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commit 47934e06b65637c88a762d9c98329ae6e3238888 upstream.
In one net namespace, after creating a packet socket without binding
it to a device, users in other net namespaces can observe the new
`packet_type` added by this packet socket by reading `/proc/net/ptype`
file. This is minor information leakage as packet socket is
namespace aware.
Add a net pointer in `packet_type` to keep the net namespace of
of corresponding packet socket. In `ptype_seq_show`, this net pointer
must be checked when it is not NULL.
Fixes: 2feb27dbe00c ("[NETNS]: Minor information leak via /proc/net/ptype file.")
Signed-off-by: Congyu Liu <liu3101@purdue.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b756ad928d98e5ef0b74af7546a6a31a8dadde00 ]
KCSAN reported the following data-race [1]
Adding a couple of READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() should silence it.
Since the report hinted about multiple cpus using the history
concurrently, I added a test avoiding writing on it if the
victim slot already contains the desired value.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in fanout_demux_rollover / fanout_demux_rollover
read to 0xffff8880b01786cc of 4 bytes by task 18921 on cpu 1:
fanout_flow_is_huge net/packet/af_packet.c:1303 [inline]
fanout_demux_rollover+0x33e/0x3f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1353
packet_rcv_fanout+0x34e/0x490 net/packet/af_packet.c:1453
deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1888 [inline]
dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x15b/0x540 net/core/dev.c:1958
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3195 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3f5/0x430 net/core/dev.c:3215
__dev_queue_xmit+0x14ab/0x1b40 net/core/dev.c:3792
dev_queue_xmit+0x21/0x30 net/core/dev.c:3825
neigh_direct_output+0x1f/0x30 net/core/neighbour.c:1530
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
ip6_local_out+0x74/0x90 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179
ip6_send_skb+0x53/0x110 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1795
udp_v6_send_skb.isra.0+0x3ec/0xa70 net/ipv6/udp.c:1173
udpv6_sendmsg+0x1906/0x1c20 net/ipv6/udp.c:1471
inet6_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:576
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657
___sys_sendmsg+0x2b7/0x5d0 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_sendmmsg+0x123/0x350 net/socket.c:2413
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x64/0x80 net/socket.c:2439
do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
write to 0xffff8880b01786cc of 4 bytes by task 18922 on cpu 0:
fanout_flow_is_huge net/packet/af_packet.c:1306 [inline]
fanout_demux_rollover+0x3a4/0x3f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1353
packet_rcv_fanout+0x34e/0x490 net/packet/af_packet.c:1453
deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1888 [inline]
dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x15b/0x540 net/core/dev.c:1958
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3195 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3f5/0x430 net/core/dev.c:3215
__dev_queue_xmit+0x14ab/0x1b40 net/core/dev.c:3792
dev_queue_xmit+0x21/0x30 net/core/dev.c:3825
neigh_direct_output+0x1f/0x30 net/core/neighbour.c:1530
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:511 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0x7a2/0xec0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:116
__ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:142 [inline]
__ip6_finish_output+0x2d7/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:127
ip6_finish_output+0x41/0x160 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:152
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:294 [inline]
ip6_output+0xf2/0x280 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:175
dst_output include/net/dst.h:436 [inline]
ip6_local_out+0x74/0x90 net/ipv6/output_core.c:179
ip6_send_skb+0x53/0x110 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1795
udp_v6_send_skb.isra.0+0x3ec/0xa70 net/ipv6/udp.c:1173
udpv6_sendmsg+0x1906/0x1c20 net/ipv6/udp.c:1471
inet6_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:576
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657
___sys_sendmsg+0x2b7/0x5d0 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_sendmmsg+0x123/0x350 net/socket.c:2413
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x64/0x80 net/socket.c:2439
do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 18922 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: 3b3a5b0aab5b ("packet: rollover huge flows before small flows")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b2cf86e1563e33a14a1c69b3e508d15dc12f804c ]
Packet send checks that msg_name is at least sizeof sockaddr_ll.
Packet recv must return at least this length, so that its output
can be passed unmodified to packet send.
This ceased to be true since adding support for lladdr longer than
sll_addr. Since, the return value uses true address length.
Always return at least sizeof sockaddr_ll, even if address length
is shorter. Zero the padding bytes.
Change v1->v2: do not overwrite zeroed padding again. use copy_len.
Fixes: 0fb375fb9b93 ("[AF_PACKET]: Allow for > 8 byte hardware addresses.")
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b43d1f9f7067c6759b1051e8ecb84e82cef569fe ]
There is softlockup when using TPACKET_V3:
...
NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 60010ms!
(__irq_svc) from [<c0558a0c>] (_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x54)
(_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore) from [<c027b7e8>] (mod_timer+0x210/0x25c)
(mod_timer) from [<c0549c30>]
(prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired+0x68/0x11c)
(prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired) from [<c027a7ac>]
(call_timer_fn+0x90/0x17c)
(call_timer_fn) from [<c027ab6c>] (run_timer_softirq+0x2d4/0x2fc)
(run_timer_softirq) from [<c021eaf4>] (__do_softirq+0x218/0x318)
(__do_softirq) from [<c021eea0>] (irq_exit+0x88/0xac)
(irq_exit) from [<c0240130>] (msa_irq_exit+0x11c/0x1d4)
(msa_irq_exit) from [<c0209cf0>] (handle_IPI+0x650/0x7f4)
(handle_IPI) from [<c02015bc>] (gic_handle_irq+0x108/0x118)
(gic_handle_irq) from [<c0558ee4>] (__irq_usr+0x44/0x5c)
...
If __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() is failed in
prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo(), msec and tmo will be zero, so tov_in_jiffies
is zero and the timer expire for retire_blk_timer is turn to
mod_timer(&pkc->retire_blk_timer, jiffies + 0),
which will trigger cpu usage of softirq is 100%.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Tested-by: Xiao Jiangfeng <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6ae81ced378820c4c6434b1dedba14a7122df310 ]
Trinity and other fuzzers can hit this WARN on far too easily,
resulting in a tainted kernel that hinders automated fuzzing.
Replace it with a rate-limited printk.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 32d3182cd2cd29b2e7e04df7b0db350fbe11289f ]
packet_sendmsg() checks tx_ring.pg_vec to decide
if it must call tpacket_snd().
Problem is that the check is lockless, meaning another thread
can issue a concurrent setsockopt(PACKET_TX_RING ) to flip
tx_ring.pg_vec back to NULL.
Given that tpacket_snd() grabs pg_vec_lock mutex, we can
perform the check again to solve the race.
syzbot reported :
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 1 PID: 11429 Comm: syz-executor394 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc4+ #101
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:packet_lookup_frame+0x8d/0x270 net/packet/af_packet.c:474
Code: c1 ee 03 f7 73 0c 80 3c 0e 00 0f 85 cb 01 00 00 48 8b 0b 89 c0 4c 8d 24 c1 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e1 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 4d 8b 3c 24 48 b8 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88809f82f7b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880a45c7030 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff110148b8e06 RDI: ffff8880a45c703c
RBP: ffff88809f82f7e8 R08: ffff888087aea200 R09: fffffbfff134ae50
R10: fffffbfff134ae4f R11: ffffffff89a5727f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8880a45c6ac0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fa04716f700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa04716edb8 CR3: 0000000091eb4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
packet_current_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:487 [inline]
tpacket_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2667 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x590/0x6250 net/packet/af_packet.c:2975
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
___sys_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_sendmmsg+0x1bf/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2413
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2439 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x9d/0x100 net/socket.c:2439
do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 36096f2f4fa05f7678bc87397665491700bae757 ]
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:47!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1
CPU: 0 PID: 12914 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W 5.1.0+ #47
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x53/0x90
Code: 48 8b 32 48 39 fe 75 35 48 8b 50 08 48 39 f2 75 40 b8 01 00 00 00 5d c3 48
89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 18 75 fe 82 e8 cb 34 78 ff <0f> 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 50 75 fe 82 e8 ba 34 78 ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c2fe40 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffffffffa0184000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888237a17788 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffc90001c2fe40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc90001c2fe10 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffc90001c2fe50 R14: ffffffffa0184000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f3d83634540(0000) GS:ffff888237a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000555c350ea818 CR3: 0000000231677000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
unregister_pernet_operations+0x34/0x120
unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30
packet_exit+0x1c/0x369 [af_packet
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x156/0x260
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x133/0x1b0
? do_syscall_64+0x12/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x1f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
When modprobe af_packet, register_pernet_subsys
fails and does a cleanup, ops->list is set to LIST_POISON1,
but the module init is considered to success, then while rmmod it,
BUG() is triggered in __list_del_entry_valid which is called from
unregister_pernet_subsys. This patch fix error handing path in
packet_init to avoid possilbe issue if some error occur.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 486efdc8f6ce802b27e15921d2353cc740c55451 ]
Packet sockets in datagram mode take a destination address. Verify its
length before passing to dev_hard_header.
Prior to 2.6.14-rc3, the send code ignored sll_halen. This is
established behavior. Directly compare msg_namelen to dev->addr_len.
Change v1->v2: initialize addr in all paths
Fixes: 6b8d95f1795c4 ("packet: validate address length if non-zero")
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a4dc6a49156b1f8d6e17251ffda17c9e6a5db78a ]
When using fanouts with AF_PACKET, the demux functions such as
fanout_demux_cpu will return an index in the fanout socket array, which
corresponds to the selected socket.
The ordering of this array depends on the order the sockets were added
to a given fanout group, so for FANOUT_CPU this means sockets are bound
to cpus in the order they are configured, which is OK.
However, when stopping then restarting the interface these sockets are
bound to, the sockets are reassigned to the fanout group in the reverse
order, due to the fact that they were inserted at the head of the
interface's AF_PACKET socket list.
This means that traffic that was directed to the first socket in the
fanout group is now directed to the last one after an interface restart.
In the case of FANOUT_CPU, traffic from CPU0 will be directed to the
socket that used to receive traffic from the last CPU after an interface
restart.
This commit introduces a helper to add a socket at the tail of a list,
then uses it to register AF_PACKET sockets.
Note that this changes the order in which sockets are listed in /proc and
with sock_diag.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 398f0132c14754fcd03c1c4f8e7176d001ce8ea1 ]
Since commit fc62814d690c ("net/packet: fix 4gb buffer limit due to overflow check")
one can now allocate packet ring buffers >= UINT_MAX. However, syzkaller
found that that triggers a warning:
[ 21.100000] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2075 at mm/page_alloc.c:4584 __alloc_pages_nod0
[ 21.101490] Modules linked in:
[ 21.101921] CPU: 2 PID: 2075 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0 #146
[ 21.102784] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[ 21.103887] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2a0/0x630
[ 21.104640] Code: fe ff ff 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 de 01 00 48 05 90 0f 00 00 41 bd 01 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 48 e9 9c fe 3
[ 21.107121] RSP: 0018:ffff88805e1cf920 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 21.107819] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff85a488a0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 21.108753] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 21.109699] RBP: 1ffff1100bc39f28 R08: ffffed100bcefb67 R09: ffffed100bcefb67
[ 21.110646] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed100bcefb66 R12: 000000000000000d
[ 21.111623] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88805e77d888 R15: 000000000000000d
[ 21.112552] FS: 00007f7c7de05700(0000) GS:ffff88806d100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 21.113612] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 21.114405] CR2: 000000000065c000 CR3: 000000005e58e006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
[ 21.115367] Call Trace:
[ 21.115705] ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x21c0/0x21c0
[ 21.116362] alloc_pages_current+0xac/0x1e0
[ 21.116923] kmalloc_order+0x18/0x70
[ 21.117393] kmalloc_order_trace+0x18/0x110
[ 21.117949] packet_set_ring+0x9d5/0x1770
[ 21.118524] ? packet_rcv_spkt+0x440/0x440
[ 21.119094] ? lock_downgrade+0x620/0x620
[ 21.119646] ? __might_fault+0x177/0x1b0
[ 21.120177] packet_setsockopt+0x981/0x2940
[ 21.120753] ? __fget+0x2fb/0x4b0
[ 21.121209] ? packet_release+0xab0/0xab0
[ 21.121740] ? sock_has_perm+0x1cd/0x260
[ 21.122297] ? selinux_secmark_relabel_packet+0xd0/0xd0
[ 21.123013] ? __fget+0x324/0x4b0
[ 21.123451] ? selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt+0x101/0x320
[ 21.124186] ? selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb+0x3a0/0x3a0
[ 21.124908] ? __lock_acquire+0x529/0x3200
[ 21.125453] ? selinux_socket_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70
[ 21.126075] ? __sys_setsockopt+0x131/0x210
[ 21.126533] ? packet_release+0xab0/0xab0
[ 21.127004] __sys_setsockopt+0x131/0x210
[ 21.127449] ? kernel_accept+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 21.127911] ? ret_from_fork+0x8/0x50
[ 21.128313] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11b/0x280
[ 21.128800] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150
[ 21.129271] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x37f/0x560
[ 21.129769] do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450
[ 21.130182] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
We should allocate with __GFP_NOWARN to handle this.
Cc: Kal Conley <kal.conley@dectris.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Fixes: fc62814d690c ("net/packet: fix 4gb buffer limit due to overflow check")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fc62814d690cf62189854464f4bd07457d5e9e50 ]
When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result
can overflow. Check it for overflow without limiting the total buffer
size to UINT_MAX.
This change fixes support for packet ring buffers >= UINT_MAX.
Fixes: 8f8d28e4d6d8 ("net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_frame_nr")
Signed-off-by: Kal Conley <kal.conley@dectris.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d972f3dce8d161e2142da0ab1ef25df00e2f21a9 ]
'dev' is non NULL when the addr_len check triggers so it must goto a label
that does the dev_put otherwise dev will have a leaked refcount.
This bug causes the ib_ipoib module to become unloadable when using
systemd-network as it triggers this check on InfiniBand links.
Fixes: 99137b7888f4 ("packet: validate address length")
Reported-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6b8d95f1795c42161dc0984b6863e95d6acf24ed ]
Validate packet socket address length if a length is given. Zero
length is equivalent to not setting an address.
Fixes: 99137b7888f4 ("packet: validate address length")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 99137b7888f4058087895d035d81c6b2d31015c5 ]
Packet sockets with SOCK_DGRAM may pass an address for use in
dev_hard_header. Ensure that it is of sufficient length.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit 4576cd469d980317c4edd9173f8b694aa71ea3a3 upstream.
TPACKET_V3 stores variable length frames in fixed length blocks.
Blocks must be able to store a block header, optional private space
and at least one minimum sized frame.
Frames, even for a zero snaplen packet, store metadata headers and
optional reserved space.
In the block size bounds check, ensure that the frame of the
chosen configuration fits. This includes sockaddr_ll and optional
tp_reserve.
Syzbot was able to construct a ring with insuffient room for the
sockaddr_ll in the header of a zero-length frame, triggering an
out-of-bounds write in dev_parse_header.
Convert the comparison to less than, as zero is a valid snap len.
This matches the test for minimum tp_frame_size immediately below.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Fixes: eb73190f4fbe ("net/packet: refine check for priv area size")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 993675a3100b16a4c80dfd70cbcde8ea7127b31d ]
If variable length link layer headers result in a packet shorter
than dev->hard_header_len, reset the network header offset. Else
skb->mac_len may exceed skb->len after skb_mac_reset_len.
packet_sendmsg_spkt already has similar logic.
Fixes: b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9aad13b087ab0a588cd68259de618f100053360e ]
Commit b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link
layer allocation") ensures that packet_snd always starts writing
the link layer header in reserved headroom allocated for this
purpose.
This is needed because packets may be shorter than hard_header_len,
in which case the space up to hard_header_len may be zeroed. But
that necessary padding is not accounted for in skb->len.
The fix, however, is buggy. It calls skb_push, which grows skb->len
when moving skb->data back. But in this case packet length should not
change.
Instead, call skb_reserve, which moves both skb->data and skb->tail
back, without changing length.
Fixes: b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation")
Reported-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit eb73190f4fbeedf762394e92d6a4ec9ace684c88 ]
syzbot was able to trick af_packet again [1]
Various commits tried to address the problem in the past,
but failed to take into account V3 header size.
[1]
tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 72 to 4294967224. macoff=96
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
Write of size 2 at addr ffff8801cb62000e by task kworker/1:2/2106
CPU: 1 PID: 2106 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc7+ #77
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
__asan_report_store2_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:436
prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
__packet_lookup_frame_in_block net/packet/af_packet.c:1094 [inline]
packet_current_rx_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:1117 [inline]
tpacket_rcv+0x1866/0x3340 net/packet/af_packet.c:2282
dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x891/0xb90 net/core/dev.c:2018
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3049 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xc10 net/core/dev.c:3069
__dev_queue_xmit+0x2724/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3584
dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3617
neigh_resolve_output+0x679/0xad0 net/core/neighbour.c:1358
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:482 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xc9c/0x2810 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120
ip6_finish_output+0x5fe/0xbc0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:154
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:277 [inline]
ip6_output+0x227/0x9b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:171
dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
ndisc_send_skb+0x100d/0x1570 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:491
ndisc_send_ns+0x3c1/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:633
addrconf_dad_work+0xbef/0x1340 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4033
process_one_work+0xc1e/0x1b50 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
worker_thread+0x1cc/0x1440 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00072d8800 count:0 mapcount:-127 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff8801cb620e80
flags: 0x2fffc0000000000()
raw: 02fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8801cb620e80 00000000ffffff80
raw: ffffea00072e3820 ffffea0007132d20 0000000000000002 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801cb61ff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8801cb61ff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8801cb620000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff8801cb620080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff8801cb620100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
Fixes: 2b6867c2ce76 ("net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size")
Fixes: dc808110bb62 ("packet: handle too big packets for PACKET_V3")
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b84bbaf7a6c8cca24f8acf25a2c8e46913a947ba ]
Packet sockets allow construction of packets shorter than
dev->hard_header_len to accommodate protocols with variable length
link layer headers. These packets are padded to dev->hard_header_len,
because some device drivers interpret that as a minimum packet size.
packet_snd reserves dev->hard_header_len bytes on allocation.
SOCK_DGRAM sockets call skb_push in dev_hard_header() to ensure that
link layer headers are stored in the reserved range. SOCK_RAW sockets
do the same in tpacket_snd, but not in packet_snd.
Syzbot was able to send a zero byte packet to a device with massive
116B link layer header, causing padding to cross over into skb_shinfo.
Fix this by writing from the start of the llheader reserved range also
in the case of packet_snd/SOCK_RAW.
Update skb_set_network_header to the new offset. This also corrects
it for SOCK_DGRAM, where it incorrectly double counted reserve due to
the skb_push in dev_hard_header.
Fixes: 9ed988cd5915 ("packet: validate variable length ll headers")
Reported-by: syzbot+71d74a5406d02057d559@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5171b37d959641bbc619781caf62e61f7b940871 ]
In order to remove the race caught by syzbot [1], we need
to lock the socket before using po->tp_version as this could
change under us otherwise.
This means lock_sock() and release_sock() must be done by
packet_set_ring() callers.
[1] :
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249
CPU: 0 PID: 20195 Comm: syzkaller707632 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #83
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
__msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:676
packet_set_ring+0x1254/0x3870 net/packet/af_packet.c:4249
packet_setsockopt+0x12c6/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3662
SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849
SyS_setsockopt+0x76/0xa0 net/socket.c:1828
do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
RIP: 0033:0x449099
RSP: 002b:00007f42b5307ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000070003c RCX: 0000000000449099
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000000000107 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000700038 R08: 000000000000001c R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000200000c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000080eecf R14: 00007f42b53089c0 R15: 0000000000000001
Local variable description: ----req_u@packet_setsockopt
Variable was created at:
packet_setsockopt+0x13f/0x5a90 net/packet/af_packet.c:3612
SYSC_setsockopt+0x4b8/0x570 net/socket.c:1849
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a6361f0ca4b25460f2cdf3235ebe8115f622901e ]
Updates to the bitfields in struct packet_sock are not atomic.
Serialize these read-modify-write cycles.
Move po->running into a separate variable. Its writes are protected by
po->bind_lock (except for one startup case at packet_create). Also
replace a textual precondition warning with lockdep annotation.
All others are set only in packet_setsockopt. Serialize these
updates by holding the socket lock. Analogous to other field updates,
also hold the lock when testing whether a ring is active (pg_vec).
Fixes: 8dc419447415 ("[PACKET]: Add optional checksum computation for recvmsg")
Reported-by: DaeRyong Jeong <threeearcat@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Byoungyoung Lee <byoungyoung@purdue.edu>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 15fe076edea787807a7cdc168df832544b58eba6 ]
syzbot reported crashes [1] and provided a C repro easing bug hunting.
When/if packet_do_bind() calls __unregister_prot_hook() and releases
po->bind_lock, another thread can run packet_notifier() and process an
NETDEV_UP event.
This calls register_prot_hook() and hooks again the socket right before
first thread is able to grab again po->bind_lock.
Fixes this issue by temporarily setting po->num to 0, as suggested by
David Miller.
[1]
dev_remove_pack: ffff8801bf16fa80 not found
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:7945! ( BUG_ON(!list_empty(&dev->ptype_all)); )
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
device syz0 entered promiscuous mode
CPU: 0 PID: 3161 Comm: syzkaller404108 Not tainted 4.14.0+ #190
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
task: ffff8801cc57a500 task.stack: ffff8801cc588000
RIP: 0010:netdev_run_todo+0x772/0xae0 net/core/dev.c:7945
RSP: 0018:ffff8801cc58f598 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffff8801cc57a500 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff841f75b2
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 1ffff100398b1ede RDI: ffff8801bf1f8810
device syz0 entered promiscuous mode
RBP: ffff8801cc58f898 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801bf1f8cd8
R13: ffff8801cc58f870 R14: ffff8801bf1f8780 R15: ffff8801cc58f7f0
FS: 0000000001716880(0000) GS:ffff8801db400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020b13000 CR3: 0000000005e25000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
rtnl_unlock+0xe/0x10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:106
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:670 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0x49/0x60 drivers/net/tun.c:2845
__fput+0x333/0x7f0 fs/file_table.c:210
____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
task_work_run+0x199/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:113
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
do_exit+0x9bb/0x1ae0 kernel/exit.c:865
do_group_exit+0x149/0x400 kernel/exit.c:968
SYSC_exit_group kernel/exit.c:979 [inline]
SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20 kernel/exit.c:977
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
RIP: 0033:0x44ad19
Fixes: 30f7ea1c2b5f ("packet: race condition in packet_bind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@aristanetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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syzkaller found a race condition fanout_demux_rollover() while removing
a packet socket from a fanout group.
po->rollover is read and operated on during packet_rcv_fanout(), via
fanout_demux_rollover(), but the pointer is currently cleared before the
synchronization in packet_release(). It is safer to delay the cleanup
until after synchronize_net() has been called, ensuring all calls to
packet_rcv_fanout() for this socket have finished.
To further simplify synchronization around the rollover structure, set
po->rollover in fanout_add() only if there are no errors. This removes
the need for rcu in the struct and in the call to
packet_getsockopt(..., PACKET_ROLLOVER_STATS, ...).
Crashing stack trace:
fanout_demux_rollover+0xb6/0x4d0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1392
packet_rcv_fanout+0x649/0x7c8 net/packet/af_packet.c:1487
dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x835/0xc10 net/core/dev.c:1953
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:2975 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xac0 net/core/dev.c:2995
__dev_queue_xmit+0x17a4/0x2050 net/core/dev.c:3476
dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3509
neigh_connected_output+0x489/0x720 net/core/neighbour.c:1379
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:482 [inline]
ip6_finish_output2+0xad1/0x22a0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120
ip6_finish_output+0x2f9/0x920 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:146
NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:239 [inline]
ip6_output+0x1f4/0x850 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:163
dst_output include/net/dst.h:459 [inline]
NF_HOOK.constprop.35+0xff/0x630 include/linux/netfilter.h:250
mld_sendpack+0x6a8/0xcc0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1660
mld_send_initial_cr.part.24+0x103/0x150 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2072
mld_send_initial_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2056 [inline]
ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x99/0x130 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2079
addrconf_dad_completed+0x595/0x970 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4039
addrconf_dad_work+0xac9/0x1160 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3971
process_one_work+0xbf0/0x1bc0 kernel/workqueue.c:2113
worker_thread+0x223/0x1990 kernel/workqueue.c:2247
kthread+0x35e/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:432
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Fixes: 509c7a1ecc860 ("packet: avoid panic in packet_getsockopt()")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 509c7a1ecc8601f94ffba8a00889fefb239c00c6 ]
syzkaller got crashes in packet_getsockopt() processing
PACKET_ROLLOVER_STATS command while another thread was managing
to change po->rollover
Using RCU will fix this bug. We might later add proper RCU annotations
for sparse sake.
In v2: I replaced kfree(rollover) in fanout_add() to kfree_rcu()
variant, as spotted by John.
Fixes: a9b6391814d5 ("packet: rollover statistics")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit da7c9561015e93d10fe6aab73e9288e0d09d65a6 ]
Packet socket option po->has_vnet_hdr can be updated concurrently with
other operations if no ring is attached.
Do not test the option twice in packet_snd, as the value may change in
between calls. A race on setsockopt disable may cause a packet > mtu
to be sent without having GSO options set.
Fixes: bfd5f4a3d605 ("packet: Add GSO/csum offload support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 4971613c1639d8e5f102c4e797c3bf8f83a5a69e ]
Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group
until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical
across sockets in the group.
If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout
and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent
with that of the fanout group.
Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race.
I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually
observe the race.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 008ba2a13f2d04c947adc536d19debb8fe66f110 ]
Packet socket bind operations must hold the po->bind_lock. This keeps
po->running consistent with whether the socket is actually on a ptype
list to receive packets.
fanout_add unbinds a socket and its packet_rcv/tpacket_rcv call, then
binds the fanout object to receive through packet_rcv_fanout.
Make it hold the po->bind_lock when testing po->running and rebinding.
Else, it can race with other rebind operations, such as that in
packet_set_ring from packet_rcv to tpacket_rcv. Concurrent updates
can result in a socket being added to a fanout group twice, causing
use-after-free KASAN bug reports, among others.
Reported independently by both trinity and syzkaller.
Verified that the syzkaller reproducer passes after this patch.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Reported-by: nixioaming <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit fd2c83b35752f0a8236b976978ad4658df14a59f ]
In the case getsockopt() is called with PACKET_HDRLEN and optlen < 4
|val| remains uninitialized and the syscall may behave differently
depending on its value, and even copy garbage to userspace on certain
architectures. To fix this we now return -EINVAL if optlen is too small.
This bug has been detected with KMSAN.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit c27927e372f0785f3303e8fad94b85945e2c97b7 ]
Updates to tp_reserve can race with reads of the field in
packet_set_ring. Avoid this by holding the socket lock during
updates in setsockopt PACKET_RESERVE.
This bug was discovered by syzkaller.
Fixes: 8913336a7e8d ("packet: add PACKET_RESERVE sockopt")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit c800aaf8d869f2b9b47b10c5c312fe19f0a94042 ]
There are multiple reports showing we have a use-after-free in
the timer prb_retire_rx_blk_timer_expired(), where we use struct
tpacket_kbdq_core::pkbdq, a pg_vec, after it gets freed by
free_pg_vec().
The interesting part is it is not freed via packet_release() but
via packet_setsockopt(), which means we are not closing the socket.
Looking into the big and fat function packet_set_ring(), this could
happen if we satisfy the following conditions:
1. closing == 0, not on packet_release() path
2. req->tp_block_nr == 0, we don't allocate a new pg_vec
3. rx_ring->pg_vec is already set as V3, which means we already called
packet_set_ring() wtih req->tp_block_nr > 0 previously
4. req->tp_frame_nr == 0, pass sanity check
5. po->mapped == 0, never called mmap()
In this scenario we are clearing the old rx_ring->pg_vec, so we need
to free this pg_vec, but we don't stop the timer on this path because
of closing==0.
The timer has to be stopped as long as we need to free pg_vec, therefore
the check on closing!=0 is wrong, we should check pg_vec!=NULL instead.
Thanks to liujian for testing different fixes.
Reported-by: alexander.levin@verizon.com
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Reported-by: liujian (CE) <liujian56@huawei.com>
Tested-by: liujian (CE) <liujian56@huawei.com>
Cc: Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit bcc5364bdcfe131e6379363f089e7b4108d35b70 ]
When calculating po->tp_hdrlen + po->tp_reserve the result can overflow.
Fix by checking that tp_reserve <= INT_MAX on assign.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8f8d28e4d6d815a391285e121c3a53a0b6cb9e7b ]
When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result
can overflow.
Add a check that tp_block_size * tp_block_nr <= UINT_MAX.
Since frames_per_block <= tp_block_size, the expression would
never overflow.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2b6867c2ce76c596676bec7d2d525af525fdc6e2 upstream.
Subtracting tp_sizeof_priv from tp_block_size and casting to int
to check whether one is less then the other doesn't always work
(both of them are unsigned ints).
Compare them as is instead.
Also cast tp_sizeof_priv to u64 before using BLK_PLUS_PRIV, as
it can overflow inside BLK_PLUS_PRIV otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 540e2894f7905538740aaf122bd8e0548e1c34a4 ]
KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of
uninitialized memory in packet_bind_spkt():
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory
CPU: 0 PID: 1074 Comm: packet Not tainted 4.8.0-rc6+ #1891
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
0000000000000000 ffff88006b6dfc08 ffffffff82559ae8 ffff88006b6dfb48
ffffffff818a7c91 ffffffff85b9c870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85b9c550
0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000ec400911 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82559ae8>] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff818a6626>] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1003
[<ffffffff818a783b>] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0
mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424
[< inline >] strlen lib/string.c:484
[<ffffffff8259b58d>] strlcpy+0x9d/0x200 lib/string.c:144
[<ffffffff84b2eca4>] packet_bind_spkt+0x144/0x230
net/packet/af_packet.c:3132
[<ffffffff84242e4d>] SYSC_bind+0x40d/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1370
[<ffffffff84242a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff8515991b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
chained origin: 00000000eba00911
[<ffffffff810bb787>] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50
arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:334
[<ffffffff818a59f8>] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0
mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
[<ffffffff818a7773>] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130
mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380
[<ffffffff84242b69>] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff84242a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff8515991b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x8f
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000eb400911)
==================================================================
(the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists
upstream)
, when I run the following program as root:
=====================================
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netpacket/packet.h>
#include <net/ethernet.h>
int main() {
struct sockaddr addr;
memset(&addr, 0xff, sizeof(addr));
addr.sa_family = AF_PACKET;
int fd = socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, htons(ETH_P_ALL));
bind(fd, &addr, sizeof(addr));
return 0;
}
=====================================
This happens because addr.sa_data copied from the userspace is not
zero-terminated, and copying it with strlcpy() in packet_bind_spkt()
results in calling strlen() on the kernel copy of that non-terminated
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2bd624b4611ffee36422782d16e1c944d1351e98 ]
Commit 6664498280cf ("packet: call fanout_release, while UNREGISTERING a
netdev"), unfortunately, introduced the following issues.
1. calling mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex) (fanout_release()) from inside
rcu_read-side critical section. rcu_read_lock disables preemption, most often,
which prohibits calling sleeping functions.
[ ] include/linux/rcupdate.h:560 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section!
[ ]
[ ] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
[ ] 4 locks held by ovs-vswitchd/1969:
[ ] #0: (cb_lock){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8158a6c9>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40
[ ] #1: (ovs_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa04878ca>] ovs_vport_cmd_del+0x4a/0x100 [openvswitch]
[ ] #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81564157>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
[ ] #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff81614165>] packet_notifier+0x5/0x3f0
[ ]
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
[ ] [<ffffffff810c9077>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x107/0x110
[ ] [<ffffffff810a2da7>] ___might_sleep+0x57/0x210
[ ] [<ffffffff810a2fd0>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x90
[ ] [<ffffffff8162e80c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x3a0
[ ] [<ffffffff810de93f>] ? vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[ ] [<ffffffff81186e88>] ? printk+0x4d/0x4f
[ ] [<ffffffff816106dd>] fanout_release+0x1d/0xe0
[ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0
2. calling mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex) inside spin_lock(&po->bind_lock).
"sleeping function called from invalid context"
[ ] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620
[ ] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1969, name: ovs-vswitchd
[ ] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
[ ] [<ffffffff810a2f52>] ___might_sleep+0x202/0x210
[ ] [<ffffffff810a2fd0>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x90
[ ] [<ffffffff8162e80c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x3a0
[ ] [<ffffffff816106dd>] fanout_release+0x1d/0xe0
[ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0
3. calling dev_remove_pack(&fanout->prot_hook), from inside
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock) or rcu_read-side critical-section. dev_remove_pack()
-> synchronize_net(), which might sleep.
[ ] BUG: scheduling while atomic: ovs-vswitchd/1969/0x00000002
[ ] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4
[ ] [<ffffffff81186274>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x73
[ ] [<ffffffff8162b8cb>] __schedule+0x6b/0xd10
[ ] [<ffffffff8162c5db>] schedule+0x6b/0x80
[ ] [<ffffffff81630b1d>] schedule_timeout+0x38d/0x410
[ ] [<ffffffff810ea3fd>] synchronize_sched_expedited+0x53d/0x810
[ ] [<ffffffff810ea6de>] synchronize_rcu_expedited+0xe/0x10
[ ] [<ffffffff8154eab5>] synchronize_net+0x35/0x50
[ ] [<ffffffff8154eae3>] dev_remove_pack+0x13/0x20
[ ] [<ffffffff8161077e>] fanout_release+0xbe/0xe0
[ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0
4. fanout_release() races with calls from different CPU.
To fix the above problems, remove the call to fanout_release() under
rcu_read_lock(). Instead, call __dev_remove_pack(&fanout->prot_hook) and
netdev_run_todo will be happy that &dev->ptype_specific list is empty. In order
to achieve this, I moved dev_{add,remove}_pack() out of fanout_{add,release} to
__fanout_{link,unlink}. So, call to {,__}unregister_prot_hook() will make sure
fanout->prot_hook is removed as well.
Fixes: 6664498280cf ("packet: call fanout_release, while UNREGISTERING a netdev")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Anoob Soman <anoob.soman@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d199fab63c11998a602205f7ee7ff7c05c97164b ]
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 57031eb794906eea4e1c7b31dc1e2429c0af0c66 ]
Link layer protocols may unconditionally pull headers, as Ethernet
does in eth_type_trans. Ensure that the entire link layer header
always lies in the skb linear segment. tpacket_snd has such a check.
Extend this to packet_snd.
Variable length link layer headers complicate the computation
somewhat. Here skb->len may be smaller than dev->hard_header_len.
Round up the linear length to be at least as long as the smallest of
the two.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c ]
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 104ba78c98808ae837d1f63aae58c183db5505df ]
When transmitting on a packet socket with PACKET_VNET_HDR and
PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS, validate device support for features requested
in vnet_hdr.
Drop TSO packets sent to devices that do not support TSO or have the
feature disabled. Note that the latter currently do process those
packets correctly, regardless of not advertising the feature.
Because of SKB_GSO_DODGY, it is not sufficient to test device features
with netif_needs_gso. Full validate_xmit_skb is needed.
Switch to software checksum for non-TSO packets that request checksum
offload if that device feature is unsupported or disabled. Note that
similar to the TSO case, device drivers may perform checksum offload
correctly even when not advertising it.
When switching to software checksum, packets hit skb_checksum_help,
which has two BUG_ON checksum not in linear segment. Packet sockets
always allocate at least up to csum_start + csum_off + 2 as linear.
Tested by running github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/psock_txring_vnet.c
ethtool -K eth0 tso off tx on
psock_txring_vnet -d $dst -s $src -i eth0 -l 2000 -n 1 -q -v
psock_txring_vnet -d $dst -s $src -i eth0 -l 2000 -n 1 -q -v -N
ethtool -K eth0 tx off
psock_txring_vnet -d $dst -s $src -i eth0 -l 1000 -n 1 -q -v -G
psock_txring_vnet -d $dst -s $src -i eth0 -l 1000 -n 1 -q -v -G -N
v2:
- add EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(validate_xmit_skb_list)
Fixes: d346a3fae3ff ("packet: introduce PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS socket option")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6664498280cf17a59c3e7cf1a931444c02633ed1 ]
If a socket has FANOUT sockopt set, a new proto_hook is registered
as part of fanout_add(). When processing a NETDEV_UNREGISTER event in
af_packet, __fanout_unlink is called for all sockets, but prot_hook which was
registered as part of fanout_add is not removed. Call fanout_release, on a
NETDEV_UNREGISTER, which removes prot_hook and removes fanout from the
fanout_list.
This fixes BUG_ON(!list_empty(&dev->ptype_specific)) in netdev_run_todo()
Signed-off-by: Anoob Soman <anoob.soman@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit eb70db8756717b90c01ccc765fdefc4dd969fc74 ]
People who use PACKET_FANOUT_HASH want a symmetric hash, meaning that
they want packets going in both directions on a flow to hash to the
same bucket.
The core kernel SKB hash became non-symmetric when the ipv6 flow label
and other entities were incorporated into the standard flow hash order
to increase entropy.
But there are no users of PACKET_FANOUT_HASH who want an assymetric
hash, they all want a symmetric one.
Therefore, use the flow dissector to compute a flat symmetric hash
over only the protocol, addresses and ports. This hash does not get
installed into and override the normal skb hash, so this change has
no effect whatsoever on the rest of the stack.
Reported-by: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org>
Tested-by: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 309cf37fe2a781279b7675d4bb7173198e532867 ]
Because we miss to wipe the remainder of i->addr[] in packet_mc_add(),
pdiag_put_mclist() leaks uninitialized heap bytes via the
PACKET_DIAG_MCLIST netlink attribute.
Fix this by explicitly memset(0)ing the remaining bytes in i->addr[].
Fixes: eea68e2f1a00 ("packet: Report socket mclist info via diag module")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9ed988cd591500c040b2a6257bc68543e08ceeef ]
Replace link layer header validation check ll_header_truncate with
more generic dev_validate_header.
Validation based on hard_header_len incorrectly drops valid packets
in variable length protocols, such as AX25. dev_validate_header
calls header_ops.validate for such protocols to ensure correctness
below hard_header_len.
See also http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/401064
Fixes 9c7077622dd9 ("packet: make packet_snd fail on len smaller than l2 header")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit 9c7077622dd91 ("packet: make packet_snd fail on len smaller
than l2 header") added validation for the packet size in packet_snd.
This change enforces that every packet needs a header (with at least
hard_header_len bytes) plus a payload with at least one byte. Before
this change the payload was optional.
This fixes PPPoE connections which do not have a "Service" or
"Host-Uniq" configured (which is violating the spec, but is still
widely used in real-world setups). Those are currently failing with the
following message: "pppd: packet size is too short (24 <= 24)"
Signed-off-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use PAGE_ALIGNED(...) instead of open-coding it.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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rb->frames_per_block is an unsigned int, thus can never be negative.
Also fix spacing in the calculation of frames_per_block.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Since it's introduction in commit 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and
packet mmap"), TX_RING could be used from SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_RAW
side. When used with SOCK_DGRAM only, the size_max > dev->mtu +
reserve check should have reserve as 0, but currently, this is
unconditionally set (in it's original form as dev->hard_header_len).
I think this is not correct since tpacket_fill_skb() would then
take dev->mtu and dev->hard_header_len into account for SOCK_DGRAM,
the extra VLAN_HLEN could be possible in both cases. Presumably, the
reserve code was copied from packet_snd(), but later on missed the
check. Make it similar as we have it in packet_snd().
Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In case no struct sockaddr_ll has been passed to packet
socket's sendmsg() when doing a TX_RING flush run, then
skb->protocol is set to po->num instead, which is the protocol
passed via socket(2)/bind(2).
Applications only xmitting can go the path of allocating the
socket as socket(PF_PACKET, <mode>, 0) and do a bind(2) on the
TX_RING with sll_protocol of 0. That way, register_prot_hook()
is neither called on creation nor on bind time, which saves
cycles when there's no interest in capturing anyway.
That leaves us however with po->num 0 instead and therefore
the TX_RING flush run sets skb->protocol to 0 as well. Eric
reported that this leads to problems when using tools like
trafgen over bonding device. I.e. the bonding's hash function
could invoke the kernel's flow dissector, which depends on
skb->protocol being properly set. In the current situation, all
the traffic is then directed to a single slave.
Fix it up by inferring skb->protocol from the Ethernet header
when not set and we have ARPHRD_ETHER device type. This is only
done in case of SOCK_RAW and where we have a dev->hard_header_len
length. In case of ARPHRD_ETHER devices, this is guaranteed to
cover ETH_HLEN, and therefore being accessed on the skb after
the skb_store_bits().
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Packet sockets can be used by various net devices and are not
really restricted to ARPHRD_ETHER device types. However, when
currently checking for the extra 4 bytes that can be transmitted
in VLAN case, our assumption is that we generally probe on
ARPHRD_ETHER devices. Therefore, before looking into Ethernet
header, check the device type first.
This also fixes the issue where non-ARPHRD_ETHER devices could
have no dev->hard_header_len in TX_RING SOCK_RAW case, and thus
the check would test unfilled linear part of the skb (instead
of non-linear).
Fixes: 57f89bfa2140 ("network: Allow af_packet to transmit +4 bytes for VLAN packets.")
Fixes: 52f1454f629f ("packet: allow to transmit +4 byte in TX_RING slot for VLAN case")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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We concluded that the skb_probe_transport_header() should better be
called unconditionally. Avoiding the call into the flow dissector has
also not really much to do with the direct xmit mode.
While it seems that only virtio_net code makes use of GSO from non
RX/TX ring packet socket paths, we should probe for a transport header
nevertheless before they hit devices.
Reference: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/386173/
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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