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authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>2018-05-03 13:45:58 -0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2018-05-16 10:06:51 +0200
commit0df23e9b9b2f0293b873145bd22d218d2940dfaa (patch)
tree19f4369b74d2d3847e7605a4ba17b87aa7313519 /net/rds/tcp_recv.c
parent787bbee29326dce2f0ddd1c0d5b4fbc088849e13 (diff)
net: atm: Fix potential Spectre v1
commit acf784bd0ce257fe43da7ca266f7a10b837479d2 upstream. ioc_data.dev_num can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: net/atm/lec.c:702 lec_vcc_attach() warn: potential spectre issue 'dev_lec' Fix this by sanitizing ioc_data.dev_num before using it to index dev_lec. Also, notice that there is another instance in which array dev_lec is being indexed using ioc_data.dev_num at line 705: lec_vcc_added(netdev_priv(dev_lec[ioc_data.dev_num]), Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rds/tcp_recv.c')
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