = &sdata->fragments[idx];
+ entry = &cache->entries[idx];
if (skb_queue_empty(&entry->skb_list) || entry->seq != seq ||
entry->rx_queue != rx_queue ||
entry->last_frag + 1 != frag)
@@ -1808,16 +1823,27 @@ ieee80211_reassemble_find(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
return NULL;
}
+static bool requires_sequential_pn(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc)
+{
+ return rx->key &&
+ (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 ||
+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP ||
+ rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) &&
+ ieee80211_has_protected(fc);
+}
+
static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline
ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache *cache = &rx->sdata->frags;
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
u16 sc;
__le16 fc;
unsigned int frag, seq;
struct ieee80211_fragment_entry *entry;
struct sk_buff *skb;
- struct ieee80211_rx_status *status;
+ struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
fc = hdr->frame_control;
@@ -1828,14 +1854,15 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
sc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->seq_ctrl);
frag = sc & IEEE80211_SCTL_FRAG;
- if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) {
- I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount);
- goto out_no_led;
- }
+ if (rx->sta)
+ cache = &rx->sta->frags;
if (likely(!ieee80211_has_morefrags(fc) && frag == 0))
goto out;
+ if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
+ return RX_DROP_MONITOR;
+
I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_fragments);
if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
@@ -1851,20 +1878,17 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (frag == 0) {
/* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */
- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
+ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(cache, frag, seq,
rx->seqno_idx, &(rx->skb));
- if (rx->key &&
- (rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP ||
- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 ||
- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP ||
- rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) &&
- ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
+ if (requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc)) {
int queue = rx->security_idx;
/* Store CCMP/GCMP PN so that we can verify that the
* next fragment has a sequential PN value.
*/
entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
+ entry->is_protected = true;
+ entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
memcpy(entry->last_pn,
rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
@@ -1876,6 +1900,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+ } else if (rx->key &&
+ (ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))) {
+ entry->is_protected = true;
+ entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
}
return RX_QUEUED;
}
@@ -1883,7 +1912,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
/* This is a fragment for a frame that should already be pending in
* fragment cache. Add this fragment to the end of the pending entry.
*/
- entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
+ entry = ieee80211_reassemble_find(cache, frag, seq,
rx->seqno_idx, hdr);
if (!entry) {
I802_DEBUG_INC(rx->local->rx_handlers_drop_defrag);
@@ -1898,25 +1927,39 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (entry->check_sequential_pn) {
int i;
u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn;
- int queue;
- if (!rx->key ||
- (rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP &&
- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256 &&
- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP &&
- rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256))
+ if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+ /* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */
+ if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
pn[i]++;
if (pn[i])
break;
}
- queue = rx->security_idx;
- rpn = rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue];
+
+ rpn = rx->ccm_gcm.pn;
if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ } else if (entry->is_protected &&
+ (!rx->key ||
+ (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc) &&
+ !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) ||
+ rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
+ /* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
+ * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
+ * lost cause anyway.
+ */
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ } else if (entry->is_protected && rx->key &&
+ entry->key_color != rx->key->color &&
+ (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));
@@ -1948,7 +1991,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
out:
ieee80211_led_rx(rx->local);
- out_no_led:
if (rx->sta)
rx->sta->rx_stats.packets++;
return RX_CONTINUE;
@@ -2105,13 +2147,13 @@ static bool ieee80211_frame_allowed(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, __le16 fc)
struct ethhdr *ehdr = (struct ethhdr *) rx->skb->data;
/*
- * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless
- * of whether the frame was encrypted or not.
+ * Allow EAPOL frames to us/the PAE group address regardless of
+ * whether the frame was encrypted or not, and always disallow
+ * all other destination addresses for them.
*/
- if (ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol &&
- (ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) ||
- ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr)))
- return true;
+ if (unlikely(ehdr->h_proto == rx->sdata->control_port_protocol))
+ return ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, rx->sdata->vif.addr) ||
+ ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, pae_group_addr);
if (ieee80211_802_1x_port_control(rx) ||
ieee80211_drop_unencrypted(rx, fc))
@@ -2140,6 +2182,7 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if ((sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) &&
!(sdata->flags & IEEE80211_SDATA_DONT_BRIDGE_PACKETS) &&
+ ehdr->h_proto != rx->sdata->control_port_protocol &&
(sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN || !sdata->u.vlan.sta)) {
if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ehdr->h_dest)) {
/*
@@ -2192,9 +2235,30 @@ ieee80211_deliver_skb(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
#endif
if (skb) {
+ struct ethhdr *ehdr = (void *)skb_mac_header(skb);
+
/* deliver to local stack */
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb));
+
+ /*
+ * 802.1X over 802.11 requires that the authenticator address
+ * be used for EAPOL frames. However, 802.1X allows the use of
+ * the PAE group address instead. If the interface is part of
+ * a bridge and we pass the frame with the PAE group address,
+ * then the bridge will forward it to the network (even if the
+ * client was not associated yet), which isn't supposed to
+ * happen.
+ * To avoid that, rewrite the destination address to our own
+ * address, so that the authenticator (e.g. hostapd) will see
+ * the frame, but bridge won't forward it anywhere else. Note
+ * that due to earlier filtering, the only other address can
+ * be the PAE group address.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(skb->protocol == sdata->control_port_protocol &&
+ !ether_addr_equal(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr)))
+ ether_addr_copy(ehdr->h_dest, sdata->vif.addr);
+
if (rx->napi)
napi_gro_receive(rx->napi, skb);
else
@@ -2258,6 +2322,23 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_amsdu(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
if (skb_linearize(skb))
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ if (rx->key) {
+ /*
+ * We should not receive A-MSDUs on pre-HT connections,
+ * and HT connections cannot use old ciphers. Thus drop
+ * them, as in those cases we couldn't even have SPP
+ * A-MSDUs or such.
+ */
+ switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) {
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
+ case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
+ return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(skb, &frame_list, dev->dev_addr,
rx->sdata->vif.type,
rx->local->hw.extra_tx_headroom, true);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
index c4b192e7f48f..5f2c8aeb9bd3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
@@ -356,6 +356,8 @@ struct sta_info *sta_info_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
sta->sdata = sdata;
sta->rx_stats.last_rx = jiffies;
+ ieee80211_init_frag_cache(&sta->frags);
+
sta->sta_state = IEEE80211_STA_NONE;
/* Mark TID as unreserved */
@@ -975,6 +977,8 @@ static void __sta_info_destroy_part2(struct sta_info *sta)
ieee80211_sta_debugfs_remove(sta);
ieee80211_recalc_min_chandef(sdata);
+ ieee80211_destroy_frag_cache(&sta->frags);
+
cleanup_single_sta(sta);
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
index 15b0150283b6..b2e5928b1f7b 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
@@ -324,6 +324,34 @@ struct mesh_sta {
DECLARE_EWMA(signal, 1024, 8)
+/*
+ * IEEE 802.11-2016 (10.6 "Defragmentation") recommends support for "concurrent
+ * reception of at least one MSDU per access category per associated STA"
+ * on APs, or "at least one MSDU per access category" on other interface types.
+ *
+ * This limit can be increased by changing this define, at the cost of slower
+ * frame reassembly and increased memory use while fragments are pending.
+ */
+#define IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX 4
+
+struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
+ struct sk_buff_head skb_list;
+ unsigned long first_frag_time;
+ u16 seq;
+ u16 extra_len;
+ u16 last_frag;
+ u8 rx_queue;
+ u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+ is_protected:1;
+ u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
+ unsigned int key_color;
+};
+
+struct ieee80211_fragment_cache {
+ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry entries[IEEE80211_FRAGMENT_MAX];
+ unsigned int next;
+};
+
/**
* struct sta_info - STA information
*
@@ -384,6 +412,7 @@ DECLARE_EWMA(signal, 1024, 8)
* @tx_stats: TX statistics
* @rx_stats: RX statistics
* @status_stats: TX status statistics
+ * @frags: fragment cache
*/
struct sta_info {
/* General information, mostly static */
@@ -493,6 +522,8 @@ struct sta_info {
struct cfg80211_chan_def tdls_chandef;
+ struct ieee80211_fragment_cache frags;
+
/* keep last! */
struct ieee80211_sta sta;
};
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index cb439e06919f..921115327ec8 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
update_iv:
/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32;
+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
return RX_CONTINUE;
@@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
key, skb->data + hdrlen,
skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
- &rx->tkip_iv32,
- &rx->tkip_iv16);
+ &rx->tkip.iv32,
+ &rx->tkip.iv16);
if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
@@ -553,6 +553,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
}
memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
+ memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
}
/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
@@ -784,6 +786,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
}
memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+ if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
+ memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
}
/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */