diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 85 |
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index d311c635a00e..7f4e5cba0b13 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ #include <asm/esr.h> #include <asm/irq.h> #include <asm/memory.h> +#include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/thread_info.h> +#include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> /* @@ -109,6 +111,34 @@ mrs x22, elr_el1 mrs x23, spsr_el1 stp lr, x21, [sp, #S_LR] + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN + /* + * Set the TTBR0 PAN bit in SPSR. When the exception is taken from + * EL0, there is no need to check the state of TTBR0_EL1 since + * accesses are always enabled. + * Note that the meaning of this bit differs from the ARMv8.1 PAN + * feature as all TTBR0_EL1 accesses are disabled, not just those to + * user mappings. + */ +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_PAN + nop +alternative_else + b 1f // skip TTBR0 PAN +alternative_endif + + .if \el != 0 + mrs x21, ttbr0_el1 + tst x21, #0xffff << 48 // Check for the reserved ASID + orr x23, x23, #PSR_PAN_BIT // Set the emulated PAN in the saved SPSR + b.eq 1f // TTBR0 access already disabled + and x23, x23, #~PSR_PAN_BIT // Clear the emulated PAN in the saved SPSR + .endif + + uaccess_ttbr0_disable x21 +1: +#endif + stp x22, x23, [sp, #S_PC] /* @@ -147,6 +177,42 @@ ldp x21, x22, [sp, #S_PC] // load ELR, SPSR .if \el == 0 ct_user_enter + .endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN + /* + * Restore access to TTBR0_EL1. If returning to EL0, no need for SPSR + * PAN bit checking. + */ +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_PAN + nop +alternative_else + b 2f // skip TTBR0 PAN +alternative_endif + + .if \el != 0 + tbnz x22, #_PSR_PAN_BIT, 1f // Skip re-enabling TTBR0 access if previously disabled + .endif + + uaccess_ttbr0_enable x0 + + .if \el == 0 + /* + * Enable errata workarounds only if returning to user. The only + * workaround currently required for TTBR0_EL1 changes are for the + * Cavium erratum 27456 (broadcast TLBI instructions may cause I-cache + * corruption). + */ + post_ttbr0_update_workaround + .endif +1: + .if \el != 0 + and x22, x22, #~PSR_PAN_BIT // ARMv8.0 CPUs do not understand this bit + .endif +2: +#endif + + .if \el == 0 ldr x23, [sp, #S_SP] // load return stack pointer msr sp_el0, x23 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_845719 @@ -168,6 +234,7 @@ alternative_else alternative_endif #endif .endif + msr elr_el1, x21 // set up the return data msr spsr_el1, x22 ldp x0, x1, [sp, #16 * 0] @@ -190,10 +257,6 @@ alternative_endif eret // return to kernel .endm - .macro get_thread_info, rd - mrs \rd, sp_el0 - .endm - .macro irq_stack_entry mov x19, sp // preserve the original sp @@ -258,6 +321,7 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info /* * Exception vectors. */ + .pushsection ".entry.text", "ax" .align 11 ENTRY(vectors) @@ -293,7 +357,7 @@ END(vectors) * Invalid mode handlers */ .macro inv_entry, el, reason, regsize = 64 - kernel_entry el, \regsize + kernel_entry \el, \regsize mov x0, sp mov x1, #\reason mrs x2, esr_el1 @@ -355,6 +419,8 @@ el1_sync: lsr x24, x1, #ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT // exception class cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR // data abort in EL1 b.eq el1_da + cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR // instruction abort in EL1 + b.eq el1_ia cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64 // configurable trap b.eq el1_undef cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_SP_ALIGN // stack alignment exception @@ -366,6 +432,11 @@ el1_sync: cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_BREAKPT_CUR // debug exception in EL1 b.ge el1_dbg b el1_inv + +el1_ia: + /* + * Fall through to the Data abort case + */ el1_da: /* * Data abort handling @@ -551,7 +622,7 @@ el0_ia: enable_dbg_and_irq ct_user_exit mov x0, x26 - orr x1, x25, #1 << 24 // use reserved ISS bit for instruction aborts + mov x1, x25 mov x2, sp bl do_mem_abort b ret_to_user @@ -820,6 +891,8 @@ __ni_sys_trace: bl do_ni_syscall b __sys_trace_return + .popsection // .entry.text + /* * Special system call wrappers. */ |