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2016-09-02ANDROID: base-cfg: drop SECCOMP_FILTER configAmit Pundir
Don't need to set SECCOMP_FILTER explicitly since CONFIG_SECCOMP=y will select that config anyway. Fixes: a49dcf2e745c ("ANDROID: base-cfg: enable SECCOMP config") Change-Id: Iff18ed4d2db5a55b9f9480d5ecbeef7b818b3837 Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-09-01UPSTREAM: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's readyMathias Krause
(cherry picked from commit 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3) If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written. Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables(). This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when env_end is still zero. The expected consequence is that userland trying to access /proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment variables. Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363 Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461 Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com> Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Change-Id: Ia2f58d48c15478ed4b6e237b63e704c70ff21e96 Bug: 30951939
2016-09-01UPSTREAM: [media] xc2028: unlock on error in xc2028_set_config()Dan Carpenter
(cherry picked from commit 210bd104c6acd31c3c6b8b075b3f12d4a9f6b60d) We have to unlock before returning -ENOMEM. Fixes: 8dfbcc4351a0 ('[media] xc2028: avoid use after free') Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Change-Id: I7b6ba9fde5c6e29467e6de23d398af2fe56e2547 Bug: 30946097
2016-09-01UPSTREAM: [media] xc2028: avoid use after freeMauro Carvalho Chehab
(cherry picked from commit 8dfbcc4351a0b6d2f2d77f367552f48ffefafe18) If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name, the following trouble may happen: [11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner [11009.907491] ================================================================== [11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40 [11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992 [11009.907994] ============================================================================= [11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected [11009.907999] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992 [11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0 [11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90 [11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350 [11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] [11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60 [11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200 [11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0 [11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0 [11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560 [11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0 [11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900 [11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830 [11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30 [11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5 [11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550 [11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50 [11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992 [11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460 [11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280 [11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 [11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080 [11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001 [11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(...... [11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j.... [11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43 [11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015 [11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80 [11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280 [11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4 [11009.908158] Call Trace: [11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64 [11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150 [11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40 [11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550 [11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290 [11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50 [11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0 [11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30 [11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x] [11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x] [11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10 [11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80 [11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0 [11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0 [11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0 [11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0 [11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0 [11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360 [11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0 [11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0 [11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300 [11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290 [11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400 [11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300 [11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20 [11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70 [11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000 [11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40 [11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0 [11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50 [11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20 [11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50 [11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0 [11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0 [11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14 [11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 [11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address: [11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908405] ^ [11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908411] ================================================================== In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if the memory allocation fails. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Change-Id: I945c841dcfb45de2056267e4aa50bbe176b527cf Bug: 30946097
2016-09-01UPSTREAM: block: fix use-after-free in seq fileVegard Nossum
(cherry picked from commit 77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84) I got a KASAN report of use-after-free: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315 ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520 __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0 disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 traverse+0x176/0x860 seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0 proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 do_preadv+0x126/0x170 SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315 __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0 kfree+0x20a/0x220 disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 traverse+0x3b5/0x860 seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0 proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 do_preadv+0x126/0x170 SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480 ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480 ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84 [<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 [<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520 [<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 [<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50 [<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0 [<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 [<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 [<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 [<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 [<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170 [<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 This problem can occur in the following situation: open() - pread() - .seq_start() - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds - seqf->private = iter - .seq_stop() - kfree(seqf->private) - pread() - .seq_start() - iter = kmalloc() // fails - .seq_stop() - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq iteration stops. An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Change-Id: I07b33f4b38341f60a37806cdd45b0a0c3ab4d84d Bug: 30942273
2016-09-01UPSTREAM: assoc_array: don't call compare_object() on a nodeJerome Marchand
(cherry picked from commit 8d4a2ec1e0b41b0cf9a0c5cd4511da7f8e4f3de2) Changes since V1: fixed the description and added KASan warning. In assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(), we call the compare_object() method on all non-empty slots, even when they're not leaves, passing a pointer to an unexpected structure to compare_object(). Currently it causes an out-of-bound read access in keyring_compare_object detected by KASan (see below). The issue is easily reproduced with keyutils testsuite. Only call compare_object() when the slot is a leave. KASan warning: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 at addr ffff880060a6f838 Read of size 8 by task keyctl/1655 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-192 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60 age=69 cpu=1 pid=1647 ___slab_alloc+0x563/0x5c0 __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x263/0x300 assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60 __key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270 key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0 SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001829b80 objects=16 used=8 fp=0xffff880060a6f550 flags=0x3fff8000004080 INFO: Object 0xffff880060a6f740 @offset=5952 fp=0xffff880060a6e5d1 Bytes b4 ffff880060a6f730: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f740: d1 e5 a6 60 00 88 ff ff 0e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...`............ Object ffff880060a6f750: 02 cf 8e 60 00 88 ff ff 02 c0 8e 60 00 88 ff ff ...`.......`.... Object ffff880060a6f760: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f770: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f790: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7d0: 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ CPU: 0 PID: 1655 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.5.0-rc4-kasan+ #291 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 000000001b2800b4 ffff880060a179e0 ffffffff81b60491 ffff88006c802900 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a17a10 ffffffff815e2969 ffff88006c802900 ffffea0001829b80 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a6e650 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81b60491>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [<ffffffff815e2969>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150 [<ffffffff815e9454>] object_err+0x34/0x40 [<ffffffff815ebe50>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550 [<ffffffff819949be>] ? keyring_get_key_chunk+0x13e/0x210 [<ffffffff815ec62d>] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x5d/0x70 [<ffffffff81994cc3>] ? keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 [<ffffffff81994cc3>] keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 [<ffffffff81bc238c>] assoc_array_insert+0x86c/0x3a60 [<ffffffff81bc1b20>] ? assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff8199797d>] ? __key_link_begin+0x20d/0x270 [<ffffffff8199786c>] __key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270 [<ffffffff81993389>] key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0 [<ffffffff8128ce0d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff81992f30>] ? key_type_lookup+0xc0/0xc0 [<ffffffff8199e19d>] ? lookup_user_key+0x13d/0xcd0 [<ffffffff81534763>] ? memdup_user+0x53/0x80 [<ffffffff819983ea>] SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350 [<ffffffff81998230>] ? key_get_type_from_user.constprop.6+0xa0/0xa0 [<ffffffff828bcf4e>] ? retint_user+0x18/0x23 [<ffffffff8128cc7e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3fe/0x580 [<ffffffff81004017>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x17/0x19 [<ffffffff828bc432>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880060a6f700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc >ffff880060a6f800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff880060a6f880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff880060a6f900: fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Change-Id: I903935a221a5b9fb14cec14ef64bd2b6fa8eb222 Bug: 30513364
2016-09-01ANDROID: base-cfg: enable SECCOMP configYongqin Liu
Enable following seccomp configs CONFIG_SECCOMP=y CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y Otherwise we will get mediacode error like this on Android N: E /system/bin/mediaextractor: libminijail: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER): Invalid argument Change-Id: I2477b6a2cfdded5c0ebf6ffbb6150b0e5fe2ba12 Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-08-31ANDROID: rcu_sync: Export rcu_sync_lockdep_assertGuenter Roeck
x86_64:allmodconfig fails to build with the following error. ERROR: "rcu_sync_lockdep_assert" [kernel/locking/locktorture.ko] undefined! Introduced by commit 3228c5eb7af2 ("RFC: FROMLIST: locking/percpu-rwsem: Optimize readers and reduce global impact"). The applied upstream version exports the missing symbol, so let's do the same. Change-Id: If4e516715c3415fe8c82090f287174857561550d Fixes: 3228c5eb7af2 ("RFC: FROMLIST: locking/percpu-rwsem: Optimize ...") Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
2016-08-30UPSTREAM: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checkingBadhri Jagan Sridharan
commit 8835ba4a39cf53f705417b3b3a94eb067673f2c9 upstream. An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check to the code path for quirky devices. BUG: 28242610 Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I9a5f7f3c704b65e866335054f470451fcfae9d1c
2016-08-30UPSTREAM: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptorsBadhri Jagan Sridharan
commit 4ec0ef3a82125efc36173062a50624550a900ae0 upstream. The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface before using it. The full report of this issue can be found here: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87 BUG: 28242610 Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: If5161c23928e9ef77cb3359cba9b36622b1908df
2016-08-30UPSTREAM: USB: usb_driver_claim_interface: add sanity checkingBadhri Jagan Sridharan
commit 0b818e3956fc1ad976bee791eadcbb3b5fec5bfd upstream. Attacks that trick drivers into passing a NULL pointer to usb_driver_claim_interface() using forged descriptors are known. This thwarts them by sanity checking. BUG: 28242610 Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: Ib43ec5edb156985a9db941785a313f6801df092a
2016-08-30UPSTREAM: USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probeBadhri Jagan Sridharan
commit 4e9a0b05257f29cf4b75f3209243ed71614d062e upstream. An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This patch checks for the existence of a second port. CVE-2016-3136 BUG: 28242610 Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com> [johan: add error message ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I284ad648c2087c34a098d67e0cc6d948a568413c
2016-08-30UPSTREAM: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity checkBadhri Jagan Sridharan
commit c55aee1bf0e6b6feec8b2927b43f7a09a6d5f754 upstream. An attack using missing endpoints exists. CVE-2016-3137 BUG: 28242610 Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I1cc7957a5924175d24f12fdc41162ece67c907e5
2016-08-30UPSTREAM: Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptorsBadhri Jagan Sridharan
The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of endpoints on the interface before using them. The full report for this issue can be found here: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85 BUG: 28242610 Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I1cb956a35f3bba73324240d5bd0a029f49d3c456
2016-08-30BACKPORT: tcp: enable per-socket rate limiting of all 'challenge acks'Jason Baron
(cherry picked from commit 083ae308280d13d187512b9babe3454342a7987e) The per-socket rate limit for 'challenge acks' was introduced in the context of limiting ack loops: commit f2b2c582e824 ("tcp: mitigate ACK loops for connections as tcp_sock") And I think it can be extended to rate limit all 'challenge acks' on a per-socket basis. Since we have the global tcp_challenge_ack_limit, this patch allows for tcp_challenge_ack_limit to be set to a large value and effectively rely on the per-socket limit, or set tcp_challenge_ack_limit to a lower value and still prevents a single connections from consuming the entire challenge ack quota. It further moves in the direction of eliminating the global limit at some point, as Eric Dumazet has suggested. This a follow-up to: Subject: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu> Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Change-Id: I622d5ae96e9387e775a0196c892d8d0e1a5564a7 Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-08-26RFC: FROMLIST: cgroup: reduce read locked section of ↵Balbir Singh
cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem during fork cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem is acquired in read mode during process exit and fork. It is also grabbed in write mode during __cgroups_proc_write(). I've recently run into a scenario with lots of memory pressure and OOM and I am beginning to see systemd __switch_to+0x1f8/0x350 __schedule+0x30c/0x990 schedule+0x48/0xc0 percpu_down_write+0x114/0x170 __cgroup_procs_write.isra.12+0xb8/0x3c0 cgroup_file_write+0x74/0x1a0 kernfs_fop_write+0x188/0x200 __vfs_write+0x6c/0xe0 vfs_write+0xc0/0x230 SyS_write+0x6c/0x110 system_call+0x38/0xb4 This thread is waiting on the reader of cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem to exit. The reader itself is under memory pressure and has gone into reclaim after fork. There are times the reader also ends up waiting on oom_lock as well. __switch_to+0x1f8/0x350 __schedule+0x30c/0x990 schedule+0x48/0xc0 jbd2_log_wait_commit+0xd4/0x180 ext4_evict_inode+0x88/0x5c0 evict+0xf8/0x2a0 dispose_list+0x50/0x80 prune_icache_sb+0x6c/0x90 super_cache_scan+0x190/0x210 shrink_slab.part.15+0x22c/0x4c0 shrink_zone+0x288/0x3c0 do_try_to_free_pages+0x1dc/0x590 try_to_free_pages+0xdc/0x260 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x72c/0xc90 alloc_pages_current+0xb4/0x1a0 page_table_alloc+0xc0/0x170 __pte_alloc+0x58/0x1f0 copy_page_range+0x4ec/0x950 copy_process.isra.5+0x15a0/0x1870 _do_fork+0xa8/0x4b0 ppc_clone+0x8/0xc In the meanwhile, all processes exiting/forking are blocked almost stalling the system. This patch moves the threadgroup_change_begin from before cgroup_fork() to just before cgroup_canfork(). There is no nee to worry about threadgroup changes till the task is actually added to the threadgroup. This avoids having to call reclaim with cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem held. tj: Subject and description edits. Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com> Acked-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> [jstultz: Cherry-picked from: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup.git 568ac888215c7f] Change-Id: Ie8ece84fb613cf6a7b08cea1468473a8df2b9661 Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2016-08-26RFC: FROMLIST: cgroup: avoid synchronize_sched() in __cgroup_procs_write()Peter Zijlstra
The current percpu-rwsem read side is entirely free of serializing insns at the cost of having a synchronize_sched() in the write path. The latency of the synchronize_sched() is too high for cgroups. The commit 1ed1328792ff talks about the write path being a fairly cold path but this is not the case for Android which moves task to the foreground cgroup and back around binder IPC calls from foreground processes to background processes, so it is significantly hotter than human initiated operations. Switch cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem into the slow mode for now to avoid the problem, hopefully it should not be that slow after another commit 80127a39681b ("locking/percpu-rwsem: Optimize readers and reduce global impact"). We could just add rcu_sync_enter() into cgroup_init() but we do not want another synchronize_sched() at boot time, so this patch adds the new helper which doesn't block but currently can only be called before the first use. Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reported-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> [jstultz: backported to 4.4] Change-Id: I34aa9c394d3052779b56976693e96d861bd255f2 Mailing-list-URL: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/11/557 Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2016-08-26RFC: FROMLIST: locking/percpu-rwsem: Optimize readers and reduce global impactPeter Zijlstra
Currently the percpu-rwsem switches to (global) atomic ops while a writer is waiting; which could be quite a while and slows down releasing the readers. This patch cures this problem by ordering the reader-state vs reader-count (see the comments in __percpu_down_read() and percpu_down_write()). This changes a global atomic op into a full memory barrier, which doesn't have the global cacheline contention. This also enables using the percpu-rwsem with rcu_sync disabled in order to bias the implementation differently, reducing the writer latency by adding some cost to readers. Mailing-list-URL: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/9/181 Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> [jstultz: Backported to 4.4] Change-Id: I8ea04b4dca2ec36f1c2469eccafde1423490572f Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2016-08-26net: ipv6: Fix ping to link-local addresses.Lorenzo Colitti
ping_v6_sendmsg does not set flowi6_oif in response to sin6_scope_id or sk_bound_dev_if, so it is not possible to use these APIs to ping an IPv6 address on a different interface. Instead, it sets flowi6_iif, which is incorrect but harmless. Stop setting flowi6_iif, and support various ways of setting oif in the same priority order used by udpv6_sendmsg. [Backport of net 5e457896986e16c440c97bb94b9ccd95dd157292] Bug: 29370996 Change-Id: Ibe1b9434c00ed96f1e30acb110734c6570b087b8 Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/254470/ Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-26ipv6: fix endianness error in icmpv6_errHannes Frederic Sowa
IPv6 ping socket error handler doesn't correctly convert the new 32 bit mtu to host endianness before using. [Cherry-pick of net dcb94b88c09ce82a80e188d49bcffdc83ba215a6] Bug: 29370996 Change-Id: Iea0ca79f16c2a1366d82b3b0a3097093d18da8b7 Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Fixes: 6d0bfe22611602f ("net: ipv6: Add IPv6 support to the ping socket.") Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-25ANDROID: dm: android-verity: Allow android-verity to be compiled as an ↵Badhri Jagan Sridharan
independent module Exports the device mapper callbacks of linear and dm-verity-target methods. Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I0358be0615c431dce3cc78575aaac4ccfe3aacd7
2016-08-25Revert "Android: MMC/UFS IO Latency Histograms."Mohamad Ayyash
This reverts commit 8d525c512280bb7d8218fd59c04de985b1886eca. Change-Id: I69350b98d9de9b1c9f591e03a90f133e328ba72a
2016-08-24Android: MMC/UFS IO Latency Histograms.Mohan Srinivasan
This patch adds a new sysfs node (latency_hist) and reports IO (svc time) latency histograms. Disabled by default, can be enabled by echoing 0 into latency_hist, stats can be cleared by writing 2 into latency_hist. Bug: 30677035 Change-Id: I625938135ea33e6e87cf6af1fc7edc136d8b4b32 Signed-off-by: Mohan Srinivasan <srmohan@google.com>
2016-08-24UPSTREAM: af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsgRainer Weikusat
(cherry picked from commit a5527dda344fff0514b7989ef7a755729769daa1) The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) { to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of the unix_peer_get but disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other). In both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk check to guard against this. Fixes: 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue") Reported-By: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de> Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> Tested-by: Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@pmhahn.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Change-Id: I4ebef6a390df3487903b166b837e34c653e01cb2 Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-08-22UPSTREAM: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctlsTakashi Iwai
(cherry picked from commit af368027a49a751d6ff4ee9e3f9961f35bb4fede) ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl. The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to serialize there. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Change-Id: I1ac52f1cba5e7408fd88c8fc1c30ca2e83967ebb Bug: 28694392
2016-08-16UPSTREAM: tcp: make challenge acks less predictableEric Dumazet
(cherry picked from commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758) Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS (RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic paper. This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes. Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus. Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting to remove the host limit in the future. v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period. Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2") Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Change-Id: Ib46ba66f5e4a5a7c81bfccd7b0aa83c3d9e1b3bb Bug: 30809774
2016-08-15UPSTREAM: usb: gadget: configfs: add mutex lock before unregister gadgetWinter Wang
There may be a race condition if f_fs calls unregister_gadget_item in ffs_closed() when unregister_gadget is called by UDC store at the same time. this leads to a kernel NULL pointer dereference: [ 310.644928] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004 [ 310.645053] init: Service 'adbd' is being killed... [ 310.658938] pgd = c9528000 [ 310.662515] [00000004] *pgd=19451831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 [ 310.669702] Internal error: Oops: 817 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [ 310.675211] Modules linked in: [ 310.678294] CPU: 0 PID: 1537 Comm: ->transport Not tainted 4.1.15-03725-g793404c #2 [ 310.685958] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) [ 310.692493] task: c8e24200 ti: c945e000 task.ti: c945e000 [ 310.697911] PC is at usb_gadget_unregister_driver+0xb4/0xd0 [ 310.703502] LR is at __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10c/0x16c [ 310.708648] pc : [<c075efc0>] lr : [<c0bfb0bc>] psr: 600f0113 <snip..> [ 311.565585] [<c075efc0>] (usb_gadget_unregister_driver) from [<c075e2b8>] (unregister_gadget_item+0x1c/0x34) [ 311.575426] [<c075e2b8>] (unregister_gadget_item) from [<c076fcc8>] (ffs_closed+0x8c/0x9c) [ 311.583702] [<c076fcc8>] (ffs_closed) from [<c07736b8>] (ffs_data_reset+0xc/0xa0) [ 311.591194] [<c07736b8>] (ffs_data_reset) from [<c07738ac>] (ffs_data_closed+0x90/0xd0) [ 311.599208] [<c07738ac>] (ffs_data_closed) from [<c07738f8>] (ffs_ep0_release+0xc/0x14) [ 311.607224] [<c07738f8>] (ffs_ep0_release) from [<c023e030>] (__fput+0x80/0x1d0) [ 311.614635] [<c023e030>] (__fput) from [<c014e688>] (task_work_run+0xb0/0xe8) [ 311.621788] [<c014e688>] (task_work_run) from [<c010afdc>] (do_work_pending+0x7c/0xa4) [ 311.629718] [<c010afdc>] (do_work_pending) from [<c010770c>] (work_pending+0xc/0x20) for functions using functionFS, i.e. android adbd will close /dev/usb-ffs/adb/ep0 when usb IO thread fails, but switch adb from on to off also triggers write "none" > UDC. These 2 operations both call unregister_gadget, which will lead to the panic above. add a mutex before calling unregister_gadget for api used in f_fs. Signed-off-by: Winter Wang <wente.wang@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
2016-08-12ANDROID: dm-verity: adopt changes made to dm callbacksBadhri Jagan Sridharan
v4.4 introduced changes to the callbacks used for dm-linear and dm-verity-target targets. Move to those headers in dm-android-verity. Verified on hikey while having BOARD_USES_RECOVERY_AS_BOOT := true BOARD_BUILD_SYSTEM_ROOT_IMAGE := true BUG: 27339727 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: Ic64950c3b55f0a6eaa570bcedc2ace83bbf3005e
2016-08-12UPSTREAM: ecryptfs: fix handling of directory openingAl Viro
(cherry picked from commit 6a480a7842545ec520a91730209ec0bae41694c1) First of all, trying to open them r/w is idiocy; it's guaranteed to fail. Moreover, assigning ->f_pos and assuming that everything will work is blatantly broken - try that with e.g. tmpfs as underlying layer and watch the fireworks. There may be a non-trivial amount of state associated with current IO position, well beyond the numeric offset. Using the single struct file associated with underlying inode is really not a good idea; we ought to open one for each ecryptfs directory struct file. Additionally, file_operations both for directories and non-directories are full of pointless methods; non-directories should *not* have ->iterate(), directories should not have ->flush(), ->fasync() and ->splice_read(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Change-Id: I4813ce803f270fdd364758ce1dc108b76eab226e Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-08-12UPSTREAM: ecryptfs: don't allow mmap when the lower fs doesn't support itJeff Mahoney
(cherry picked from commit f0fe970df3838c202ef6c07a4c2b36838ef0a88b) There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems that don't offer support natively. CVE-2016-1583 Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org [tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()] Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Change-Id: I66e3670771630a25b0608f10019d1584e9ce73a6 Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-08-12UPSTREAM: Revert "ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler"Jeff Mahoney
(cherry picked from commit 78c4e172412de5d0456dc00d2b34050aa0b683b5) This reverts upstream commit 2f36db71009304b3f0b95afacd8eba1f9f046b87. It fixed a local root exploit but also introduced a dependency on the lower file system implementing an mmap operation just to open a file, which is a bit of a heavy hammer. The right fix is to have mmap depend on the existence of the mmap handler instead. Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Fixes: Change-Id I0be77c7f8bd3046bc34cd87ef577529792d479bc ("UPSTREAM: ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler") Change-Id: Ib9bc87099f7f89e4e12dbc1a79e884dcadb1befb Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-08-12ANDROID: net: core: fix UID-based routingAmit Pundir
Fix RTA_UID enum to match it with the Android userspace code which assumes RTA_UID=18. With this patch all Android kernel networking unit tests mentioned here https://source.android.com/devices/tech/config/kernel_network_tests.html are success. Without this patch multinetwork_test.py unit test fails. Change-Id: I3ff36670f7d4e5bf5f01dce584ae9d53deabb3ed Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-08-12ANDROID: net: fib: remove duplicate assignmentAmit Pundir
Remove duplicate FRA_GOTO assignment. Fixes: fd2cf795f3ab ("net: core: Support UID-based routing.") Change-Id: I462c24b16fdef42ae2332571a0b95de3ef9d2e25 Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
2016-08-11FROMLIST: proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting selfJohn Stultz
In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't. Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns (which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method). This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking the CAP_SYS_NICE value. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com> Mailing-list-url: http://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg2317488.html Change-Id: Ia3e8aff07c2d41f55b6617502d33c39b7d781aac Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm verity fec: pack the fec_header structureJeremy Compostella
The fec_header structure is generated build time and stored on disk. The fec_header might be build on a 64 bits machine while it is read per a 32 bits device or the other way around. In such situations, the fec_header fields are not aligned as expected by the device and it fails to read the fec_header structure. This patch makes the fec_header packed. Change-Id: Idb84453e70cc11abd5ef3a0adfbb16f8b5feaf06 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Compostella <jeremy.compostella@intel.com>
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: android-verity: Verify header before fetching tableBadhri Jagan Sridharan
Move header validation logic before reading the verity_table as an invalid header implies the table is invalid as well. (Cherry-picked from: https://partner-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/625203) BUG: 29940612 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: Ib34d25c0854202f3e70df0a6d0ef1d96f0250c8e
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: allow adb disable-verity only in userdebugBadhri Jagan Sridharan
adb disable-verity was allowed when the phone is in the unlocked state. Since the driver is now aware of the build variant, honor "adb disable-verity" only in userdebug builds. (Cherry-picked from https://partner-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/622117) BUG: 29276559 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I7ce9f38d8c7a62361392c5a8ccebb288f8a3a2ea
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: mount as linear target if eng buildBadhri Jagan Sridharan
eng builds dont have verity enabled i.e it does even have verity metadata appended to the parition. Therefore add rootdev as linear device and map the entire partition if build variant is "eng". (Cherry-picked based on https://partner-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/618690/) BUG: 29276559 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I8f5c2289b842b820ca04f5773525e5449bb3f355
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: use default verity public keyBadhri Jagan Sridharan
If the dm-android-verity target does not provide a default key try using the default public key from the system keyring. The defualt verity keyid is passed as a kernel command line argument veritykeyid=. The order of the dm-android-verity params have been reversed to facilitate the change. Old format example: dm="system none ro,0 1 android-verity Android:#7e4333f9bba00adfe0ede979e28ed1920492b40f /dev/mmcblk0p43" New formats supported: dm="system none ro,0 1 android-verity /dev/mmcblk0p43 Android:#7e4333f9bba00adfe0ede979e28ed1920492b40f" (or) dm="system none ro,0 1 android-verity /dev/mmcblk0p43" when veritykeyid= is set in the kernel command line. BUG: 28384658 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I506c89b053d835ab579e703eef2bc1f8487250de (cherry picked from commit c5c74d0327729f35b576564976885596c6d0e7fb)
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: fix signature verification flagBadhri Jagan Sridharan
The bug was that the signature verification was only happening when verity was disabled. It should always happen when verity is enabled. Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I2d9354e240d36ea06fc68c2d18d8e87b823a4c2f (cherry picked from commit 5364b5ca0b1a12a58283b51408e43fc36d4e4fe7)
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: use name_to_dev_tJeremy Compostella
This patch makes android_verity_ctr() parse its block device string parameter with name_to_dev_t(). It allows the use of less hardware related block device reference like PARTUUID for instance. Change-Id: Idb84453e70cc11abd5ef3a0adfbb16f8b5feaf07 Signed-off-by: Jeremy Compostella <jeremy.compostella@intel.com>
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: rename dm-linear methods for dm-android-verityBadhri Jagan Sridharan
This keeps linear_target as static variable and just exposes the linear target methods for android-verity Cherry-picked: https://android-review.googlesource.com/#/c/212858 Change-Id: I4a377e417b00afd9ecccdb3e605fea31a7df112e Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> (cherry picked from commit a6d1b091f40b25d97849487e29ec097bc5f568dd)
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: Minor cleanupBadhri Jagan Sridharan
Compacts the linear device arguments removing the unnecessary variables. Bug: 27175947 Change-Id: I157170eebe3c0f89a68ae05870a1060f188d0da0 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: Mounting root as linear device when verity disabledBadhri Jagan Sridharan
This CL makes android-verity target to be added as linear dm device if when bootloader is unlocked and verity is disabled. Bug: 27175947 Change-Id: Ic41ca4b8908fb2777263799cf3a3e25934d70f18 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm-android-verity: Rebase on top of 4.1Badhri Jagan Sridharan
Following CLs in upstream causes minor changes to dm-android-verity target. 1. keys: change asymmetric keys to use common hash definitions 2. block: Abstract out bvec iterator Rebase dm-android-verity on top of these changes. Bug: 27175947 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: Icfdc3e7b3ead5de335a059cade1aca70414db415
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: Add android verity targetBadhri Jagan Sridharan
This device-mapper target is virtually a VERITY target. This target is setup by reading the metadata contents piggybacked to the actual data blocks in the block device. The signature of the metadata contents are verified against the key included in the system keyring. Upon success, the underlying verity target is setup. BUG: 27175947 Change-Id: I7e99644a0960ac8279f02c0158ed20999510ea97 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com>
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: fix dm_substitute_devices()Jeremy Compostella
When candidate is the last parameter, candidate_end points to the '\0' character and not the DM_FIELD_SEP character. In such a situation, we should not move the candidate_end pointer one character backward. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Compostella <jeremy.compostella@intel.com>
2016-08-10ANDROID: dm: Rebase on top of 4.1Badhri Jagan Sridharan
1. "dm: optimize use SRCU and RCU" removes the use of dm_table_put. 2. "dm: remove request-based logic from make_request_fn wrapper" necessitates calling dm_setup_md_queue or else the request_queue's make_request_fn pointer ends being unset. [ 7.711600] Internal error: Oops - bad mode: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 7.717519] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.1.15-02273-gb057d16-dirty #33 [ 7.726559] Hardware name: HiKey Development Board (DT) [ 7.731779] task: ffffffc005f8acc0 ti: ffffffc005f8c000 task.ti: ffffffc005f8c000 [ 7.739257] PC is at 0x0 [ 7.741787] LR is at generic_make_request+0x8c/0x108 .... [ 9.082931] Call trace: [ 9.085372] [< (null)>] (null) [ 9.090074] [<ffffffc0003f4ac0>] submit_bio+0x98/0x1e0 [ 9.095212] [<ffffffc0001e2618>] _submit_bh+0x120/0x1f0 [ 9.096165] cfg80211: Calling CRDA to update world regulatory domain [ 9.106781] [<ffffffc0001e5450>] __bread_gfp+0x94/0x114 [ 9.112004] [<ffffffc00024a748>] ext4_fill_super+0x18c/0x2d64 [ 9.117750] [<ffffffc0001b275c>] mount_bdev+0x194/0x1c0 [ 9.122973] [<ffffffc0002450dc>] ext4_mount+0x14/0x1c [ 9.128021] [<ffffffc0001b29a0>] mount_fs+0x3c/0x194 [ 9.132985] [<ffffffc0001d059c>] vfs_kern_mount+0x4c/0x134 [ 9.138467] [<ffffffc0001d2168>] do_mount+0x204/0xbbc [ 9.143514] [<ffffffc0001d2ec4>] SyS_mount+0x94/0xe8 [ 9.148479] [<ffffffc000c54074>] mount_block_root+0x120/0x24c [ 9.154222] [<ffffffc000c543e8>] mount_root+0x110/0x12c [ 9.159443] [<ffffffc000c54574>] prepare_namespace+0x170/0x1b8 [ 9.165273] [<ffffffc000c53d98>] kernel_init_freeable+0x23c/0x260 [ 9.171365] [<ffffffc0009b1748>] kernel_init+0x10/0x118 [ 9.176589] Code: bad PC value [ 9.179807] ---[ end trace 75e1bc52ba364d13 ]--- Bug: 27175947 Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <Badhri@google.com> Change-Id: I952d86fd1475f0825f9be1386e3497b36127abd0
2016-08-10CHROMIUM: dm: boot time specification of dm=Will Drewry
This is a wrap-up of three patches pending upstream approval. I'm bundling them because they are interdependent, and it'll be easier to drop it on rebase later. 1. dm: allow a dm-fs-style device to be shared via dm-ioctl Integrates feedback from Alisdair, Mike, and Kiyoshi. Two main changes occur here: - One function is added which allows for a programmatically created mapped device to be inserted into the dm-ioctl hash table. This binds the device to a name and, optional, uuid which is needed by udev and allows for userspace management of the mapped device. - dm_table_complete() was extended to handle all of the final functional changes required for the table to be operational once called. 2. init: boot to device-mapper targets without an initr* Add a dm= kernel parameter modeled after the md= parameter from do_mounts_md. It allows for device-mapper targets to be configured at boot time for use early in the boot process (as the root device or otherwise). It also replaces /dev/XXX calls with major:minor opportunistically. The format is dm="name uuid ro,table line 1,table line 2,...". The parser expects the comma to be safe to use as a newline substitute but, otherwise, uses the normal separator of space. Some attempt has been made to make it forgiving of additional spaces (using skip_spaces()). A mapped device created during boot will be assigned a minor of 0 and may be access via /dev/dm-0. An example dm-linear root with no uuid may look like: root=/dev/dm-0 dm="lroot none ro, 0 4096 linear /dev/ubdb 0, 4096 4096 linear /dv/ubdc 0" Once udev is started, /dev/dm-0 will become /dev/mapper/lroot. Older upstream threads: http://marc.info/?l=dm-devel&m=127429492521964&w=2 http://marc.info/?l=dm-devel&m=127429499422096&w=2 http://marc.info/?l=dm-devel&m=127429493922000&w=2 Latest upstream threads: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/104859/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/104860/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/104861/ Bug: 27175947 Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2020011 Change-Id: I92bd53432a11241228d2e5ac89a3b20d19b05a31
2016-08-07UPSTREAM: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit pathArnaldo Carvalho de Melo
(cherry picked from commit 34b88a68f26a75e4fded796f1a49c40f82234b7d) The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free: Call Trace: [<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295 [<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261 [< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281 [<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270 [<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it. Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall") http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Change-Id: I2adb0faf595b7b634d9b739dfdd1a47109e20ecb Bug: 30515201
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-16 21:06:18 +0000