From 96adc5c82bdf1e7d1c8e0830e7d3f9a3747ae8f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 13:59:22 -0400 Subject: media: v4l2-compat-ioctl32: don't oops on overlay commit 85ea29f19eab56ec16ec6b92bc67305998706afa upstream. At put_v4l2_window32(), it tries to access kp->clips. However, kp points to an userspace pointer. So, it should be obtained via get_user(), otherwise it can OOPS: vivid-000: ================== END STATUS ================== BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000fffb18e0 IP: [] __put_v4l2_format32+0x169/0x220 [videodev] PGD 3f5776067 PUD 3f576f067 PMD 3f5769067 PTE 800000042548f067 Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: vivid videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops v4l2_dv_timings videobuf2_core v4l2_common videodev media xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables bluetooth rfkill binfmt_misc snd_hda_codec_hdmi i915 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_controller snd_hda_codec intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal snd_hwdep intel_powerclamp snd_pcm coretemp snd_seq_midi kvm_intel kvm snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper snd_seq drm crct10dif_pclmul e1000e snd_seq_device crc32_pclmul snd_timer ghash_clmulni_intel snd mei_me mei ptp pps_core soundcore lpc_ich video crc32c_intel [last unloaded: media] CPU: 2 PID: 28332 Comm: v4l2-compliance Not tainted 3.18.102+ #107 Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0364.2017.0511.0949 05/11/2017 task: ffff8804293f8000 ti: ffff8803f5640000 task.ti: ffff8803f5640000 RIP: 0010:[] [] __put_v4l2_format32+0x169/0x220 [videodev] RSP: 0018:ffff8803f5643e28 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000fffb1ab4 RDX: 00000000fffb1a68 RSI: 00000000fffb18d8 RDI: 00000000fffb1aa8 RBP: ffff8803f5643e48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8803f54b0378 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000168 R12: 00000000fffb18c0 R13: 00000000fffb1a94 R14: 00000000fffb18c8 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880456d00000(0063) knlGS:00000000f7100980 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000fffb18e0 CR3: 00000003f552b000 CR4: 00000000003407e0 Stack: 00000000fffb1a94 00000000c0cc5640 0000000000000056 ffff8804274f3600 ffff8803f5643ed0 ffffffffc0547e16 0000000000000003 ffff8803f5643eb0 ffffffff81301460 ffff88009db44b01 ffff880441942520 ffff8800c0d05640 Call Trace: [] v4l2_compat_ioctl32+0x12d6/0x1b1d [videodev] [] ? file_has_perm+0x70/0xc0 [] compat_SyS_ioctl+0xec/0x1200 [] sysenter_dispatch+0x7/0x21 Code: 00 00 48 8b 80 48 c0 ff ff 48 83 e8 38 49 39 c6 0f 87 2b ff ff ff 49 8d 45 1c e8 a3 ce e3 c0 85 c0 0f 85 1a ff ff ff 41 8d 40 ff <4d> 8b 64 24 20 41 89 d5 48 8d 44 40 03 4d 8d 34 c4 eb 15 0f 1f RIP [] __put_v4l2_format32+0x169/0x220 [videodev] RSP CR2: 00000000fffb18e0 Tested with vivid driver on Kernel v3.18.102. Same bug happens upstream too: BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __put_v4l2_format32+0x98/0x4d0 [videodev] Read of size 8 at addr 00000000ffe48400 by task v4l2-compliance/8713 CPU: 0 PID: 8713 Comm: v4l2-compliance Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #108 Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0364.2017.0511.0949 05/11/2017 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5c/0x7c kasan_report+0x164/0x380 ? __put_v4l2_format32+0x98/0x4d0 [videodev] __put_v4l2_format32+0x98/0x4d0 [videodev] v4l2_compat_ioctl32+0x1aec/0x27a0 [videodev] ? __fsnotify_inode_delete+0x20/0x20 ? __put_v4l2_format32+0x4d0/0x4d0 [videodev] compat_SyS_ioctl+0x646/0x14d0 ? do_ioctl+0x30/0x30 do_fast_syscall_32+0x191/0x3f4 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x6b/0x7a ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffe48400 IP: __put_v4l2_format32+0x98/0x4d0 [videodev] PGD 3a22fb067 P4D 3a22fb067 PUD 39b6f0067 PMD 39b6f1067 PTE 80000003256af067 Oops: 0001 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: vivid videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_dma_contig videobuf2_memops v4l2_tpg v4l2_dv_timings videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common v4l2_common videodev xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack libcrc32c tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables bluetooth rfkill ecdh_generic binfmt_misc snd_hda_codec_hdmi intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp i915 coretemp snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec kvm_intel snd_hwdep snd_hda_core kvm snd_pcm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_seq_midi ghash_clmulni_intel snd_seq_midi_event i2c_algo_bit intel_cstate snd_rawmidi intel_uncore snd_seq drm_kms_helper e1000e snd_seq_device snd_timer intel_rapl_perf drm ptp snd mei_me mei lpc_ich pps_core soundcore video crc32c_intel CPU: 0 PID: 8713 Comm: v4l2-compliance Tainted: G B 4.16.0-rc4+ #108 Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0364.2017.0511.0949 05/11/2017 RIP: 0010:__put_v4l2_format32+0x98/0x4d0 [videodev] RSP: 0018:ffff8803b9be7d30 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8803ac983e80 RCX: ffffffff8cd929f2 RDX: 1ffffffff1d0a149 RSI: 0000000000000297 RDI: 0000000000000297 RBP: 00000000ffe485c0 R08: fffffbfff1cf5123 R09: ffffffff8e7a8948 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff1cf5122 R12: 00000000ffe483e0 R13: 00000000ffe485c4 R14: ffff8803ac985918 R15: 00000000ffe483e8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880407400000(0063) knlGS:00000000f7a46980 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000ffe48400 CR3: 00000003a83f2003 CR4: 00000000003606f0 Call Trace: v4l2_compat_ioctl32+0x1aec/0x27a0 [videodev] ? __fsnotify_inode_delete+0x20/0x20 ? __put_v4l2_format32+0x4d0/0x4d0 [videodev] compat_SyS_ioctl+0x646/0x14d0 ? do_ioctl+0x30/0x30 do_fast_syscall_32+0x191/0x3f4 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x6b/0x7a Code: 4c 89 f7 4d 8d 7c 24 08 e8 e6 a4 69 cb 48 8b 83 98 1a 00 00 48 83 e8 10 49 39 c7 0f 87 9d 01 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 20 e8 c8 a4 69 cb <4d> 8b 74 24 20 4c 89 ef 4c 89 fe ba 10 00 00 00 e8 23 d9 08 cc RIP: __put_v4l2_format32+0x98/0x4d0 [videodev] RSP: ffff8803b9be7d30 CR2: 00000000ffe48400 cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Reviewed-by: Sakari Ailus Reviewed-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c index 943f90e392a7..e0ae2f34623a 100644 --- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c +++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int get_v4l2_window32(struct v4l2_window __user *kp, static int put_v4l2_window32(struct v4l2_window __user *kp, struct v4l2_window32 __user *up) { - struct v4l2_clip __user *kclips = kp->clips; + struct v4l2_clip __user *kclips; struct v4l2_clip32 __user *uclips; compat_caddr_t p; u32 clipcount; @@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ static int put_v4l2_window32(struct v4l2_window __user *kp, if (!clipcount) return 0; + if (get_user(kclips, &kp->clips)) + return -EFAULT; if (get_user(p, &up->clips)) return -EFAULT; uclips = compat_ptr(p); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8778f3e6e35b2a618dc96722d4e945fbba783180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Helge Deller Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2018 23:53:22 +0200 Subject: parisc: Fix out of array access in match_pci_device() commit 615b2665fd20c327b631ff1e79426775de748094 upstream. As found by the ubsan checker, the value of the 'index' variable can be out of range for the bc[] array: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c:655:21 index 6 is out of range for type 'char [6]' Backtrace: [<104fa850>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x68/0x80 [<1019d83c>] check_parent+0xc0/0x170 [<1019d91c>] descend_children+0x30/0x6c [<1059e164>] device_for_each_child+0x60/0x98 [<1019cd54>] parse_tree_node+0x40/0x54 [<1019d86c>] check_parent+0xf0/0x170 [<1019d91c>] descend_children+0x30/0x6c [<1059e164>] device_for_each_child+0x60/0x98 [<1019d938>] descend_children+0x4c/0x6c [<1059e164>] device_for_each_child+0x60/0x98 [<1019cd54>] parse_tree_node+0x40/0x54 [<1019cffc>] hwpath_to_device+0xa4/0xc4 Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c index dba508fe1683..4f7060ec6875 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/drivers.c @@ -648,6 +648,10 @@ static int match_pci_device(struct device *dev, int index, (modpath->mod == PCI_FUNC(devfn))); } + /* index might be out of bounds for bc[] */ + if (index >= 6) + return 0; + id = PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) | (PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn) << 5); return (modpath->bc[index] == id); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From aedc7bff2ea537367d59d71c47d4eb6552762f06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Hunter Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 16:02:21 +0200 Subject: perf intel-pt: Fix overlap detection to identify consecutive buffers correctly commit 117db4b27bf08dba412faf3924ba55fe970c57b8 upstream. Overlap detection was not not updating the buffer's 'consecutive' flag. Marking buffers consecutive has the advantage that decoding begins from the start of the buffer instead of the first PSB. Fix overlap detection to identify consecutive buffers correctly. Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1520431349-30689-2-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c | 62 ++++++++++------------ .../perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.h | 2 +- tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c | 5 +- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c index eeeae0629ad3..66f53ef06945 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c @@ -2152,14 +2152,6 @@ const struct intel_pt_state *intel_pt_decode(struct intel_pt_decoder *decoder) return &decoder->state; } -static bool intel_pt_at_psb(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) -{ - if (len < INTEL_PT_PSB_LEN) - return false; - return memmem(buf, INTEL_PT_PSB_LEN, INTEL_PT_PSB_STR, - INTEL_PT_PSB_LEN); -} - /** * intel_pt_next_psb - move buffer pointer to the start of the next PSB packet. * @buf: pointer to buffer pointer @@ -2248,6 +2240,7 @@ static unsigned char *intel_pt_last_psb(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) * @buf: buffer * @len: size of buffer * @tsc: TSC value returned + * @rem: returns remaining size when TSC is found * * Find a TSC packet in @buf and return the TSC value. This function assumes * that @buf starts at a PSB and that PSB+ will contain TSC and so stops if a @@ -2255,7 +2248,8 @@ static unsigned char *intel_pt_last_psb(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) * * Return: %true if TSC is found, false otherwise. */ -static bool intel_pt_next_tsc(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, uint64_t *tsc) +static bool intel_pt_next_tsc(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, uint64_t *tsc, + size_t *rem) { struct intel_pt_pkt packet; int ret; @@ -2266,6 +2260,7 @@ static bool intel_pt_next_tsc(unsigned char *buf, size_t len, uint64_t *tsc) return false; if (packet.type == INTEL_PT_TSC) { *tsc = packet.payload; + *rem = len; return true; } if (packet.type == INTEL_PT_PSBEND) @@ -2316,6 +2311,8 @@ static int intel_pt_tsc_cmp(uint64_t tsc1, uint64_t tsc2) * @len_a: size of first buffer * @buf_b: second buffer * @len_b: size of second buffer + * @consecutive: returns true if there is data in buf_b that is consecutive + * to buf_a * * If the trace contains TSC we can look at the last TSC of @buf_a and the * first TSC of @buf_b in order to determine if the buffers overlap, and then @@ -2328,33 +2325,41 @@ static int intel_pt_tsc_cmp(uint64_t tsc1, uint64_t tsc2) static unsigned char *intel_pt_find_overlap_tsc(unsigned char *buf_a, size_t len_a, unsigned char *buf_b, - size_t len_b) + size_t len_b, bool *consecutive) { uint64_t tsc_a, tsc_b; unsigned char *p; - size_t len; + size_t len, rem_a, rem_b; p = intel_pt_last_psb(buf_a, len_a); if (!p) return buf_b; /* No PSB in buf_a => no overlap */ len = len_a - (p - buf_a); - if (!intel_pt_next_tsc(p, len, &tsc_a)) { + if (!intel_pt_next_tsc(p, len, &tsc_a, &rem_a)) { /* The last PSB+ in buf_a is incomplete, so go back one more */ len_a -= len; p = intel_pt_last_psb(buf_a, len_a); if (!p) return buf_b; /* No full PSB+ => assume no overlap */ len = len_a - (p - buf_a); - if (!intel_pt_next_tsc(p, len, &tsc_a)) + if (!intel_pt_next_tsc(p, len, &tsc_a, &rem_a)) return buf_b; /* No TSC in buf_a => assume no overlap */ } while (1) { /* Ignore PSB+ with no TSC */ - if (intel_pt_next_tsc(buf_b, len_b, &tsc_b) && - intel_pt_tsc_cmp(tsc_a, tsc_b) < 0) - return buf_b; /* tsc_a < tsc_b => no overlap */ + if (intel_pt_next_tsc(buf_b, len_b, &tsc_b, &rem_b)) { + int cmp = intel_pt_tsc_cmp(tsc_a, tsc_b); + + /* Same TSC, so buffers are consecutive */ + if (!cmp && rem_b >= rem_a) { + *consecutive = true; + return buf_b + len_b - (rem_b - rem_a); + } + if (cmp < 0) + return buf_b; /* tsc_a < tsc_b => no overlap */ + } if (!intel_pt_step_psb(&buf_b, &len_b)) return buf_b + len_b; /* No PSB in buf_b => no data */ @@ -2368,6 +2373,8 @@ static unsigned char *intel_pt_find_overlap_tsc(unsigned char *buf_a, * @buf_b: second buffer * @len_b: size of second buffer * @have_tsc: can use TSC packets to detect overlap + * @consecutive: returns true if there is data in buf_b that is consecutive + * to buf_a * * When trace samples or snapshots are recorded there is the possibility that * the data overlaps. Note that, for the purposes of decoding, data is only @@ -2378,7 +2385,7 @@ static unsigned char *intel_pt_find_overlap_tsc(unsigned char *buf_a, */ unsigned char *intel_pt_find_overlap(unsigned char *buf_a, size_t len_a, unsigned char *buf_b, size_t len_b, - bool have_tsc) + bool have_tsc, bool *consecutive) { unsigned char *found; @@ -2390,7 +2397,8 @@ unsigned char *intel_pt_find_overlap(unsigned char *buf_a, size_t len_a, return buf_b; /* No overlap */ if (have_tsc) { - found = intel_pt_find_overlap_tsc(buf_a, len_a, buf_b, len_b); + found = intel_pt_find_overlap_tsc(buf_a, len_a, buf_b, len_b, + consecutive); if (found) return found; } @@ -2405,28 +2413,16 @@ unsigned char *intel_pt_find_overlap(unsigned char *buf_a, size_t len_a, } /* Now len_b >= len_a */ - if (len_b > len_a) { - /* The leftover buffer 'b' must start at a PSB */ - while (!intel_pt_at_psb(buf_b + len_a, len_b - len_a)) { - if (!intel_pt_step_psb(&buf_a, &len_a)) - return buf_b; /* No overlap */ - } - } - while (1) { /* Potential overlap so check the bytes */ found = memmem(buf_a, len_a, buf_b, len_a); - if (found) + if (found) { + *consecutive = true; return buf_b + len_a; + } /* Try again at next PSB in buffer 'a' */ if (!intel_pt_step_psb(&buf_a, &len_a)) return buf_b; /* No overlap */ - - /* The leftover buffer 'b' must start at a PSB */ - while (!intel_pt_at_psb(buf_b + len_a, len_b - len_a)) { - if (!intel_pt_step_psb(&buf_a, &len_a)) - return buf_b; /* No overlap */ - } } } diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.h b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.h index 02c38fec1c37..89a3eda6a318 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.h +++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.h @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ const struct intel_pt_state *intel_pt_decode(struct intel_pt_decoder *decoder); unsigned char *intel_pt_find_overlap(unsigned char *buf_a, size_t len_a, unsigned char *buf_b, size_t len_b, - bool have_tsc); + bool have_tsc, bool *consecutive); int intel_pt__strerror(int code, char *buf, size_t buflen); diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c index 89927b5beebf..02be74a4345f 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c @@ -188,14 +188,17 @@ static void intel_pt_dump_event(struct intel_pt *pt, unsigned char *buf, static int intel_pt_do_fix_overlap(struct intel_pt *pt, struct auxtrace_buffer *a, struct auxtrace_buffer *b) { + bool consecutive = false; void *start; start = intel_pt_find_overlap(a->data, a->size, b->data, b->size, - pt->have_tsc); + pt->have_tsc, &consecutive); if (!start) return -EINVAL; b->use_size = b->data + b->size - start; b->use_data = start; + if (b->use_size && consecutive) + b->consecutive = true; return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 410ce740596adde29697fdd8dff8ef618bb1c3d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Hunter Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 16:02:22 +0200 Subject: perf intel-pt: Fix sync_switch commit 63d8e38f6ae6c36dd5b5ba0e8c112e8861532ea2 upstream. sync_switch is a facility to synchronize decoding more closely with the point in the kernel when the context actually switched. The flag when sync_switch is enabled was global to the decoding, whereas it is really specific to the CPU. The trace data for different CPUs is put on different queues, so add sync_switch to the intel_pt_queue structure and use that in preference to the global setting in the intel_pt structure. That fixes problems decoding one CPU's trace because sync_switch was disabled on a different CPU's queue. Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1520431349-30689-3-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c index 02be74a4345f..3693cb26ec66 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt.c @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct intel_pt_queue { bool stop; bool step_through_buffers; bool use_buffer_pid_tid; + bool sync_switch; pid_t pid, tid; int cpu; int switch_state; @@ -852,10 +853,12 @@ static int intel_pt_setup_queue(struct intel_pt *pt, if (pt->timeless_decoding || !pt->have_sched_switch) ptq->use_buffer_pid_tid = true; } + + ptq->sync_switch = pt->sync_switch; } if (!ptq->on_heap && - (!pt->sync_switch || + (!ptq->sync_switch || ptq->switch_state != INTEL_PT_SS_EXPECTING_SWITCH_EVENT)) { const struct intel_pt_state *state; int ret; @@ -1238,7 +1241,7 @@ static int intel_pt_sample(struct intel_pt_queue *ptq) if (pt->synth_opts.last_branch) intel_pt_update_last_branch_rb(ptq); - if (!pt->sync_switch) + if (!ptq->sync_switch) return 0; if (intel_pt_is_switch_ip(ptq, state->to_ip)) { @@ -1319,6 +1322,21 @@ static u64 intel_pt_switch_ip(struct intel_pt *pt, u64 *ptss_ip) return switch_ip; } +static void intel_pt_enable_sync_switch(struct intel_pt *pt) +{ + unsigned int i; + + pt->sync_switch = true; + + for (i = 0; i < pt->queues.nr_queues; i++) { + struct auxtrace_queue *queue = &pt->queues.queue_array[i]; + struct intel_pt_queue *ptq = queue->priv; + + if (ptq) + ptq->sync_switch = true; + } +} + static int intel_pt_run_decoder(struct intel_pt_queue *ptq, u64 *timestamp) { const struct intel_pt_state *state = ptq->state; @@ -1335,7 +1353,7 @@ static int intel_pt_run_decoder(struct intel_pt_queue *ptq, u64 *timestamp) if (pt->switch_ip) { intel_pt_log("switch_ip: %"PRIx64" ptss_ip: %"PRIx64"\n", pt->switch_ip, pt->ptss_ip); - pt->sync_switch = true; + intel_pt_enable_sync_switch(pt); } } } @@ -1351,9 +1369,9 @@ static int intel_pt_run_decoder(struct intel_pt_queue *ptq, u64 *timestamp) if (state->err) { if (state->err == INTEL_PT_ERR_NODATA) return 1; - if (pt->sync_switch && + if (ptq->sync_switch && state->from_ip >= pt->kernel_start) { - pt->sync_switch = false; + ptq->sync_switch = false; intel_pt_next_tid(pt, ptq); } if (pt->synth_opts.errors) { @@ -1379,7 +1397,7 @@ static int intel_pt_run_decoder(struct intel_pt_queue *ptq, u64 *timestamp) state->timestamp, state->est_timestamp); ptq->timestamp = state->est_timestamp; /* Use estimated TSC in unknown switch state */ - } else if (pt->sync_switch && + } else if (ptq->sync_switch && ptq->switch_state == INTEL_PT_SS_UNKNOWN && intel_pt_is_switch_ip(ptq, state->to_ip) && ptq->next_tid == -1) { @@ -1526,7 +1544,7 @@ static int intel_pt_sync_switch(struct intel_pt *pt, int cpu, pid_t tid, return 1; ptq = intel_pt_cpu_to_ptq(pt, cpu); - if (!ptq) + if (!ptq || !ptq->sync_switch) return 1; switch (ptq->switch_state) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 292924ec3ade9670728f7f32d130eb5e3ed5e694 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Hunter Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 16:02:23 +0200 Subject: perf intel-pt: Fix error recovery from missing TIP packet commit 1c196a6c771c47a2faa63d38d913e03284f73a16 upstream. When a TIP packet is expected but there is a different packet, it is an error. However the unexpected packet might be something important like a TSC packet, so after the error, it is necessary to continue from there, rather than the next packet. That is achieved by setting pkt_step to zero. Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1520431349-30689-4-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c index 66f53ef06945..21e7d3dc0178 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c @@ -1492,6 +1492,7 @@ static int intel_pt_walk_fup_tip(struct intel_pt_decoder *decoder) case INTEL_PT_PSBEND: intel_pt_log("ERROR: Missing TIP after FUP\n"); decoder->pkt_state = INTEL_PT_STATE_ERR3; + decoder->pkt_step = 0; return -ENOENT; case INTEL_PT_OVF: -- cgit v1.2.3 From f20002ad77fbfca3efadb2649a446899ce505af3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Hunter Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 16:02:24 +0200 Subject: perf intel-pt: Fix timestamp following overflow commit 91d29b288aed3406caf7c454bf2b898c96cfd177 upstream. timestamp_insn_cnt is used to estimate the timestamp based on the number of instructions since the last known timestamp. If the estimate is not accurate enough decoding might not be correctly synchronized with side-band events causing more trace errors. However there are always timestamps following an overflow, so the estimate is not needed and can indeed result in more errors. Suppress the estimate by setting timestamp_insn_cnt to zero. Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1520431349-30689-5-git-send-email-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c index 21e7d3dc0178..0b540b84f8b7 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-decoder.c @@ -1270,6 +1270,7 @@ static int intel_pt_overflow(struct intel_pt_decoder *decoder) intel_pt_clear_tx_flags(decoder); decoder->have_tma = false; decoder->cbr = 0; + decoder->timestamp_insn_cnt = 0; decoder->pkt_state = INTEL_PT_STATE_ERR_RESYNC; decoder->overflow = true; return -EOVERFLOW; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f83eb6b57f5ae7f4d1bc668f198655e854a90432 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 16:26:57 +0100 Subject: radeon: hide pointless #warning when compile testing MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit c02216acf4177c4411d33735c81cad687790fa59 upstream. In randconfig testing, we sometimes get this warning: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_object.c: In function 'radeon_bo_create': drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_object.c:242:2: error: #warning Please enable CONFIG_MTRR and CONFIG_X86_PAT for better performance thanks to write-combining [-Werror=cpp] #warning Please enable CONFIG_MTRR and CONFIG_X86_PAT for better performance \ This is rather annoying since almost all other code produces no build-time output unless we have found a real bug. We already fixed this in the amdgpu driver in commit 31bb90f1cd08 ("drm/amdgpu: shut up #warning for compile testing") by adding a CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST check last year and agreed to do the same here, but both Michel and I then forgot about it until I came across the issue again now. For stable kernels, as this is one of very few remaining randconfig warnings in 4.14. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9550009/ Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Michel Dänzer Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_object.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_object.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_object.c index fb6ad143873f..83aee9e814ba 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_object.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_object.c @@ -238,9 +238,10 @@ int radeon_bo_create(struct radeon_device *rdev, * may be slow * See https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=88758 */ - +#ifndef CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST #warning Please enable CONFIG_MTRR and CONFIG_X86_PAT for better performance \ thanks to write-combining +#endif if (bo->flags & RADEON_GEM_GTT_WC) DRM_INFO_ONCE("Please enable CONFIG_MTRR and CONFIG_X86_PAT for " -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9580b588c86174f292ea6648320cea9f4d9f4128 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 14:56:21 +0200 Subject: Revert "perf tests: Decompress kernel module before objdump" This reverts commit b0761b57e0bf11ada4c45e68f4cba1370363d90d which is commit 94df1040b1e6aacd8dec0ba3c61d7e77cd695f26 upstream. It breaks the build of perf on 4.4.y, so I'm dropping it. Reported-by: Pavlos Parissis Reported-by: Lei Chen Reported-by: Maxime Hadjinlian Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Adrian Hunter Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: David Ahern Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Wang Nan Cc: kernel-team@lge.com Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/perf/tests/code-reading.c | 20 +------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/perf/tests/code-reading.c b/tools/perf/tests/code-reading.c index 6ea4fcfaab36..a767a6400c5c 100644 --- a/tools/perf/tests/code-reading.c +++ b/tools/perf/tests/code-reading.c @@ -182,8 +182,6 @@ static int read_object_code(u64 addr, size_t len, u8 cpumode, unsigned char buf2[BUFSZ]; size_t ret_len; u64 objdump_addr; - const char *objdump_name; - char decomp_name[KMOD_DECOMP_LEN]; int ret; pr_debug("Reading object code for memory address: %#"PRIx64"\n", addr); @@ -244,25 +242,9 @@ static int read_object_code(u64 addr, size_t len, u8 cpumode, state->done[state->done_cnt++] = al.map->start; } - objdump_name = al.map->dso->long_name; - if (dso__needs_decompress(al.map->dso)) { - if (dso__decompress_kmodule_path(al.map->dso, objdump_name, - decomp_name, - sizeof(decomp_name)) < 0) { - pr_debug("decompression failed\n"); - return -1; - } - - objdump_name = decomp_name; - } - /* Read the object code using objdump */ objdump_addr = map__rip_2objdump(al.map, al.addr); - ret = read_via_objdump(objdump_name, objdump_addr, buf2, len); - - if (dso__needs_decompress(al.map->dso)) - unlink(objdump_name); - + ret = read_via_objdump(al.map->dso->long_name, objdump_addr, buf2, len); if (ret > 0) { /* * The kernel maps are inaccurate - assume objdump is right in -- cgit v1.2.3 From 123d30649e328dd9f8823fa63db9f7c5f5a581e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 10:03:17 +0900 Subject: block/loop: fix deadlock after loop_set_status commit 1e047eaab3bb5564f25b41e9cd3a053009f4e789 upstream. syzbot is reporting deadlocks at __blkdev_get() [1]. ---------------------------------------- [ 92.493919] systemd-udevd D12696 525 1 0x00000000 [ 92.495891] Call Trace: [ 92.501560] schedule+0x23/0x80 [ 92.502923] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x5/0x10 [ 92.504645] __mutex_lock+0x416/0x9e0 [ 92.510760] __blkdev_get+0x73/0x4f0 [ 92.512220] blkdev_get+0x12e/0x390 [ 92.518151] do_dentry_open+0x1c3/0x2f0 [ 92.519815] path_openat+0x5d9/0xdc0 [ 92.521437] do_filp_open+0x7d/0xf0 [ 92.527365] do_sys_open+0x1b8/0x250 [ 92.528831] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x270 [ 92.530341] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 [ 92.931922] 1 lock held by systemd-udevd/525: [ 92.933642] #0: 00000000a2849e25 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x73/0x4f0 ---------------------------------------- The reason of deadlock turned out that wait_event_interruptible() in blk_queue_enter() got stuck with bdev->bd_mutex held at __blkdev_put() due to q->mq_freeze_depth == 1. ---------------------------------------- [ 92.787172] a.out S12584 634 633 0x80000002 [ 92.789120] Call Trace: [ 92.796693] schedule+0x23/0x80 [ 92.797994] blk_queue_enter+0x3cb/0x540 [ 92.803272] generic_make_request+0xf0/0x3d0 [ 92.807970] submit_bio+0x67/0x130 [ 92.810928] submit_bh_wbc+0x15e/0x190 [ 92.812461] __block_write_full_page+0x218/0x460 [ 92.815792] __writepage+0x11/0x50 [ 92.817209] write_cache_pages+0x1ae/0x3d0 [ 92.825585] generic_writepages+0x5a/0x90 [ 92.831865] do_writepages+0x43/0xd0 [ 92.836972] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc1/0x100 [ 92.838788] filemap_write_and_wait+0x24/0x70 [ 92.840491] __blkdev_put+0x69/0x1e0 [ 92.841949] blkdev_close+0x16/0x20 [ 92.843418] __fput+0xda/0x1f0 [ 92.844740] task_work_run+0x87/0xb0 [ 92.846215] do_exit+0x2f5/0xba0 [ 92.850528] do_group_exit+0x34/0xb0 [ 92.852018] SyS_exit_group+0xb/0x10 [ 92.853449] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x270 [ 92.854944] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 [ 92.943530] 1 lock held by a.out/634: [ 92.945105] #0: 00000000a2849e25 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_put+0x3c/0x1e0 ---------------------------------------- The reason of q->mq_freeze_depth == 1 turned out that loop_set_status() forgot to call blk_mq_unfreeze_queue() at error paths for info->lo_encrypt_type != NULL case. ---------------------------------------- [ 37.509497] CPU: 2 PID: 634 Comm: a.out Tainted: G W 4.16.0+ #457 [ 37.513608] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017 [ 37.518832] RIP: 0010:blk_freeze_queue_start+0x17/0x40 [ 37.521778] RSP: 0018:ffffb0c2013e7c60 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 37.524078] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b07b1519798 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 37.527015] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffb0c2013e7cc0 RDI: ffff8b07b1519798 [ 37.529934] RBP: ffffb0c2013e7cc0 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 47a189966239b898 [ 37.532684] R10: dad78b99b278552f R11: 9332dca72259d5ef R12: ffff8b07acd73678 [ 37.535452] R13: 0000000000004c04 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8b07b841e940 [ 37.538186] FS: 00007fede33b9740(0000) GS:ffff8b07b8e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 37.541168] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 37.543590] CR2: 00000000206fdf18 CR3: 0000000130b30006 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [ 37.546410] Call Trace: [ 37.547902] blk_freeze_queue+0x9/0x30 [ 37.549968] loop_set_status+0x67/0x3c0 [loop] [ 37.549975] loop_set_status64+0x3b/0x70 [loop] [ 37.549986] lo_ioctl+0x223/0x810 [loop] [ 37.549995] blkdev_ioctl+0x572/0x980 [ 37.550003] block_ioctl+0x34/0x40 [ 37.550006] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa7/0x6d0 [ 37.550017] ksys_ioctl+0x6b/0x80 [ 37.573076] SyS_ioctl+0x5/0x10 [ 37.574831] do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x270 [ 37.576769] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 ---------------------------------------- [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=cd662bc3f6022c0979d01a262c318fab2ee9b56f Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa Reported-by: syzbot Fixes: ecdd09597a572513 ("block/loop: fix race between I/O and set_status") Cc: Ming Lei Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: stable Cc: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/block/loop.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/loop.c b/drivers/block/loop.c index 1dd16f26e77d..e8165ec55e6f 100644 --- a/drivers/block/loop.c +++ b/drivers/block/loop.c @@ -1121,11 +1121,15 @@ loop_set_status(struct loop_device *lo, const struct loop_info64 *info) if (info->lo_encrypt_type) { unsigned int type = info->lo_encrypt_type; - if (type >= MAX_LO_CRYPT) - return -EINVAL; + if (type >= MAX_LO_CRYPT) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto exit; + } xfer = xfer_funcs[type]; - if (xfer == NULL) - return -EINVAL; + if (xfer == NULL) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto exit; + } } else xfer = NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f614d9f7372ca02aab68fae7da21ee9c7826ec86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Wiedmann Date: Mon, 5 Mar 2018 09:39:38 +0100 Subject: s390/qdio: don't retry EQBS after CCQ 96 commit dae55b6fef58530c13df074bcc182c096609339e upstream. Immediate retry of EQBS after CCQ 96 means that we potentially misreport the state of buffers inspected during the first EQBS call. This occurs when 1. the first EQBS finds all inspected buffers still in the initial state set by the driver (ie INPUT EMPTY or OUTPUT PRIMED), 2. the EQBS terminates early with CCQ 96, and 3. by the time that the second EQBS comes around, the state of those previously inspected buffers has changed. If the state reported by the second EQBS is 'driver-owned', all we know is that the previous buffers are driver-owned now as well. But we can't tell if they all have the same state. So for instance - the second EQBS reports OUTPUT EMPTY, but any number of the previous buffers could be OUTPUT ERROR by now, - the second EQBS reports OUTPUT ERROR, but any number of the previous buffers could be OUTPUT EMPTY by now. Effectively, this can result in both over- and underreporting of errors. If the state reported by the second EQBS is 'HW-owned', that doesn't guarantee that the previous buffers have not been switched to driver-owned in the mean time. So for instance - the second EQBS reports INPUT EMPTY, but any number of the previous buffers could be INPUT PRIMED (or INPUT ERROR) by now. This would result in failure to process pending work on the queue. If it's the final check before yielding initiative, this can cause a (temporary) queue stall due to IRQ avoidance. Fixes: 25f269f17316 ("[S390] qdio: EQBS retry after CCQ 96") Cc: #v3.2+ Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c | 11 ++--------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c index 4bb5262f7aee..da28b172446d 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c +++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static inline int qdio_check_ccq(struct qdio_q *q, unsigned int ccq) static int qdio_do_eqbs(struct qdio_q *q, unsigned char *state, int start, int count, int auto_ack) { - int rc, tmp_count = count, tmp_start = start, nr = q->nr, retried = 0; + int rc, tmp_count = count, tmp_start = start, nr = q->nr; unsigned int ccq = 0; qperf_inc(q, eqbs); @@ -149,14 +149,7 @@ again: qperf_inc(q, eqbs_partial); DBF_DEV_EVENT(DBF_WARN, q->irq_ptr, "EQBS part:%02x", tmp_count); - /* - * Retry once, if that fails bail out and process the - * extracted buffers before trying again. - */ - if (!retried++) - goto again; - else - return count - tmp_count; + return count - tmp_count; } DBF_ERROR("%4x EQBS ERROR", SCH_NO(q)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7dc2c154c1764e2d19a18380e51935cb5ccb5c66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Wiedmann Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 14:01:01 +0100 Subject: s390/qdio: don't merge ERROR output buffers commit 0cf1e05157b9e5530dcc3ca9fec9bf617fc93375 upstream. On an Output queue, both EMPTY and PENDING buffer states imply that the buffer is ready for completion-processing by the upper-layer drivers. So for a non-QEBSM Output queue, get_buf_states() merges mixed batches of PENDING and EMPTY buffers into one large batch of EMPTY buffers. The upper-layer driver (ie. qeth) later distuingishes PENDING from EMPTY by inspecting the slsb_state for QDIO_OUTBUF_STATE_FLAG_PENDING. But the merge logic in get_buf_states() contains a bug that causes us to erronously also merge ERROR buffers into such a batch of EMPTY buffers (ERROR is 0xaf, EMPTY is 0xa1; so ERROR & EMPTY == EMPTY). Effectively, most outbound ERROR buffers are currently discarded silently and processed as if they had succeeded. Note that this affects _all_ non-QEBSM device types, not just IQD with CQ. Fix it by explicitly spelling out the exact conditions for merging. For extracting the "get initial state" part out of the loop, this relies on the fact that get_buf_states() is never called with a count of 0. The QEBSM path already strictly requires this, and the two callers with variable 'count' make sure of it. Fixes: 104ea556ee7f ("qdio: support asynchronous delivery of storage blocks") Cc: #v3.2+ Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann Reviewed-by: Ursula Braun Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c index da28b172446d..742ca57ece8c 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c +++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_main.c @@ -205,7 +205,10 @@ again: return 0; } -/* returns number of examined buffers and their common state in *state */ +/* + * Returns number of examined buffers and their common state in *state. + * Requested number of buffers-to-examine must be > 0. + */ static inline int get_buf_states(struct qdio_q *q, unsigned int bufnr, unsigned char *state, unsigned int count, int auto_ack, int merge_pending) @@ -216,17 +219,23 @@ static inline int get_buf_states(struct qdio_q *q, unsigned int bufnr, if (is_qebsm(q)) return qdio_do_eqbs(q, state, bufnr, count, auto_ack); - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - if (!__state) { - __state = q->slsb.val[bufnr]; - if (merge_pending && __state == SLSB_P_OUTPUT_PENDING) - __state = SLSB_P_OUTPUT_EMPTY; - } else if (merge_pending) { - if ((q->slsb.val[bufnr] & __state) != __state) - break; - } else if (q->slsb.val[bufnr] != __state) - break; + /* get initial state: */ + __state = q->slsb.val[bufnr]; + if (merge_pending && __state == SLSB_P_OUTPUT_PENDING) + __state = SLSB_P_OUTPUT_EMPTY; + + for (i = 1; i < count; i++) { bufnr = next_buf(bufnr); + + /* merge PENDING into EMPTY: */ + if (merge_pending && + q->slsb.val[bufnr] == SLSB_P_OUTPUT_PENDING && + __state == SLSB_P_OUTPUT_EMPTY) + continue; + + /* stop if next state differs from initial state: */ + if (q->slsb.val[bufnr] != __state) + break; } *state = __state; return i; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 93da190b72043d607803b350d947769b7b27e1ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasily Gorbik Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 16:02:15 +0200 Subject: s390/ipl: ensure loadparm valid flag is set commit 15deb080a6087b73089139569558965750e69d67 upstream. When loadparm is set in reipl parm block, the kernel should also set DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID flag. This fixes loadparm ignoring during z/VM fcp -> ccw reipl and kvm direct boot -> ccw reipl. Cc: Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c index 42570d8fb265..e73979236659 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c @@ -798,6 +798,7 @@ static ssize_t reipl_generic_loadparm_store(struct ipl_parameter_block *ipb, /* copy and convert to ebcdic */ memcpy(ipb->hdr.loadparm, buf, lp_len); ASCEBC(ipb->hdr.loadparm, LOADPARM_LEN); + ipb->hdr.flags |= DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID; return len; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5da4880c985b0b00021809f7fb7153ed10f4eaa0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Sun, 8 Apr 2018 11:57:10 -0400 Subject: getname_kernel() needs to make sure that ->name != ->iname in long case commit 30ce4d1903e1d8a7ccd110860a5eef3c638ed8be upstream. missed it in "kill struct filename.separate" several years ago. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/namei.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 0fcad42e4d3e..de57dd59d95f 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -219,9 +219,10 @@ getname_kernel(const char * filename) if (len <= EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX) { result->name = (char *)result->iname; } else if (len <= PATH_MAX) { + const size_t size = offsetof(struct filename, iname[1]); struct filename *tmp; - tmp = kmalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_KERNEL); + tmp = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!tmp)) { __putname(result); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2f2c030c1e96ac9055f36d8a841e751ac4fe40d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sudhir Sreedharan Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 12:52:45 +0530 Subject: rtl8187: Fix NULL pointer dereference in priv->conf_mutex commit 7972326a26b5bf8dc2adac575c4e03ee7e9d193a upstream. This can be reproduced by bind/unbind the driver multiple times in AM3517 board. Analysis revealed that rtl8187_start() was invoked before probe finishes(ie. before the mutex is initialized). INFO: trying to register non-static key. the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation. turning off the locking correctness validator. CPU: 0 PID: 821 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 4.9.80-dirty #250 Hardware name: Generic AM3517 (Flattened Device Tree) [] (unwind_backtrace) from [] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [] (show_stack) from [] (register_lock_class+0x4f4/0x55c) [] (register_lock_class) from [] (__lock_acquire+0x74/0x1938) [] (__lock_acquire) from [] (lock_acquire+0xfc/0x23c) [] (lock_acquire) from [] (mutex_lock_nested+0x50/0x3b0) [] (mutex_lock_nested) from [] (rtl8187_start+0x2c/0xd54) [] (rtl8187_start) from [] (drv_start+0xa8/0x320) [] (drv_start) from [] (ieee80211_do_open+0x2bc/0x8e4) [] (ieee80211_do_open) from [] (__dev_open+0xb8/0x120) [] (__dev_open) from [] (__dev_change_flags+0x88/0x14c) [] (__dev_change_flags) from [] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [] (dev_change_flags) from [] (devinet_ioctl+0x738/0x840) [] (devinet_ioctl) from [] (sock_ioctl+0x164/0x2f4) [] (sock_ioctl) from [] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x8c/0x9d0) [] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [] (SyS_ioctl+0x6c/0x7c) [] (SyS_ioctl) from [] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c) Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 pgd = cd1ec000 [00000000] *pgd=8d1de831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 817 [#1] PREEMPT ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 821 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 4.9.80-dirty #250 Hardware name: Generic AM3517 (Flattened Device Tree) task: ce73eec0 task.stack: cd1ea000 PC is at mutex_lock_nested+0xe8/0x3b0 LR is at mutex_lock_nested+0xd0/0x3b0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sudhir Sreedharan Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8187/dev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8187/dev.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8187/dev.c index b7f72f9c7988..b3691712df61 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8187/dev.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl818x/rtl8187/dev.c @@ -1454,6 +1454,7 @@ static int rtl8187_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, goto err_free_dev; } mutex_init(&priv->io_mutex); + mutex_init(&priv->conf_mutex); SET_IEEE80211_DEV(dev, &intf->dev); usb_set_intfdata(intf, dev); @@ -1627,7 +1628,6 @@ static int rtl8187_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, printk(KERN_ERR "rtl8187: Cannot register device\n"); goto err_free_dmabuf; } - mutex_init(&priv->conf_mutex); skb_queue_head_init(&priv->b_tx_status.queue); wiphy_info(dev->wiphy, "hwaddr %pM, %s V%d + %s, rfkill mask %d\n", -- cgit v1.2.3 From 09293a7b610f7a2a145c4dc7bf4315886457d0da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Szyprowski Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 14:58:21 +0100 Subject: hwmon: (ina2xx) Fix access to uninitialized mutex commit 0c4c5860e9983eb3da7a3d73ca987643c3ed034b upstream. Initialize data->config_lock mutex before it is used by the driver code. This fixes following warning on Odroid XU3 boards: INFO: trying to register non-static key. the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation. turning off the locking correctness validator. CPU: 5 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc7-next-20180115-00001-gb75575dee3f2 #107 Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) [] (unwind_backtrace) from [] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [] (show_stack) from [] (dump_stack+0x90/0xc8) [] (dump_stack) from [] (register_lock_class+0x1c0/0x59c) [] (register_lock_class) from [] (__lock_acquire+0x78/0x1850) [] (__lock_acquire) from [] (lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2b8) [] (lock_acquire) from [] (__mutex_lock+0x60/0xa0c) [] (__mutex_lock) from [] (mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24) [] (mutex_lock_nested) from [] (ina2xx_set_shunt+0x70/0xb0) [] (ina2xx_set_shunt) from [] (ina2xx_probe+0x88/0x1b0) [] (ina2xx_probe) from [] (i2c_device_probe+0x1e0/0x2d0) [] (i2c_device_probe) from [] (driver_probe_device+0x2b8/0x4a0) [] (driver_probe_device) from [] (__driver_attach+0xfc/0x120) [] (__driver_attach) from [] (bus_for_each_dev+0x58/0x7c) [] (bus_for_each_dev) from [] (bus_add_driver+0x174/0x250) [] (bus_add_driver) from [] (driver_register+0x78/0xf4) [] (driver_register) from [] (i2c_register_driver+0x38/0xa8) [] (i2c_register_driver) from [] (do_one_initcall+0x48/0x18c) [] (do_one_initcall) from [] (kernel_init_freeable+0x110/0x1d4) [] (kernel_init_freeable) from [] (kernel_init+0x8/0x114) [] (kernel_init) from [] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) Fixes: 5d389b125186 ("hwmon: (ina2xx) Make calibration register value fixed") Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck [backport to v4.4.y/v4.9.y: context changes] Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hwmon/ina2xx.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/ina2xx.c b/drivers/hwmon/ina2xx.c index a629f7c130f0..ac63e562071f 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/ina2xx.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/ina2xx.c @@ -447,6 +447,7 @@ static int ina2xx_probe(struct i2c_client *client, /* set the device type */ data->config = &ina2xx_config[id->driver_data]; + mutex_init(&data->config_lock); if (of_property_read_u32(dev->of_node, "shunt-resistor", &val) < 0) { struct ina2xx_platform_data *pdata = dev_get_platdata(dev); @@ -473,8 +474,6 @@ static int ina2xx_probe(struct i2c_client *client, return -ENODEV; } - mutex_init(&data->config_lock); - data->groups[group++] = &ina2xx_group; if (id->driver_data == ina226) data->groups[group++] = &ina226_group; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 085c9c4b9e7eb21d6bdfb08228ee16a3af6c2cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bassem Boubaker Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 13:15:53 +0200 Subject: cdc_ether: flag the Cinterion AHS8 modem by gemalto as WWAN [ Upstream commit 53765341ee821c0a0f1dec41adc89c9096ad694c ] The Cinterion AHS8 is a 3G device with one embedded WWAN interface using cdc_ether as a driver. The modem is controlled via AT commands through the exposed TTYs. AT+CGDCONT write command can be used to activate or deactivate a WWAN connection for a PDP context defined with the same command. UE supports one WWAN adapter. Signed-off-by: Bassem Boubaker Acked-by: Oliver Neukum Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/cdc_ether.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ether.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ether.c index f9343bee1de3..6578127db847 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ether.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ether.c @@ -704,6 +704,12 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = { USB_CDC_SUBCLASS_ETHERNET, USB_CDC_PROTO_NONE), .driver_info = (unsigned long)&wwan_info, +}, { + /* Cinterion AHS3 modem by GEMALTO */ + USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x1e2d, 0x0055, USB_CLASS_COMM, + USB_CDC_SUBCLASS_ETHERNET, + USB_CDC_PROTO_NONE), + .driver_info = (unsigned long)&wwan_info, }, { /* Telit modules */ USB_VENDOR_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(0x1bc7, USB_CLASS_COMM, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 460439418f1c720d87baa55ed4c965fc9275576d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejaswi Tanikella Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 16:34:47 +0530 Subject: slip: Check if rstate is initialized before uncompressing [ Upstream commit 3f01ddb962dc506916c243f9524e8bef97119b77 ] On receiving a packet the state index points to the rstate which must be used to fill up IP and TCP headers. But if the state index points to a rstate which is unitialized, i.e. filled with zeros, it gets stuck in an infinite loop inside ip_fast_csum trying to compute the ip checsum of a header with zero length. 89.666953: <2> [] slhc_uncompress+0x464/0x468 89.666965: <2> [] ppp_receive_nonmp_frame+0x3b4/0x65c 89.666978: <2> [] ppp_receive_frame+0x64/0x7e0 89.666991: <2> [] ppp_input+0x104/0x198 89.667005: <2> [] pppopns_recv_core+0x238/0x370 89.667027: <2> [] __sk_receive_skb+0xdc/0x250 89.667040: <2> [] pppopns_recv+0x44/0x60 89.667053: <2> [] __sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x16c/0x24c 89.667065: <2> [] sock_queue_rcv_skb+0x2c/0x38 89.667085: <2> [] raw_rcv+0x124/0x154 89.667098: <2> [] raw_local_deliver+0x1e0/0x22c 89.667117: <2> [] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x70/0x24c 89.667131: <2> [] ip_local_deliver+0x100/0x10c ./scripts/faddr2line vmlinux slhc_uncompress+0x464/0x468 output: ip_fast_csum at arch/arm64/include/asm/checksum.h:40 (inlined by) slhc_uncompress at drivers/net/slip/slhc.c:615 Adding a variable to indicate if the current rstate is initialized. If such a packet arrives, move to toss state. Signed-off-by: Tejaswi Tanikella Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/slip/slhc.c | 5 +++++ include/net/slhc_vj.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/slip/slhc.c b/drivers/net/slip/slhc.c index 27ed25252aac..cfd81eb1b532 100644 --- a/drivers/net/slip/slhc.c +++ b/drivers/net/slip/slhc.c @@ -509,6 +509,10 @@ slhc_uncompress(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize) if(x < 0 || x > comp->rslot_limit) goto bad; + /* Check if the cstate is initialized */ + if (!comp->rstate[x].initialized) + goto bad; + comp->flags &=~ SLF_TOSS; comp->recv_current = x; } else { @@ -673,6 +677,7 @@ slhc_remember(struct slcompress *comp, unsigned char *icp, int isize) if (cs->cs_tcp.doff > 5) memcpy(cs->cs_tcpopt, icp + ihl*4 + sizeof(struct tcphdr), (cs->cs_tcp.doff - 5) * 4); cs->cs_hsize = ihl*2 + cs->cs_tcp.doff*2; + cs->initialized = true; /* Put headers back on packet * Neither header checksum is recalculated */ diff --git a/include/net/slhc_vj.h b/include/net/slhc_vj.h index 8716d5942b65..8fcf8908a694 100644 --- a/include/net/slhc_vj.h +++ b/include/net/slhc_vj.h @@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ typedef __u32 int32; */ struct cstate { byte_t cs_this; /* connection id number (xmit) */ + bool initialized; /* true if initialized */ struct cstate *next; /* next in ring (xmit) */ struct iphdr cs_ip; /* ip/tcp hdr from most recent packet */ struct tcphdr cs_tcp; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3d069960454e2b8795fed56fba9efb5f3e7a8615 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Elwell Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 10:59:17 +0100 Subject: lan78xx: Correctly indicate invalid OTP [ Upstream commit 4bfc33807a9a02764bdd1e42e794b3b401240f27 ] lan78xx_read_otp tries to return -EINVAL in the event of invalid OTP content, but the value gets overwritten before it is returned and the read goes ahead anyway. Make the read conditional as it should be and preserve the error code. Fixes: 55d7de9de6c3 ("Microchip's LAN7800 family USB 2/3 to 10/100/1000 Ethernet device driver") Signed-off-by: Phil Elwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c index ebdee8f01f65..a6d429950cb0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c @@ -618,7 +618,8 @@ static int lan78xx_read_otp(struct lan78xx_net *dev, u32 offset, offset += 0x100; else ret = -EINVAL; - ret = lan78xx_read_raw_otp(dev, offset, length, data); + if (!ret) + ret = lan78xx_read_raw_otp(dev, offset, length, data); } return ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c597f98755e0387067127033eef7a21a34ecf21c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov Date: Mon, 30 May 2016 12:56:27 +0200 Subject: x86/hweight: Get rid of the special calling convention commit f5967101e9de12addcda4510dfbac66d7c5779c3 upstream. People complained about ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS and how it throws a wrench into kcov, lto, etc, experimentations. Add asm versions for __sw_hweight{32,64}() and do explicit saving and restoring of clobbered registers. This gets rid of the special calling convention. We get to call those functions on !X86_FEATURE_POPCNT CPUs. We still need to hardcode POPCNT and register operands as some old gas versions which we support, do not know about POPCNT. Btw, remove redundant REX prefix from 32-bit POPCNT because alternatives can do padding now. Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464605787-20603-1-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 5 --- arch/x86/include/asm/arch_hweight.h | 24 +++++------- arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/lib/hweight.S | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/Makefile | 2 - lib/hweight.c | 4 ++ 8 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/hweight.S diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index bb6aab2fa7f5..eab1ef25eecd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -280,11 +280,6 @@ config X86_32_LAZY_GS def_bool y depends on X86_32 && !CC_STACKPROTECTOR -config ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS - string - default "-fcall-saved-ecx -fcall-saved-edx" if X86_32 - default "-fcall-saved-rdi -fcall-saved-rsi -fcall-saved-rdx -fcall-saved-rcx -fcall-saved-r8 -fcall-saved-r9 -fcall-saved-r10 -fcall-saved-r11" if X86_64 - config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES def_bool y diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/arch_hweight.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/arch_hweight.h index 259a7c1ef709..44f825c80ed5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/arch_hweight.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/arch_hweight.h @@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ #define _ASM_X86_HWEIGHT_H #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT -/* popcnt %edi, %eax -- redundant REX prefix for alignment */ -#define POPCNT32 ".byte 0xf3,0x40,0x0f,0xb8,0xc7" +/* popcnt %edi, %eax */ +#define POPCNT32 ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xb8,0xc7" /* popcnt %rdi, %rax */ #define POPCNT64 ".byte 0xf3,0x48,0x0f,0xb8,0xc7" #define REG_IN "D" @@ -15,19 +15,15 @@ #define REG_OUT "a" #endif -/* - * __sw_hweightXX are called from within the alternatives below - * and callee-clobbered registers need to be taken care of. See - * ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS in for the respective - * compiler switches. - */ +#define __HAVE_ARCH_SW_HWEIGHT + static __always_inline unsigned int __arch_hweight32(unsigned int w) { - unsigned int res = 0; + unsigned int res; asm (ALTERNATIVE("call __sw_hweight32", POPCNT32, X86_FEATURE_POPCNT) - : "="REG_OUT (res) - : REG_IN (w)); + : "="REG_OUT (res) + : REG_IN (w)); return res; } @@ -51,11 +47,11 @@ static inline unsigned long __arch_hweight64(__u64 w) #else static __always_inline unsigned long __arch_hweight64(__u64 w) { - unsigned long res = 0; + unsigned long res; asm (ALTERNATIVE("call __sw_hweight64", POPCNT64, X86_FEATURE_POPCNT) - : "="REG_OUT (res) - : REG_IN (w)); + : "="REG_OUT (res) + : REG_IN (w)); return res; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c index 64341aa485ae..d40ee8a38fed 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/i386_ksyms_32.c @@ -42,3 +42,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page); EXPORT_SYMBOL(___preempt_schedule); EXPORT_SYMBOL(___preempt_schedule_notrace); #endif + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sw_hweight32); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c index a0695be19864..c7efd394c42b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x8664_ksyms_64.c @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_page); EXPORT_SYMBOL(csum_partial); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sw_hweight32); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sw_hweight64); + /* * Export string functions. We normally rely on gcc builtin for most of these, * but gcc sometimes decides not to inline them. diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile index 12a34d15b648..c0c8b0a49bb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o -obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o +obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y) obj-y += atomic64_32.o diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S b/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..02de3d74d2c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +#include + +#include + +/* + * unsigned int __sw_hweight32(unsigned int w) + * %rdi: w + */ +ENTRY(__sw_hweight32) + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + movl %edi, %eax # w +#endif + __ASM_SIZE(push,) %__ASM_REG(dx) + movl %eax, %edx # w -> t + shrl %edx # t >>= 1 + andl $0x55555555, %edx # t &= 0x55555555 + subl %edx, %eax # w -= t + + movl %eax, %edx # w -> t + shrl $2, %eax # w_tmp >>= 2 + andl $0x33333333, %edx # t &= 0x33333333 + andl $0x33333333, %eax # w_tmp &= 0x33333333 + addl %edx, %eax # w = w_tmp + t + + movl %eax, %edx # w -> t + shrl $4, %edx # t >>= 4 + addl %edx, %eax # w_tmp += t + andl $0x0f0f0f0f, %eax # w_tmp &= 0x0f0f0f0f + imull $0x01010101, %eax, %eax # w_tmp *= 0x01010101 + shrl $24, %eax # w = w_tmp >> 24 + __ASM_SIZE(pop,) %__ASM_REG(dx) + ret +ENDPROC(__sw_hweight32) + +ENTRY(__sw_hweight64) +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + pushq %rdx + + movq %rdi, %rdx # w -> t + movabsq $0x5555555555555555, %rax + shrq %rdx # t >>= 1 + andq %rdx, %rax # t &= 0x5555555555555555 + movabsq $0x3333333333333333, %rdx + subq %rax, %rdi # w -= t + + movq %rdi, %rax # w -> t + shrq $2, %rdi # w_tmp >>= 2 + andq %rdx, %rax # t &= 0x3333333333333333 + andq %rdi, %rdx # w_tmp &= 0x3333333333333333 + addq %rdx, %rax # w = w_tmp + t + + movq %rax, %rdx # w -> t + shrq $4, %rdx # t >>= 4 + addq %rdx, %rax # w_tmp += t + movabsq $0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f, %rdx + andq %rdx, %rax # w_tmp &= 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f + movabsq $0x0101010101010101, %rdx + imulq %rdx, %rax # w_tmp *= 0x0101010101010101 + shrq $56, %rax # w = w_tmp >> 56 + + popq %rdx + ret +#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ + /* We're getting an u64 arg in (%eax,%edx): unsigned long hweight64(__u64 w) */ + pushl %ecx + + call __sw_hweight32 + movl %eax, %ecx # stash away result + movl %edx, %eax # second part of input + call __sw_hweight32 + addl %ecx, %eax # result + + popl %ecx + ret +#endif +ENDPROC(__sw_hweight64) diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index 7f1de26613d2..cb4f6aa95013 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM) += iomap_copy.o devres.o obj-$(CONFIG_CHECK_SIGNATURE) += check_signature.o obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKING_API_SELFTESTS) += locking-selftest.o -GCOV_PROFILE_hweight.o := n -CFLAGS_hweight.o = $(subst $(quote),,$(CONFIG_ARCH_HWEIGHT_CFLAGS)) obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT) += hweight.o obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o diff --git a/lib/hweight.c b/lib/hweight.c index 9a5c1f221558..43273a7d83cf 100644 --- a/lib/hweight.c +++ b/lib/hweight.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ * The Hamming Weight of a number is the total number of bits set in it. */ +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SW_HWEIGHT unsigned int __sw_hweight32(unsigned int w) { #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER @@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ unsigned int __sw_hweight32(unsigned int w) #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sw_hweight32); +#endif unsigned int __sw_hweight16(unsigned int w) { @@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ unsigned int __sw_hweight8(unsigned int w) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sw_hweight8); +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_SW_HWEIGHT unsigned long __sw_hweight64(__u64 w) { #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 @@ -65,3 +68,4 @@ unsigned long __sw_hweight64(__u64 w) #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sw_hweight64); +#endif -- cgit v1.2.3 From 34a6851c55f72b3121b2c3d2d26ce61cc5869182 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ville Syrjälä Date: Mon, 8 Aug 2016 20:35:29 +0300 Subject: x86/hweight: Don't clobber %rdi MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 65ea11ec6a82b1d44aba62b59e9eb20247e57c6e upstream. The caller expects %rdi to remain intact, push+pop it make that happen. Fixes the following kind of explosions on my core2duo machine when trying to reboot or shut down: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper cfbfillrect syscopyarea cfbimgblt sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cfbcopyarea drm netconsole configfs binfmt_misc iTCO_wdt psmouse pcspkr snd_hda_codec_idt e100 coretemp hwmon snd_hda_codec_generic i2c_i801 mii i2c_smbus lpc_ich mfd_core snd_hda_intel uhci_hcd snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ehci_pci 8250 ehci_hcd snd_pcm 8250_base usbcore evdev serial_core usb_common parport_pc parport snd_timer snd soundcore CPU: 0 PID: 3070 Comm: reboot Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1-perf-dirty #69 Hardware name: /D946GZIS, BIOS TS94610J.86A.0087.2007.1107.1049 11/07/2007 task: ffff88012a0b4080 task.stack: ffff880123850000 RIP: 0010:[] [] x86_perf_event_update+0x52/0xc0 RSP: 0018:ffff880123853b60 EFLAGS: 00010087 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88012fc0a3c0 RCX: 000000000000001e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000040000000 RDI: ffff88012b014800 RBP: ffff880123853b88 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffea0004a012c0 R11: ffffea0004acedc0 R12: ffffffff80000001 R13: ffff88012b0149c0 R14: ffff88012b014800 R15: 0000000000000018 FS: 00007f8b155cd700(0000) GS:ffff88012fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8b155f5000 CR3: 000000012a2d7000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff88012fc0a3c0 ffff88012b014800 0000000000000004 0000000000000001 ffff88012fc1b750 ffff880123853bb0 ffffffff81003d59 ffff88012b014800 ffff88012fc0a3c0 ffff88012b014800 ffff880123853bd8 ffffffff81003e13 Call Trace: [] x86_pmu_stop+0x59/0xd0 [] x86_pmu_del+0x43/0x140 [] event_sched_out.isra.105+0xbd/0x260 [] __perf_remove_from_context+0x2d/0xb0 [] __perf_event_exit_context+0x4d/0x70 [] generic_exec_single+0xb6/0x140 [] ? __perf_remove_from_context+0xb0/0xb0 [] ? __perf_remove_from_context+0xb0/0xb0 [] smp_call_function_single+0xdf/0x140 [] perf_event_exit_cpu_context+0x87/0xc0 [] perf_reboot+0x13/0x40 [] notifier_call_chain+0x4a/0x70 [] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x47/0x60 [] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [] kernel_restart_prepare+0x1d/0x40 [] kernel_restart+0x12/0x60 [] SYSC_reboot+0xf6/0x1b0 [] ? mntput_no_expire+0x2c/0x1b0 [] ? mntput+0x24/0x40 [] ? __fput+0x16c/0x1e0 [] ? ____fput+0xe/0x10 [] ? task_work_run+0x83/0xa0 [] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x53/0xc0 [] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [] SyS_reboot+0xe/0x10 [] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xa3 Code: 7c 4c 8d af c0 01 00 00 49 89 fe eb 10 48 09 c2 4c 89 e0 49 0f b1 55 00 4c 39 e0 74 35 4d 8b a6 c0 01 00 00 41 8b 8e 60 01 00 00 <0f> 33 8b 35 6e 02 8c 00 48 c1 e2 20 85 f6 7e d2 48 89 d3 89 cf RIP [] x86_perf_event_update+0x52/0xc0 RSP ---[ end trace 7ec95181faf211be ]--- note: reboot[3070] exited with preempt_count 2 Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Brian Gerst Cc: Denys Vlasenko Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Fixes: f5967101e9de ("x86/hweight: Get rid of the special calling convention") Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/lib/hweight.S | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S b/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S index 02de3d74d2c5..8a602a1e404a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/hweight.S @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ ENDPROC(__sw_hweight32) ENTRY(__sw_hweight64) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + pushq %rdi pushq %rdx movq %rdi, %rdx # w -> t @@ -60,6 +61,7 @@ ENTRY(__sw_hweight64) shrq $56, %rax # w = w_tmp >> 56 popq %rdx + popq %rdi ret #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ /* We're getting an u64 arg in (%eax,%edx): unsigned long hweight64(__u64 w) */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 12ed237ccc0518a867bb6ba8d624865dfb44620c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tejun Heo Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 07:38:08 -0800 Subject: tty: make n_tty_read() always abort if hangup is in progress commit 28b0f8a6962a24ed21737578f3b1b07424635c9e upstream. A tty is hung up by __tty_hangup() setting file->f_op to hung_up_tty_fops, which is skipped on ttys whose write operation isn't tty_write(). This means that, for example, /dev/console whose write op is redirected_tty_write() is never actually marked hung up. Because n_tty_read() uses the hung up status to decide whether to abort the waiting readers, the lack of hung-up marking can lead to the following scenario. 1. A session contains two processes. The leader and its child. The child ignores SIGHUP. 2. The leader exits and starts disassociating from the controlling terminal (/dev/console). 3. __tty_hangup() skips setting f_op to hung_up_tty_fops. 4. SIGHUP is delivered and ignored. 5. tty_ldisc_hangup() is invoked. It wakes up the waits which should clear the read lockers of tty->ldisc_sem. 6. The reader wakes up but because tty_hung_up_p() is false, it doesn't abort and goes back to sleep while read-holding tty->ldisc_sem. 7. The leader progresses to tty_ldisc_lock() in tty_ldisc_hangup() and is now stuck in D sleep indefinitely waiting for tty->ldisc_sem. The following is Alan's explanation on why some ttys aren't hung up. http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171101170908.6ad08580@alans-desktop 1. It broke the serial consoles because they would hang up and close down the hardware. With tty_port that *should* be fixable properly for any cases remaining. 2. The console layer was (and still is) completely broken and doens't refcount properly. So if you turn on console hangups it breaks (as indeed does freeing consoles and half a dozen other things). As neither can be fixed quickly, this patch works around the problem by introducing a new flag, TTY_HUPPING, which is used solely to tell n_tty_read() that hang-up is in progress for the console and the readers should be aborted regardless of the hung-up status of the device. The following is a sample hung task warning caused by this issue. INFO: task agetty:2662 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Not tainted 4.11.3-dbg-tty-lockup-02478-gfd6c7ee-dirty #28 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. 0 2662 1 0x00000086 Call Trace: __schedule+0x267/0x890 schedule+0x36/0x80 schedule_timeout+0x23c/0x2e0 ldsem_down_write+0xce/0x1f6 tty_ldisc_lock+0x16/0x30 tty_ldisc_hangup+0xb3/0x1b0 __tty_hangup+0x300/0x410 disassociate_ctty+0x6c/0x290 do_exit+0x7ef/0xb00 do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0 get_signal+0x1b3/0x5d0 do_signal+0x28/0x660 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x46/0x86 do_syscall_64+0x9c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 The following is the repro. Run "$PROG /dev/console". The parent process hangs in D state. #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct sigaction sact = { .sa_handler = SIG_IGN }; struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 }; pid_t pid; int fd; if (argc < 2) { fprintf(stderr, "test-hung-tty /dev/$TTY\n"); return 1; } /* fork a child to ensure that it isn't already the session leader */ pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { perror("fork"); return 1; } if (pid > 0) { /* top parent, wait for everyone */ while (waitpid(-1, NULL, 0) >= 0) ; if (errno != ECHILD) perror("waitpid"); return 0; } /* new session, start a new session and set the controlling tty */ if (setsid() < 0) { perror("setsid"); return 1; } fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) { perror("open"); return 1; } if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSCTTY, 1) < 0) { perror("ioctl"); return 1; } /* fork a child, sleep a bit and exit */ pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { perror("fork"); return 1; } if (pid > 0) { nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL); printf("Session leader exiting\n"); exit(0); } /* * The child ignores SIGHUP and keeps reading from the controlling * tty. Because SIGHUP is ignored, the child doesn't get killed on * parent exit and the bug in n_tty makes the read(2) block the * parent's control terminal hangup attempt. The parent ends up in * D sleep until the child is explicitly killed. */ sigaction(SIGHUP, &sact, NULL); printf("Child reading tty\n"); while (1) { char buf[1024]; if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) { perror("read"); return 1; } } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Cc: Alan Cox Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/n_tty.c | 6 ++++++ drivers/tty/tty_io.c | 9 +++++++++ include/linux/tty.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c index 41dda25da049..190e5dc15738 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/n_tty.c +++ b/drivers/tty/n_tty.c @@ -2238,6 +2238,12 @@ static ssize_t n_tty_read(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file, } if (tty_hung_up_p(file)) break; + /* + * Abort readers for ttys which never actually + * get hung up. See __tty_hangup(). + */ + if (test_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags)) + break; if (!timeout) break; if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c index a638c1738547..89fd20382ce4 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c @@ -702,6 +702,14 @@ static void __tty_hangup(struct tty_struct *tty, int exit_session) return; } + /* + * Some console devices aren't actually hung up for technical and + * historical reasons, which can lead to indefinite interruptible + * sleep in n_tty_read(). The following explicitly tells + * n_tty_read() to abort readers. + */ + set_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags); + /* inuse_filps is protected by the single tty lock, this really needs to change if we want to flush the workqueue with the lock held */ @@ -757,6 +765,7 @@ static void __tty_hangup(struct tty_struct *tty, int exit_session) * can't yet guarantee all that. */ set_bit(TTY_HUPPED, &tty->flags); + clear_bit(TTY_HUPPING, &tty->flags); tty_unlock(tty); if (f) diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h index a1042afff99a..d67ceb3f5958 100644 --- a/include/linux/tty.h +++ b/include/linux/tty.h @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ struct tty_file_private { #define TTY_PTY_LOCK 16 /* pty private */ #define TTY_NO_WRITE_SPLIT 17 /* Preserve write boundaries to driver */ #define TTY_HUPPED 18 /* Post driver->hangup() */ +#define TTY_HUPPING 19 /* Hangup in progress */ #define TTY_LDISC_HALTED 22 /* Line discipline is halted */ #define TTY_WRITE_FLUSH(tty) tty_write_flush((tty)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From a4e98ec002e1c5d1691a2ef8a35c8b5006cdc87e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Weinberger Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 19:12:42 +0100 Subject: ubifs: Check ubifs_wbuf_sync() return code commit aac17948a7ce01fb60b9ee6cf902967a47b3ce26 upstream. If ubifs_wbuf_sync() fails we must not write a master node with the dirty marker cleared. Otherwise it is possible that in case of an IO error while syncing we mark the filesystem as clean and UBIFS refuses to recover upon next mount. Cc: Fixes: 1e51764a3c2a ("UBIFS: add new flash file system") Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ubifs/super.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ubifs/super.c b/fs/ubifs/super.c index 1fd90c079537..0bb6de356451 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/super.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/super.c @@ -1728,8 +1728,11 @@ static void ubifs_remount_ro(struct ubifs_info *c) dbg_save_space_info(c); - for (i = 0; i < c->jhead_cnt; i++) - ubifs_wbuf_sync(&c->jheads[i].wbuf); + for (i = 0; i < c->jhead_cnt; i++) { + err = ubifs_wbuf_sync(&c->jheads[i].wbuf); + if (err) + ubifs_ro_mode(c, err); + } c->mst_node->flags &= ~cpu_to_le32(UBIFS_MST_DIRTY); c->mst_node->flags |= cpu_to_le32(UBIFS_MST_NO_ORPHS); @@ -1795,8 +1798,11 @@ static void ubifs_put_super(struct super_block *sb) int err; /* Synchronize write-buffers */ - for (i = 0; i < c->jhead_cnt; i++) - ubifs_wbuf_sync(&c->jheads[i].wbuf); + for (i = 0; i < c->jhead_cnt; i++) { + err = ubifs_wbuf_sync(&c->jheads[i].wbuf); + if (err) + ubifs_ro_mode(c, err); + } /* * We are being cleanly unmounted which means the -- cgit v1.2.3 From 75ee85667473444fe10765850e4edc2727f9da75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Weinberger Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 23:15:57 +0100 Subject: ubi: fastmap: Don't flush fastmap work on detach commit 29b7a6fa1ec07e8480b0d9caf635a4498a438bf4 upstream. At this point UBI volumes have already been free()'ed and fastmap can no longer access these data structures. Reported-by: Martin Townsend Fixes: 74cdaf24004a ("UBI: Fastmap: Fix memory leaks while closing the WL sub-system") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c b/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c index 30d3999dddba..ed62f1efe6eb 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c @@ -360,7 +360,6 @@ static void ubi_fastmap_close(struct ubi_device *ubi) { int i; - flush_work(&ubi->fm_work); return_unused_pool_pebs(ubi, &ubi->fm_pool); return_unused_pool_pebs(ubi, &ubi->fm_wl_pool); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 782635ba966ee2adc898adb9af2bc240b1aded43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Romain Izard Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 11:18:20 +0100 Subject: ubi: Fix error for write access commit 78a8dfbabbece22bee58ac4cb26cab10e7a19c5d upstream. When opening a device with write access, ubiblock_open returns an error code. Currently, this error code is -EPERM, but this is not the right value. The open function for other block devices returns -EROFS when opening read-only devices with FMODE_WRITE set. When used with dm-verity, the veritysetup userspace tool is expecting EROFS, and refuses to use the ubiblock device. Use -EROFS for ubiblock as well. As a result, veritysetup accepts the ubiblock device as valid. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9d54c8a33eec (UBI: R/O block driver on top of UBI volumes) Signed-off-by: Romain Izard Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c b/drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c index b2fb0528c092..07ad86759d92 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/block.c @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static int ubiblock_open(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode) * in any case. */ if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { - ret = -EPERM; + ret = -EROFS; goto out_unlock; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 78cc9472ae1995d50c1d1382bebbb906c8d02ac2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Weinberger Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 11:45:54 +0100 Subject: ubi: Reject MLC NAND commit b5094b7f135be34630e3ea8a98fa215715d0f29d upstream. While UBI and UBIFS seem to work at first sight with MLC NAND, you will most likely lose all your data upon a power-cut or due to read/write disturb. In order to protect users from bad surprises, refuse to attach to MLC NAND. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Acked-by: Boris Brezillon Acked-by: Artem Bityutskiy Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c b/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c index 27de0463226e..a2e6c7848b0a 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/build.c @@ -889,6 +889,17 @@ int ubi_attach_mtd_dev(struct mtd_info *mtd, int ubi_num, return -EINVAL; } + /* + * Both UBI and UBIFS have been designed for SLC NAND and NOR flashes. + * MLC NAND is different and needs special care, otherwise UBI or UBIFS + * will die soon and you will lose all your data. + */ + if (mtd->type == MTD_MLCNANDFLASH) { + pr_err("ubi: refuse attaching mtd%d - MLC NAND is not supported\n", + mtd->index); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (ubi_num == UBI_DEV_NUM_AUTO) { /* Search for an empty slot in the @ubi_devices array */ for (ubi_num = 0; ubi_num < UBI_MAX_DEVICES; ubi_num++) -- cgit v1.2.3 From bc6305c0fa911d1af1be896e7222431a07112d15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Morton Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 16:34:41 -0700 Subject: fs/reiserfs/journal.c: add missing resierfs_warning() arg commit 9ad553abe66f8be3f4755e9fa0a6ba137ce76341 upstream. One use of the reiserfs_warning() macro in journal_init_dev() is missing a parameter, causing the following warning: REISERFS warning (device loop0): journal_init_dev: Cannot open '%s': %i journal_init_dev: This also causes a WARN_ONCE() warning in the vsprintf code, and then a panic if panic_on_warn is set. Please remove unsupported %/ in format string WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4480 at lib/vsprintf.c:2138 format_decode+0x77f/0x830 lib/vsprintf.c:2138 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... Just add another string argument to the macro invocation. Addresses https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0627d4551fdc39bf1ef5d82cd9eef587047f7718 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d678ebe1-6f54-8090-df4c-b9affad62293@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Reported-by: Tested-by: Randy Dunlap Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Jan Kara Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/reiserfs/journal.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/journal.c b/fs/reiserfs/journal.c index a72097b625ef..00985f9db9f7 100644 --- a/fs/reiserfs/journal.c +++ b/fs/reiserfs/journal.c @@ -2643,7 +2643,7 @@ static int journal_init_dev(struct super_block *super, if (IS_ERR(journal->j_dev_bd)) { result = PTR_ERR(journal->j_dev_bd); journal->j_dev_bd = NULL; - reiserfs_warning(super, + reiserfs_warning(super, "sh-457", "journal_init_dev: Cannot open '%s': %i", jdev_name, result); return result; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0a2f9fe1b663c9c8e9fee7436bfab013270451da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 15:35:13 -0700 Subject: resource: fix integer overflow at reallocation commit 60bb83b81169820c691fbfa33a6a4aef32aa4b0b upstream. We've got a bug report indicating a kernel panic at booting on an x86-32 system, and it turned out to be the invalid PCI resource assigned after reallocation. __find_resource() first aligns the resource start address and resets the end address with start+size-1 accordingly, then checks whether it's contained. Here the end address may overflow the integer, although resource_contains() still returns true because the function validates only start and end address. So this ends up with returning an invalid resource (start > end). There was already an attempt to cover such a problem in the commit 47ea91b4052d ("Resource: fix wrong resource window calculation"), but this case is an overseen one. This patch adds the validity check of the newly calculated resource for avoiding the integer overflow problem. Bugzilla: http://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1086739 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/s5hpo37d5l8.wl-tiwai@suse.de Fixes: 23c570a67448 ("resource: ability to resize an allocated resource") Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Reported-by: Michael Henders Tested-by: Michael Henders Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Ram Pai Cc: Bjorn Helgaas Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c index a4a94e700fb9..41718cd8cab5 100644 --- a/kernel/resource.c +++ b/kernel/resource.c @@ -611,7 +611,8 @@ static int __find_resource(struct resource *root, struct resource *old, alloc.start = constraint->alignf(constraint->alignf_data, &avail, size, constraint->align); alloc.end = alloc.start + size - 1; - if (resource_contains(&avail, &alloc)) { + if (alloc.start <= alloc.end && + resource_contains(&avail, &alloc)) { new->start = alloc.start; new->end = alloc.end; return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From b7e06a79c2e3a7e16ad1ed4887cad9a103ca355d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 15:35:30 -0700 Subject: ipc/shm: fix use-after-free of shm file via remap_file_pages() commit 3f05317d9889ab75c7190dcd39491d2a97921984 upstream. syzbot reported a use-after-free of shm_file_data(file)->file->f_op in shm_get_unmapped_area(), called via sys_remap_file_pages(). Unfortunately it couldn't generate a reproducer, but I found a bug which I think caused it. When remap_file_pages() is passed a full System V shared memory segment, the memory is first unmapped, then a new map is created using the ->vm_file. Between these steps, the shm ID can be removed and reused for a new shm segment. But, shm_mmap() only checks whether the ID is currently valid before calling the underlying file's ->mmap(); it doesn't check whether it was reused. Thus it can use the wrong underlying file, one that was already freed. Fix this by making the "outer" shm file (the one that gets put in ->vm_file) hold a reference to the real shm file, and by making __shm_open() require that the file associated with the shm ID matches the one associated with the "outer" file. Taking the reference to the real shm file is needed to fully solve the problem, since otherwise sfd->file could point to a freed file, which then could be reallocated for the reused shm ID, causing the wrong shm segment to be mapped (and without the required permission checks). Commit 1ac0b6dec656 ("ipc/shm: handle removed segments gracefully in shm_mmap()") almost fixed this bug, but it didn't go far enough because it didn't consider the case where the shm ID is reused. The following program usually reproduces this bug: #include #include #include #include int main() { int is_parent = (fork() != 0); srand(getpid()); for (;;) { int id = shmget(0xF00F, 4096, IPC_CREAT|0700); if (is_parent) { void *addr = shmat(id, NULL, 0); usleep(rand() % 50); while (!syscall(__NR_remap_file_pages, addr, 4096, 0, 0, 0)); } else { usleep(rand() % 50); shmctl(id, IPC_RMID, NULL); } } } It causes the following NULL pointer dereference due to a 'struct file' being used while it's being freed. (I couldn't actually get a KASAN use-after-free splat like in the syzbot report. But I think it's possible with this bug; it would just take a more extraordinary race...) BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000058 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 9 PID: 258 Comm: syz_ipc Not tainted 4.16.0-05140-gf8cf2f16a7c95 #189 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:d_inode include/linux/dcache.h:519 [inline] RIP: 0010:touch_atime+0x25/0xd0 fs/inode.c:1724 [...] Call Trace: file_accessed include/linux/fs.h:2063 [inline] shmem_mmap+0x25/0x40 mm/shmem.c:2149 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline] shm_mmap+0x34/0x80 ipc/shm.c:465 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:1789 [inline] mmap_region+0x309/0x5b0 mm/mmap.c:1712 do_mmap+0x294/0x4a0 mm/mmap.c:1483 do_mmap_pgoff include/linux/mm.h:2235 [inline] SYSC_remap_file_pages mm/mmap.c:2853 [inline] SyS_remap_file_pages+0x232/0x310 mm/mmap.c:2769 do_syscall_64+0x64/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 [ebiggers@google.com: add comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180410192850.235835-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180409043039.28915-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d11f321e7f1923157eac80aa990b446596f46439@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: c8d78c1823f4 ("mm: replace remap_file_pages() syscall with emulation") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: Manfred Spraul Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- ipc/shm.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c index 4982a4e7f009..a492dd81cf56 100644 --- a/ipc/shm.c +++ b/ipc/shm.c @@ -198,6 +198,12 @@ static int __shm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma) if (IS_ERR(shp)) return PTR_ERR(shp); + if (shp->shm_file != sfd->file) { + /* ID was reused */ + shm_unlock(shp); + return -EINVAL; + } + shp->shm_atim = get_seconds(); shp->shm_lprid = task_tgid_vnr(current); shp->shm_nattch++; @@ -414,8 +420,9 @@ static int shm_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) int ret; /* - * In case of remap_file_pages() emulation, the file can represent - * removed IPC ID: propogate shm_lock() error to caller. + * In case of remap_file_pages() emulation, the file can represent an + * IPC ID that was removed, and possibly even reused by another shm + * segment already. Propagate this case as an error to caller. */ ret =__shm_open(vma); if (ret) @@ -439,6 +446,7 @@ static int shm_release(struct inode *ino, struct file *file) struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file); put_ipc_ns(sfd->ns); + fput(sfd->file); shm_file_data(file) = NULL; kfree(sfd); return 0; @@ -1198,7 +1206,16 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping; sfd->id = shp->shm_perm.id; sfd->ns = get_ipc_ns(ns); - sfd->file = shp->shm_file; + /* + * We need to take a reference to the real shm file to prevent the + * pointer from becoming stale in cases where the lifetime of the outer + * file extends beyond that of the shm segment. It's not usually + * possible, but it can happen during remap_file_pages() emulation as + * that unmaps the memory, then does ->mmap() via file reference only. + * We'll deny the ->mmap() if the shm segment was since removed, but to + * detect shm ID reuse we need to compare the file pointers. + */ + sfd->file = get_file(shp->shm_file); sfd->vm_ops = NULL; err = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5a310ab03d5a8fc4fb2d90133a383c2a3474da38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vlastimil Babka Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2018 15:35:38 -0700 Subject: mm, slab: reschedule cache_reap() on the same CPU commit a9f2a846f0503e7d729f552e3ccfe2279010fe94 upstream. cache_reap() is initially scheduled in start_cpu_timer() via schedule_delayed_work_on(). But then the next iterations are scheduled via schedule_delayed_work(), i.e. using WORK_CPU_UNBOUND. Thus since commit ef557180447f ("workqueue: schedule WORK_CPU_UNBOUND work on wq_unbound_cpumask CPUs") there is no guarantee the future iterations will run on the originally intended cpu, although it's still preferred. I was able to demonstrate this with /sys/module/workqueue/parameters/debug_force_rr_cpu. IIUC, it may also happen due to migrating timers in nohz context. As a result, some cpu's would be calling cache_reap() more frequently and others never. This patch uses schedule_delayed_work_on() with the current cpu when scheduling the next iteration. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180411070007.32225-1-vbabka@suse.cz Fixes: ef557180447f ("workqueue: schedule WORK_CPU_UNBOUND work on wq_unbound_cpumask CPUs") Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka Acked-by: Pekka Enberg Acked-by: Christoph Lameter Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Lai Jiangshan Cc: John Stultz Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Stephen Boyd Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/slab.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c index 4765c97ce690..fa49c01225a7 100644 --- a/mm/slab.c +++ b/mm/slab.c @@ -3915,7 +3915,8 @@ next: next_reap_node(); out: /* Set up the next iteration */ - schedule_delayed_work(work, round_jiffies_relative(REAPTIMEOUT_AC)); + schedule_delayed_work_on(smp_processor_id(), work, + round_jiffies_relative(REAPTIMEOUT_AC)); } #ifdef CONFIG_SLABINFO -- cgit v1.2.3 From e23007895028b0cb73dc28d5b4e7fa5976a0dfab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 10:48:28 -0500 Subject: usb: musb: gadget: misplaced out of bounds check commit af6f8529098aeb0e56a68671b450cf74e7a64fcd upstream. musb->endpoints[] has array size MUSB_C_NUM_EPS. We must check array bounds before accessing the array and not afterwards. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt Signed-off-by: Bin Liu Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c index 10d30afe4a3c..a0d1417362cd 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c +++ b/drivers/usb/musb/musb_gadget_ep0.c @@ -114,15 +114,19 @@ static int service_tx_status_request( } is_in = epnum & USB_DIR_IN; - if (is_in) { - epnum &= 0x0f; + epnum &= 0x0f; + if (epnum >= MUSB_C_NUM_EPS) { + handled = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + if (is_in) ep = &musb->endpoints[epnum].ep_in; - } else { + else ep = &musb->endpoints[epnum].ep_out; - } regs = musb->endpoints[epnum].regs; - if (epnum >= MUSB_C_NUM_EPS || !ep->desc) { + if (!ep->desc) { handled = -EINVAL; break; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 31118e88019feb54b3457c57252d96a250d6d68b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolas Ferre Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 16:20:05 +0100 Subject: ARM: dts: at91: at91sam9g25: fix mux-mask pinctrl property commit e8fd0adf105e132fd84545997bbef3d5edc2c9c1 upstream. There are only 19 PIOB pins having primary names PB0-PB18. Not all of them have a 'C' function. So the pinctrl property mask ends up being the same as the other SoC of the at91sam9x5 series. Reported-by: Marek Sieranski Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre Cc: # v3.8+ Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi index a7da0dd0c98f..0898213f3bb2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g25.dtsi @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ atmel,mux-mask = < /* A B C */ 0xffffffff 0xffe0399f 0xc000001c /* pioA */ - 0x0007ffff 0x8000fe3f 0x00000000 /* pioB */ + 0x0007ffff 0x00047e3f 0x00000000 /* pioB */ 0x80000000 0x07c0ffff 0xb83fffff /* pioC */ 0x003fffff 0x003f8000 0x00000000 /* pioD */ >; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 318a306c53d17fa333d888d29c45268c6a8b1783 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Santiago Esteban Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 15:38:47 +0100 Subject: ARM: dts: at91: sama5d4: fix pinctrl compatible string commit 9a06757dcc8509c162ac00488c8c82fc98e04227 upstream. The compatible string is incorrect. Add atmel,sama5d3-pinctrl since it's the appropriate compatible string. Remove the atmel,at91rm9200-pinctrl compatible string, this fallback is useless, there are too many changes. Signed-off-by: Santiago Esteban Signed-off-by: Ludovic Desroches Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #v3.18 Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi index 3daf8d5d7878..fb0d1b252dc8 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d4.dtsi @@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ pinctrl@fc06a000 { #address-cells = <1>; #size-cells = <1>; - compatible = "atmel,at91sam9x5-pinctrl", "atmel,at91rm9200-pinctrl", "simple-bus"; + compatible = "atmel,sama5d3-pinctrl", "atmel,at91sam9x5-pinctrl", "simple-bus"; ranges = <0xfc068000 0xfc068000 0x100 0xfc06a000 0xfc06a000 0x4000>; /* WARNING: revisit as pin spec has changed */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4c65e94eb476b8e7d806d7e36ca1f5f789e9804a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Andryuk Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 07:23:23 -0500 Subject: xen-netfront: Fix hang on device removal commit c2d2e6738a209f0f9dffa2dc8e7292fc45360d61 upstream. A toolstack may delete the vif frontend and backend xenstore entries while xen-netfront is in the removal code path. In that case, the checks for xenbus_read_driver_state would return XenbusStateUnknown, and xennet_remove would hang indefinitely. This hang prevents system shutdown. xennet_remove must be able to handle XenbusStateUnknown, and netback_changed must also wake up the wake_queue for that state as well. Fixes: 5b5971df3bc2 ("xen-netfront: remove warning when unloading module") Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk Cc: Eduardo Otubo Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index 0b8d2655985f..fee4c01fbdfd 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -2024,7 +2024,10 @@ static void netback_changed(struct xenbus_device *dev, case XenbusStateInitialised: case XenbusStateReconfiguring: case XenbusStateReconfigured: + break; + case XenbusStateUnknown: + wake_up_all(&module_unload_q); break; case XenbusStateInitWait: @@ -2155,7 +2158,9 @@ static int xennet_remove(struct xenbus_device *dev) xenbus_switch_state(dev, XenbusStateClosing); wait_event(module_unload_q, xenbus_read_driver_state(dev->otherend) == - XenbusStateClosing); + XenbusStateClosing || + xenbus_read_driver_state(dev->otherend) == + XenbusStateUnknown); xenbus_switch_state(dev, XenbusStateClosed); wait_event(module_unload_q, -- cgit v1.2.3 From d8ad6cb0222cb8ef107af59e574614d5bd447a55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2018 10:23:44 +0300 Subject: regmap: Fix reversed bounds check in regmap_raw_write() commit f00e71091ab92eba52122332586c6ecaa9cd1a56 upstream. We're supposed to be checking that "val_len" is not too large but instead we check if it is smaller than the max. The only function affected would be regmap_i2c_smbus_i2c_write() in drivers/base/regmap/regmap-i2c.c. Strangely that function has its own limit check which returns an error if (count >= I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX) so it doesn't look like it has ever been able to do anything except return an error. Fixes: c335931ed9d2 ("regmap: Add raw_write/read checks for max_raw_write/read sizes") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c index 4ac63c0e50c7..fd377b956199 100644 --- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c +++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c @@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ int regmap_raw_write(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg, return -EINVAL; if (val_len % map->format.val_bytes) return -EINVAL; - if (map->max_raw_write && map->max_raw_write > val_len) + if (map->max_raw_write && map->max_raw_write < val_len) return -E2BIG; map->lock(map->lock_arg); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bd69c85f1f133d1a54b87ad30aef4e98e60c17e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 18:01:45 +0100 Subject: ACPI / video: Add quirk to force acpi-video backlight on Samsung 670Z5E commit bbf038618a24d72e2efc19146ef421bb1e1eda1a upstream. Just like many other Samsung models, the 670Z5E needs to use the acpi-video backlight interface rather then the native one for backlight control to work, add a quirk for this. Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1557060 Cc: All applicable Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c index b48ecbfc4498..8c5503c0bad7 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c @@ -205,6 +205,15 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = { "3570R/370R/470R/450R/510R/4450RV"), }, }, + { + /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1557060 */ + .callback = video_detect_force_video, + .ident = "SAMSUNG 670Z5E", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "670Z5E"), + }, + }, { /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1094948 */ .callback = video_detect_force_video, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 63aa8d8968331fa53d05491f812879a8d7fe3c69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mika Westerberg Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 13:55:23 +0300 Subject: ACPI / hotplug / PCI: Check presence of slot itself in get_slot_status() commit 13d3047c81505cc0fb9bdae7810676e70523c8bf upstream. Mike Lothian reported that plugging in a USB-C device does not work properly in his Dell Alienware system. This system has an Intel Alpine Ridge Thunderbolt controller providing USB-C functionality. In these systems the USB controller (xHCI) is hotplugged whenever a device is connected to the port using ACPI-based hotplug. The ACPI description of the root port in question is as follows: Device (RP01) { Name (_ADR, 0x001C0000) Device (PXSX) { Name (_ADR, 0x02) Method (_RMV, 0, NotSerialized) { // ... } } Here _ADR 0x02 means device 0, function 2 on the bus under root port (RP01) but that seems to be incorrect because device 0 is the upstream port of the Alpine Ridge PCIe switch and it has no functions other than 0 (the bridge itself). When we get ACPI Notify() to the root port resulting from connecting a USB-C device, Linux tries to read PCI_VENDOR_ID from device 0, function 2 which of course always returns 0xffffffff because there is no such function and we never find the device. In Windows this works fine. Now, since we get ACPI Notify() to the root port and not to the PXSX device we should actually start our scan from there as well and not from the non-existent PXSX device. Fix this by checking presence of the slot itself (function 0) if we fail to do that otherwise. While there use pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id() in get_slot_status(), which is the recommended way to read Device and Vendor IDs of devices on PCI buses. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198557 Reported-by: Mike Lothian Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c b/drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c index 0b3e0bfa7be5..572ca192cb1f 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c +++ b/drivers/pci/hotplug/acpiphp_glue.c @@ -587,6 +587,7 @@ static unsigned int get_slot_status(struct acpiphp_slot *slot) { unsigned long long sta = 0; struct acpiphp_func *func; + u32 dvid; list_for_each_entry(func, &slot->funcs, sibling) { if (func->flags & FUNC_HAS_STA) { @@ -597,19 +598,27 @@ static unsigned int get_slot_status(struct acpiphp_slot *slot) if (ACPI_SUCCESS(status) && sta) break; } else { - u32 dvid; - - pci_bus_read_config_dword(slot->bus, - PCI_DEVFN(slot->device, - func->function), - PCI_VENDOR_ID, &dvid); - if (dvid != 0xffffffff) { + if (pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id(slot->bus, + PCI_DEVFN(slot->device, func->function), + &dvid, 0)) { sta = ACPI_STA_ALL; break; } } } + if (!sta) { + /* + * Check for the slot itself since it may be that the + * ACPI slot is a device below PCIe upstream port so in + * that case it may not even be reachable yet. + */ + if (pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id(slot->bus, + PCI_DEVFN(slot->device, 0), &dvid, 0)) { + sta = ACPI_STA_ALL; + } + } + return (unsigned int)sta; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b286fd4a7d0849dc9d48d099d7ba6250894a7536 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhengjun Xing Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2018 13:29:42 +0800 Subject: USB:fix USB3 devices behind USB3 hubs not resuming at hibernate thaw MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 64627388b50158fd24d6ad88132525b95a5ef573 upstream. USB3 hubs don't support global suspend. USB3 specification 10.10, Enhanced SuperSpeed hubs only support selective suspend and resume, they do not support global suspend/resume where the hub downstream facing ports states are not affected. When system enters hibernation it first enters freeze process where only the root hub enters suspend, usb_port_suspend() is not called for other devices, and suspend status flags are not set for them. Other devices are expected to suspend globally. Some external USB3 hubs will suspend the downstream facing port at global suspend. These devices won't be resumed at thaw as the suspend status flag is not set. A USB3 removable hard disk connected through a USB3 hub that won't resume at thaw will fail to synchronize SCSI cache, return “cmd cmplt err -71” error, and needs a 60 seconds timeout which causing system hang for 60s before the USB host reset the port for the USB3 removable hard disk to recover. Fix this by always calling usb_port_suspend() during freeze for USB3 devices. Signed-off-by: Zhengjun Xing Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/generic.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/generic.c b/drivers/usb/core/generic.c index 358ca8dd784f..a5240b4d7ab9 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/generic.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/generic.c @@ -208,8 +208,13 @@ static int generic_suspend(struct usb_device *udev, pm_message_t msg) if (!udev->parent) rc = hcd_bus_suspend(udev, msg); - /* Non-root devices don't need to do anything for FREEZE or PRETHAW */ - else if (msg.event == PM_EVENT_FREEZE || msg.event == PM_EVENT_PRETHAW) + /* + * Non-root USB2 devices don't need to do anything for FREEZE + * or PRETHAW. USB3 devices don't support global suspend and + * needs to be selectively suspended. + */ + else if ((msg.event == PM_EVENT_FREEZE || msg.event == PM_EVENT_PRETHAW) + && (udev->speed < USB_SPEED_SUPER)) rc = 0; else rc = usb_port_suspend(udev, msg); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0ab6b8c91ecfbe8d2c4fb5119d6f67b12e1be2cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thinh Nguyen Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 13:07:35 -0700 Subject: usb: dwc3: pci: Properly cleanup resource commit cabdf83dadfb3d83eec31e0f0638a92dbd716435 upstream. Platform device is allocated before adding resources. Make sure to properly cleanup on error case. Cc: Fixes: f1c7e7108109 ("usb: dwc3: convert to pcim_enable_device()") Signed-off-by: Thinh Nguyen Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c index d2c0c1a8d979..68230adf2449 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-pci.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int dwc3_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pci, ret = platform_device_add_resources(dwc3, res, ARRAY_SIZE(res)); if (ret) { dev_err(dev, "couldn't add resources to dwc3 device\n"); - return ret; + goto err; } pci_set_drvdata(pci, dwc3); -- cgit v1.2.3 From dbae9a8dae744af765527099e685e22e6fbc46eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aaron Ma Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 10:41:40 +0800 Subject: HID: i2c-hid: fix size check and type usage commit ac75a041048b8c1f7418e27621ca5efda8571043 upstream. When convert char array with signed int, if the inbuf[x] is negative then upper bits will be set to 1. Fix this by using u8 instead of char. ret_size has to be at least 3, hid_input_report use it after minus 2 bytes. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c index 312aa1e33fb2..4c3ed078c6b9 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c +++ b/drivers/hid/i2c-hid/i2c-hid.c @@ -137,10 +137,10 @@ struct i2c_hid { * register of the HID * descriptor. */ unsigned int bufsize; /* i2c buffer size */ - char *inbuf; /* Input buffer */ - char *rawbuf; /* Raw Input buffer */ - char *cmdbuf; /* Command buffer */ - char *argsbuf; /* Command arguments buffer */ + u8 *inbuf; /* Input buffer */ + u8 *rawbuf; /* Raw Input buffer */ + u8 *cmdbuf; /* Command buffer */ + u8 *argsbuf; /* Command arguments buffer */ unsigned long flags; /* device flags */ @@ -387,7 +387,8 @@ static int i2c_hid_hwreset(struct i2c_client *client) static void i2c_hid_get_input(struct i2c_hid *ihid) { - int ret, ret_size; + int ret; + u32 ret_size; int size = le16_to_cpu(ihid->hdesc.wMaxInputLength); if (size > ihid->bufsize) @@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ static void i2c_hid_get_input(struct i2c_hid *ihid) return; } - if (ret_size > size) { + if ((ret_size > size) || (ret_size <= 2)) { dev_err(&ihid->client->dev, "%s: incomplete report (%d/%d)\n", __func__, size, ret_size); return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c8d4770e46042457ebea2b1786d878f3e6831423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Piggin Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 01:02:33 +1000 Subject: powerpc/powernv: Handle unknown OPAL errors in opal_nvram_write() commit 741de617661794246f84a21a02fc5e327bffc9ad upstream. opal_nvram_write currently just assumes success if it encounters an error other than OPAL_BUSY or OPAL_BUSY_EVENT. Have it return -EIO on other errors instead. Fixes: 628daa8d5abf ("powerpc/powernv: Add RTC and NVRAM support plus RTAS fallbacks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.2+ Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde Acked-by: Stewart Smith Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c index 9db4398ded5d..ba2ff06a2c98 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c @@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ static ssize_t opal_nvram_write(char *buf, size_t count, loff_t *index) if (rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) opal_poll_events(NULL); } + + if (rc) + return -EIO; + *index += count; return count; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From dcc29e3f43fa46acd746203ea1153af39a60ecb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Piggin Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 20:41:46 +1000 Subject: powerpc/64: Fix smp_wmb barrier definition use use lwsync consistently commit 0bfdf598900fd62869659f360d3387ed80eb71cf upstream. asm/barrier.h is not always included after asm/synch.h, which meant it was missing __SUBARCH_HAS_LWSYNC, so in some files smp_wmb() would be eieio when it should be lwsync. kernel/time/hrtimer.c is one case. __SUBARCH_HAS_LWSYNC is only used in one place, so just fold it in to where it's used. Previously with my small simulator config, 377 instances of eieio in the tree. After this patch there are 55. Fixes: 46d075be585e ("powerpc: Optimise smp_wmb") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+ Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h | 3 ++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h | 4 ---- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h index 0eca6efc0631..b9e16855a037 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h @@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ #define smp_store_mb(var, value) do { WRITE_ONCE(var, value); mb(); } while (0) -#ifdef __SUBARCH_HAS_LWSYNC +/* The sub-arch has lwsync */ +#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_E500MC) # define SMPWMB LWSYNC #else # define SMPWMB eieio diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h index c50868681f9e..e8d6a842f4bb 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/synch.h @@ -5,10 +5,6 @@ #include #include -#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(CONFIG_PPC_E500MC) -#define __SUBARCH_HAS_LWSYNC -#endif - #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ extern unsigned int __start___lwsync_fixup, __stop___lwsync_fixup; extern void do_lwsync_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 16d770bd91fc1c9659639adb2bd4c614934fc9be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Piggin Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 21:49:31 +1000 Subject: powerpc/powernv: define a standard delay for OPAL_BUSY type retry loops commit 34dd25de9fe3f60bfdb31b473bf04b28262d0896 upstream. This is the start of an effort to tidy up and standardise all the delays. Existing loops have a range of delay/sleep periods from 1ms to 20ms, and some have no delay. They all loop forever except rtc, which times out after 10 retries, and that uses 10ms delays. So use 10ms as our standard delay. The OPAL maintainer agrees 10ms is a reasonable starting point. The idea is to use the same recipe everywhere, once this is proven to work then it will be documented as an OPAL API standard. Then both firmware and OS can agree, and if a particular call needs something else, then that can be documented with reasoning. This is not the end-all of this effort, it's just a relatively easy change that fixes some existing high latency delays. There should be provision for standardising timeouts and/or interruptible loops where possible, so non-fatal firmware errors don't cause hangs. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Cc: Nathan Chancellor Cc: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h index 07a99e638449..bab3461115bb 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal.h @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ /* We calculate number of sg entries based on PAGE_SIZE */ #define SG_ENTRIES_PER_NODE ((PAGE_SIZE - 16) / sizeof(struct opal_sg_entry)) +/* Default time to sleep or delay between OPAL_BUSY/OPAL_BUSY_EVENT loops */ +#define OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS 10 + /* /sys/firmware/opal */ extern struct kobject *opal_kobj; -- cgit v1.2.3 From dace93d0f8d00412a1d13848a7958c9c7a634289 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Piggin Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 21:49:33 +1000 Subject: powerpc/powernv: Fix OPAL NVRAM driver OPAL_BUSY loops commit 3b8070335f751aac9f1526ae2e012e6f5b8b0f21 upstream. The OPAL NVRAM driver does not sleep in case it gets OPAL_BUSY or OPAL_BUSY_EVENT from firmware, which causes large scheduling latencies, and various lockup errors to trigger (again, BMC reboot can cause it). Fix this by converting it to the standard form OPAL_BUSY loop that sleeps. Fixes: 628daa8d5abf ("powerpc/powernv: Add RTC and NVRAM support plus RTAS fallbacks") Depends-on: 34dd25de9fe3 ("powerpc/powernv: define a standard delay for OPAL_BUSY type retry loops") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.2+ Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c index ba2ff06a2c98..1bceb95f422d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-nvram.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #define DEBUG +#include #include #include #include @@ -56,8 +57,12 @@ static ssize_t opal_nvram_write(char *buf, size_t count, loff_t *index) while (rc == OPAL_BUSY || rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) { rc = opal_write_nvram(__pa(buf), count, off); - if (rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) + if (rc == OPAL_BUSY_EVENT) { + msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS); opal_poll_events(NULL); + } else if (rc == OPAL_BUSY) { + msleep(OPAL_BUSY_DELAY_MS); + } } if (rc) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8d7610e122885386c4004dd0b5aca3e8928a1e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aaron Ma Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2018 23:57:15 +0800 Subject: HID: Fix hid_report_len usage commit 3064a03b94e60388f0955fcc29f3e8a978d28f75 upstream. Follow the change of return type u32 of hid_report_len, fix all the types of variables those get the return value of hid_report_len to u32, and all other code already uses u32. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-input.c | 3 ++- drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 5 +++-- drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c index 53e54855c366..8d74e691ac90 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-input.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-input.c @@ -1258,7 +1258,8 @@ static void hidinput_led_worker(struct work_struct *work) led_work); struct hid_field *field; struct hid_report *report; - int len, ret; + int ret; + u32 len; __u8 *buf; field = hidinput_get_led_field(hid); diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c index f62a9d6601cc..9de379c1b3fd 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c @@ -314,7 +314,8 @@ static struct attribute_group mt_attribute_group = { static void mt_get_feature(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_report *report) { struct mt_device *td = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); - int ret, size = hid_report_len(report); + int ret; + u32 size = hid_report_len(report); u8 *buf; /* @@ -919,7 +920,7 @@ static void mt_set_input_mode(struct hid_device *hdev) struct hid_report_enum *re; struct mt_class *cls = &td->mtclass; char *buf; - int report_len; + u32 report_len; if (td->inputmode < 0) return; diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c index 67cd059a8f46..41a4a2af9db1 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c @@ -110,8 +110,8 @@ struct rmi_data { u8 *writeReport; u8 *readReport; - int input_report_size; - int output_report_size; + u32 input_report_size; + u32 output_report_size; unsigned long flags; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 60f6c860c25892b4a1c8791cec0427af0d96bf86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aaron Ma Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 10:41:41 +0800 Subject: HID: core: Fix size as type u32 commit 6de0b13cc0b4ba10e98a9263d7a83b940720b77a upstream. When size is negative, calling memset will make segment fault. Declare the size as type u32 to keep memset safe. size in struct hid_report is unsigned, fix return type of hid_report_len to u32. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/hid.h | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index d07fb967f92b..e4541c6bf3d3 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ u8 *hid_alloc_report_buf(struct hid_report *report, gfp_t flags) * of implement() working on 8 byte chunks */ - int len = hid_report_len(report) + 7; + u32 len = hid_report_len(report) + 7; return kmalloc(len, flags); } @@ -1396,7 +1396,7 @@ void __hid_request(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_report *report, { char *buf; int ret; - int len; + u32 len; buf = hid_alloc_report_buf(report, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) @@ -1422,14 +1422,14 @@ out: } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__hid_request); -int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, int size, +int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size, int interrupt) { struct hid_report_enum *report_enum = hid->report_enum + type; struct hid_report *report; struct hid_driver *hdrv; unsigned int a; - int rsize, csize = size; + u32 rsize, csize = size; u8 *cdata = data; int ret = 0; @@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_report_raw_event); * * This is data entry for lower layers. */ -int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, int size, int interrupt) +int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size, int interrupt) { struct hid_report_enum *report_enum; struct hid_driver *hdrv; diff --git a/include/linux/hid.h b/include/linux/hid.h index 251a1d382e23..fd86687f8119 100644 --- a/include/linux/hid.h +++ b/include/linux/hid.h @@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ extern int hidinput_connect(struct hid_device *hid, unsigned int force); extern void hidinput_disconnect(struct hid_device *); int hid_set_field(struct hid_field *, unsigned, __s32); -int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *, int type, u8 *, int, int); +int hid_input_report(struct hid_device *, int type, u8 *, u32, int); int hidinput_find_field(struct hid_device *hid, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, struct hid_field **field); struct hid_field *hidinput_get_led_field(struct hid_device *hid); unsigned int hidinput_count_leds(struct hid_device *hid); @@ -1098,13 +1098,13 @@ static inline void hid_hw_wait(struct hid_device *hdev) * * @report: the report we want to know the length */ -static inline int hid_report_len(struct hid_report *report) +static inline u32 hid_report_len(struct hid_report *report) { /* equivalent to DIV_ROUND_UP(report->size, 8) + !!(report->id > 0) */ return ((report->size - 1) >> 3) + 1 + (report->id > 0); } -int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, int size, +int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size, int interrupt); /* HID quirks API */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9a8b65d4aaacde8344acb9073900eeccedc69827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Kelly Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 21:29:50 +1100 Subject: ASoC: ssm2602: Replace reg_default_raw with reg_default commit a01df75ce737951ad13a08d101306e88c3f57cb2 upstream. SSM2602 driver is broken on recent kernels (at least since 4.9). User space applications such as amixer or alsamixer get EIO when attempting to access codec controls via the relevant IOCTLs. Root cause of these failures is the regcache_hw_init function in drivers/base/regmap/regcache.c, which prevents regmap cache initalization from the reg_defaults_raw element of the regmap_config structure when registers are write only. It also disables the regmap cache entirely when all registers are write only or volatile as is the case for the SSM2602 driver. Using the reg_defaults element of the regmap_config structure rather than the reg_defaults_raw element to initalize the regmap cache avoids the logic in the regcache_hw_init function entirely. It also makes this driver consistent with other ASoC codec drivers, as this driver was the ONLY codec driver that used the reg_defaults_raw element to initalize the cache. Tested on Digilent Zybo Z7 development board which has a SSM2603 codec chip connected to a Xilinx Zynq SoC. Signed-off-by: James Kelly Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c b/sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c index 4452fea0b118..bd4998f577a0 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/ssm2602.c @@ -54,10 +54,17 @@ struct ssm2602_priv { * using 2 wire for device control, so we cache them instead. * There is no point in caching the reset register */ -static const u16 ssm2602_reg[SSM2602_CACHEREGNUM] = { - 0x0097, 0x0097, 0x0079, 0x0079, - 0x000a, 0x0008, 0x009f, 0x000a, - 0x0000, 0x0000 +static const struct reg_default ssm2602_reg[SSM2602_CACHEREGNUM] = { + { .reg = 0x00, .def = 0x0097 }, + { .reg = 0x01, .def = 0x0097 }, + { .reg = 0x02, .def = 0x0079 }, + { .reg = 0x03, .def = 0x0079 }, + { .reg = 0x04, .def = 0x000a }, + { .reg = 0x05, .def = 0x0008 }, + { .reg = 0x06, .def = 0x009f }, + { .reg = 0x07, .def = 0x000a }, + { .reg = 0x08, .def = 0x0000 }, + { .reg = 0x09, .def = 0x0000 } }; @@ -618,8 +625,8 @@ const struct regmap_config ssm2602_regmap_config = { .volatile_reg = ssm2602_register_volatile, .cache_type = REGCACHE_RBTREE, - .reg_defaults_raw = ssm2602_reg, - .num_reg_defaults_raw = ARRAY_SIZE(ssm2602_reg), + .reg_defaults = ssm2602_reg, + .num_reg_defaults = ARRAY_SIZE(ssm2602_reg), }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ssm2602_regmap_config); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 00cf298fae0bcee000bad030574b70307175219b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mika Westerberg Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 12:44:56 +0300 Subject: thunderbolt: Resume control channel after hibernation image is created commit f2a659f7d8d5da803836583aa16df06bdf324252 upstream. The driver misses implementation of PM hook that undoes what ->freeze_noirq() does after the hibernation image is created. This means the control channel is not resumed properly and the Thunderbolt bus becomes useless in later stages of hibernation (when the image is stored or if the operation fails). Fix this by pointing ->thaw_noirq to driver nhi_resume_noirq(). This makes sure the control channel is resumed properly. Fixes: 23dd5bb49d98 ("thunderbolt: Add suspend/hibernate support") Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c index 20a41f7de76f..6713fd1958e7 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c @@ -627,6 +627,7 @@ static const struct dev_pm_ops nhi_pm_ops = { * we just disable hotplug, the * pci-tunnels stay alive. */ + .thaw_noirq = nhi_resume_noirq, .restore_noirq = nhi_resume_noirq, }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 010f0fb42c2a19b71405ead2009164e4dcf78a00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2017 18:21:33 -0400 Subject: random: use a tighter cap in credit_entropy_bits_safe() commit 9f886f4d1d292442b2f22a0a33321eae821bde40 upstream. This fixes a harmless UBSAN where root could potentially end up causing an overflow while bumping the entropy_total field (which is ignored once the entropy pool has been initialized, and this generally is completed during the boot sequence). This is marginal for the stable kernel series, but it's a really trivial patch, and it fixes UBSAN warning that might cause security folks to get overly excited for no reason. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reported-by: Chen Feng Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index bd9fc2baa6aa..dffd06a3bb76 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ retry: static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits) { - const int nbits_max = (int)(~0U >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 1)); + const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32; if (nbits < 0) return -EINVAL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 10c624084758db770986de190dc9b387dfdb49c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 12:22:53 -0500 Subject: jbd2: if the journal is aborted then don't allow update of the log tail commit 85e0c4e89c1b864e763c4e3bb15d0b6d501ad5d9 upstream. This updates the jbd2 superblock unnecessarily, and on an abort we shouldn't truncate the log. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jbd2/journal.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c index 624a57a9c4aa..4759df4eb8ce 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c @@ -914,7 +914,7 @@ out: } /* - * This is a variaon of __jbd2_update_log_tail which checks for validity of + * This is a variation of __jbd2_update_log_tail which checks for validity of * provided log tail and locks j_checkpoint_mutex. So it is safe against races * with other threads updating log tail. */ @@ -1384,6 +1384,9 @@ int jbd2_journal_update_sb_log_tail(journal_t *journal, tid_t tail_tid, journal_superblock_t *sb = journal->j_superblock; int ret; + if (is_journal_aborted(journal)) + return -EIO; + BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&journal->j_checkpoint_mutex)); jbd_debug(1, "JBD2: updating superblock (start %lu, seq %u)\n", tail_block, tail_tid); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 51e3b81b386104e1e088dd3abfb3d0c2a93d7631 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2018 14:16:47 -0500 Subject: ext4: don't update checksum of new initialized bitmaps commit 044e6e3d74a3d7103a0c8a9305dfd94d64000660 upstream. When reading the inode or block allocation bitmap, if the bitmap needs to be initialized, do not update the checksum in the block group descriptor. That's because we're not set up to journal those changes. Instead, just set the verified bit on the bitmap block, so that it's not necessary to validate the checksum. When a block or inode allocation actually happens, at that point the checksum will be calculated, and update of the bg descriptor block will be properly journalled. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/balloc.c | 3 +-- fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 47 +++-------------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/balloc.c b/fs/ext4/balloc.c index f97110461c19..78c51ce913db 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c @@ -242,8 +242,6 @@ static int ext4_init_block_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, */ ext4_mark_bitmap_end(num_clusters_in_group(sb, block_group), sb->s_blocksize * 8, bh->b_data); - ext4_block_bitmap_csum_set(sb, block_group, gdp, bh); - ext4_group_desc_csum_set(sb, block_group, gdp); return 0; } @@ -447,6 +445,7 @@ ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t block_group) err = ext4_init_block_bitmap(sb, bh, block_group, desc); set_bitmap_uptodate(bh); set_buffer_uptodate(bh); + set_buffer_verified(bh); ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group); unlock_buffer(bh); if (err) { diff --git a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c index 5388207d2832..e10c12f59c58 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c @@ -63,44 +63,6 @@ void ext4_mark_bitmap_end(int start_bit, int end_bit, char *bitmap) memset(bitmap + (i >> 3), 0xff, (end_bit - i) >> 3); } -/* Initializes an uninitialized inode bitmap */ -static int ext4_init_inode_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, - struct buffer_head *bh, - ext4_group_t block_group, - struct ext4_group_desc *gdp) -{ - struct ext4_group_info *grp; - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - J_ASSERT_BH(bh, buffer_locked(bh)); - - /* If checksum is bad mark all blocks and inodes use to prevent - * allocation, essentially implementing a per-group read-only flag. */ - if (!ext4_group_desc_csum_verify(sb, block_group, gdp)) { - grp = ext4_get_group_info(sb, block_group); - if (!EXT4_MB_GRP_BBITMAP_CORRUPT(grp)) - percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, - grp->bb_free); - set_bit(EXT4_GROUP_INFO_BBITMAP_CORRUPT_BIT, &grp->bb_state); - if (!EXT4_MB_GRP_IBITMAP_CORRUPT(grp)) { - int count; - count = ext4_free_inodes_count(sb, gdp); - percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_freeinodes_counter, - count); - } - set_bit(EXT4_GROUP_INFO_IBITMAP_CORRUPT_BIT, &grp->bb_state); - return -EFSBADCRC; - } - - memset(bh->b_data, 0, (EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) + 7) / 8); - ext4_mark_bitmap_end(EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb), sb->s_blocksize * 8, - bh->b_data); - ext4_inode_bitmap_csum_set(sb, block_group, gdp, bh, - EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) / 8); - ext4_group_desc_csum_set(sb, block_group, gdp); - - return 0; -} - void ext4_end_bitmap_read(struct buffer_head *bh, int uptodate) { if (uptodate) { @@ -184,17 +146,14 @@ ext4_read_inode_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t block_group) ext4_lock_group(sb, block_group); if (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_UNINIT)) { - err = ext4_init_inode_bitmap(sb, bh, block_group, desc); + memset(bh->b_data, 0, (EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) + 7) / 8); + ext4_mark_bitmap_end(EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb), + sb->s_blocksize * 8, bh->b_data); set_bitmap_uptodate(bh); set_buffer_uptodate(bh); set_buffer_verified(bh); ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group); unlock_buffer(bh); - if (err) { - ext4_error(sb, "Failed to init inode bitmap for group " - "%u: %d", block_group, err); - goto out; - } return bh; } ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 990251318b97ed7153d9adbf633035536c7d685b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 21:56:09 -0400 Subject: ext4: fail ext4_iget for root directory if unallocated commit 8e4b5eae5decd9dfe5a4ee369c22028f90ab4c44 upstream. If the root directory has an i_links_count of zero, then when the file system is mounted, then when ext4_fill_super() notices the problem and tries to call iput() the root directory in the error return path, ext4_evict_inode() will try to free the inode on disk, before all of the file system structures are set up, and this will result in an OOPS caused by a NULL pointer dereference. This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1092. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199179 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560777 Reported-by: Wen Xu Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index f0cabc8c96cb..6e8dbc1e4f95 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4231,6 +4231,12 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) goto bad_inode; raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc); + if ((ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO) && (raw_inode->i_links_count == 0)) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "root inode unallocated"); + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto bad_inode; + } + if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) { ei->i_extra_isize = le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_extra_isize); if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + ei->i_extra_isize > -- cgit v1.2.3 From fe8fd32fb234272097104fe0a88fe126becfe5ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roland Dreier Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 15:33:01 -0700 Subject: RDMA/ucma: Don't allow setting RDMA_OPTION_IB_PATH without an RDMA device commit 8435168d50e66fa5eae01852769d20a36f9e5e83 upstream. Check to make sure that ctx->cm_id->device is set before we use it. Otherwise userspace can trigger a NULL dereference by doing RDMA_USER_CM_CMD_SET_OPTION on an ID that is not bound to a device. Cc: Reported-by: Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c index 960fcb613198..ea3bc9bb1b7a 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -1230,6 +1230,9 @@ static int ucma_set_ib_path(struct ucma_context *ctx, if (!optlen) return -EINVAL; + if (!ctx->cm_id->device) + return -EINVAL; + memset(&sa_path, 0, sizeof(sa_path)); ib_sa_unpack_path(path_data->path_rec, &sa_path); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bb256eeaec50d26413822ab8ef1fa51789fa0a2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2018 22:41:43 +0200 Subject: ALSA: pcm: Fix UAF at PCM release via PCM timer access commit a820ccbe21e8ce8e86c39cd1d3bc8c7d1cbb949b upstream. The PCM runtime object is created and freed dynamically at PCM stream open / close time. This is tracked via substream->runtime, and it's cleared at snd_pcm_detach_substream(). The runtime object assignment is protected by PCM open_mutex, so for all PCM operations, it's safely handled. However, each PCM substream provides also an ALSA timer interface, and user-space can access to this while closing a PCM substream. This may eventually lead to a UAF, as snd_pcm_timer_resolution() tries to access the runtime while clearing it in other side. Fortunately, it's the only concurrent access from the PCM timer, and it merely reads runtime->timer_resolution field. So, we can avoid the race by reordering kfree() and wrapping the substream->runtime clearance with the corresponding timer lock. Reported-by: syzbot+8e62ff4e07aa2ce87826@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/pcm.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/core/pcm.c b/sound/core/pcm.c index 074363b63cc4..6bda8f6c5f84 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1025,8 +1026,13 @@ void snd_pcm_detach_substream(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) snd_free_pages((void*)runtime->control, PAGE_ALIGN(sizeof(struct snd_pcm_mmap_control))); kfree(runtime->hw_constraints.rules); - kfree(runtime); + /* Avoid concurrent access to runtime via PCM timer interface */ + if (substream->timer) + spin_lock_irq(&substream->timer->lock); substream->runtime = NULL; + if (substream->timer) + spin_unlock_irq(&substream->timer->lock); + kfree(runtime); put_pid(substream->pid); substream->pid = NULL; substream->pstr->substream_opened--; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6931ced5d5ad430f2c7f6d2d7ca52c1058482a3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bart Van Assche Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 14:09:24 -0800 Subject: IB/srp: Fix srp_abort() commit e68088e78d82920632eba112b968e49d588d02a2 upstream. Before commit e494f6a72839 ("[SCSI] improved eh timeout handler") it did not really matter whether or not abort handlers like srp_abort() called .scsi_done() when returning another value than SUCCESS. Since that commit however this matters. Hence only call .scsi_done() when returning SUCCESS. Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c index 9a99cee2665a..ba51debef624 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c @@ -2581,9 +2581,11 @@ static int srp_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd) ret = FAST_IO_FAIL; else ret = FAILED; - srp_free_req(ch, req, scmnd, 0); - scmnd->result = DID_ABORT << 16; - scmnd->scsi_done(scmnd); + if (ret == SUCCESS) { + srp_free_req(ch, req, scmnd, 0); + scmnd->result = DID_ABORT << 16; + scmnd->scsi_done(scmnd); + } return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7a113a311b135b5e07410499074c3ab1d91999c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bart Van Assche Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 09:50:25 -0800 Subject: IB/srp: Fix completion vector assignment algorithm commit 3a148896b24adf8688dc0c59af54531931677a40 upstream. Ensure that cv_end is equal to ibdev->num_comp_vectors for the NUMA node with the highest index. This patch improves spreading of RDMA channels over completion vectors and thereby improves performance, especially on systems with only a single NUMA node. This patch drops support for the comp_vector login parameter by ignoring the value of that parameter since I have not found a good way to combine support for that parameter and automatic spreading of RDMA channels over completion vectors. Fixes: d92c0da71a35 ("IB/srp: Add multichannel support") Reported-by: Alexander Schmid Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche Cc: Alexander Schmid Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c index ba51debef624..4fd2892613dd 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c @@ -3311,12 +3311,10 @@ static ssize_t srp_create_target(struct device *dev, num_online_nodes()); const int ch_end = ((node_idx + 1) * target->ch_count / num_online_nodes()); - const int cv_start = (node_idx * ibdev->num_comp_vectors / - num_online_nodes() + target->comp_vector) - % ibdev->num_comp_vectors; - const int cv_end = ((node_idx + 1) * ibdev->num_comp_vectors / - num_online_nodes() + target->comp_vector) - % ibdev->num_comp_vectors; + const int cv_start = node_idx * ibdev->num_comp_vectors / + num_online_nodes(); + const int cv_end = (node_idx + 1) * ibdev->num_comp_vectors / + num_online_nodes(); int cpu_idx = 0; for_each_online_cpu(cpu) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5c90515d520a6c23ed0605d7185f8cc2b47f799d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxime Jayat Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 12:39:55 +0100 Subject: dmaengine: at_xdmac: fix rare residue corruption commit c5637476bbf9bb86c7f0413b8f4822a73d8d2d07 upstream. Despite the efforts made to correctly read the NDA and CUBC registers, the order in which the registers are read could sometimes lead to an inconsistent state. Re-using the timeline from the comments, this following timing of registers reads could lead to reading NDA with value "@desc2" and CUBC with value "MAX desc1": INITD -------- ------------ |____________________| _______________________ _______________ NDA @desc2 \/ @desc3 _______________________/\_______________ __________ ___________ _______________ CUBC 0 \/ MAX desc1 \/ MAX desc2 __________/\___________/\_______________ | | | | Events:(1)(2) (3)(4) (1) check_nda = @desc2 (2) initd = 1 (3) cur_ubc = MAX desc1 (4) cur_nda = @desc2 This is allowed by the condition ((check_nda == cur_nda) && initd), despite cur_ubc and cur_nda being in the precise state we don't want. This error leads to incorrect residue computation. Fix it by inversing the order in which CUBC and INITD are read. This makes sure that NDA and CUBC are always read together either _before_ INITD goes to 0 or _after_ it is back at 1. The case where NDA is read before INITD is at 0 and CUBC is read after INITD is back at 1 will be rejected by check_nda and cur_nda being different. Fixes: 53398f488821 ("dmaengine: at_xdmac: fix residue corruption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maxime Jayat Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c b/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c index 66c073fc8afc..82a7c89caae2 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/at_xdmac.c @@ -1473,10 +1473,10 @@ at_xdmac_tx_status(struct dma_chan *chan, dma_cookie_t cookie, for (retry = 0; retry < AT_XDMAC_RESIDUE_MAX_RETRIES; retry++) { check_nda = at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CNDA) & 0xfffffffc; rmb(); - initd = !!(at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CC) & AT_XDMAC_CC_INITD); - rmb(); cur_ubc = at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CUBC); rmb(); + initd = !!(at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CC) & AT_XDMAC_CC_INITD); + rmb(); cur_nda = at_xdmac_chan_read(atchan, AT_XDMAC_CNDA) & 0xfffffffc; rmb(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4cc90ae05e9b0520edef9aa756edb400bef6838e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Mazur Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 11:12:39 +0100 Subject: um: Use POSIX ucontext_t instead of struct ucontext commit 4d1a535b8ec5e74b42dfd9dc809142653b2597f6 upstream. glibc 2.26 removed the 'struct ucontext' to "improve" POSIX compliance and break programs, including User Mode Linux. Fix User Mode Linux by using POSIX ucontext_t. This fixes: arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c: In function 'hard_handler': arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c:163:22: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type 'struct ucontext' mcontext_t *mc = &uc->uc_mcontext; arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c: In function 'stub_segv_handler': arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c:16:13: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type 'struct ucontext' &uc->uc_mcontext); Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Mazur Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c | 2 +- arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c b/arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c index c211153ca69a..56648f4f8b41 100644 --- a/arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c +++ b/arch/um/os-Linux/signal.c @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void (*handlers[_NSIG])(int sig, struct siginfo *si, mcontext_t *mc) = { static void hard_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *si, void *p) { - struct ucontext *uc = p; + ucontext_t *uc = p; mcontext_t *mc = &uc->uc_mcontext; unsigned long pending = 1UL << sig; diff --git a/arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c b/arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c index 1518d2805ae8..fd6825537b97 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c +++ b/arch/x86/um/stub_segv.c @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ void __attribute__ ((__section__ (".__syscall_stub"))) stub_segv_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *p) { - struct ucontext *uc = p; + ucontext_t *uc = p; GET_FAULTINFO_FROM_MC(*((struct faultinfo *) STUB_DATA), &uc->uc_mcontext); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a7e67521c4f2074a8a2d21dd5bd3fb01d86c4d6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lu Baolu Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2018 13:42:27 +0800 Subject: iommu/vt-d: Fix a potential memory leak commit bbe4b3af9d9e3172fb9aa1f8dcdfaedcb381fc64 upstream. A memory block was allocated in intel_svm_bind_mm() but never freed in a failure path. This patch fixes this by free it to avoid memory leakage. Cc: Ashok Raj Cc: Jacob Pan Cc: # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu Fixes: 2f26e0a9c9860 ('iommu/vt-d: Add basic SVM PASID support') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c index a7d516f973dd..10068a481e22 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-svm.c @@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_mm(struct device *dev, int *pasid, int flags, struct svm_dev_ pasid_max - 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (ret < 0) { kfree(svm); + kfree(sdev); goto out; } svm->pasid = ret; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3f0491bb892eaa8a5364b38c651f02744b47ce63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Smith Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 18:00:43 -0300 Subject: mmc: jz4740: Fix race condition in IRQ mask update commit a04f0017c22453613d5f423326b190c61e3b4f98 upstream. A spinlock is held while updating the internal copy of the IRQ mask, but not while writing it to the actual IMASK register. After the lock is released, an IRQ can occur before the IMASK register is written. If handling this IRQ causes the mask to be changed, when the handler returns back to the middle of the first mask update, a stale value will be written to the mask register. If this causes an IRQ to become unmasked that cannot have its status cleared by writing a 1 to it in the IREG register, e.g. the SDIO IRQ, then we can end up stuck with the same IRQ repeatedly being fired but not handled. Normally the MMC IRQ handler attempts to clear any unexpected IRQs by writing IREG, but for those that cannot be cleared in this way then the IRQ will just repeatedly fire. This was resulting in lockups after a while of using Wi-Fi on the CI20 (GitHub issue #19). Resolve by holding the spinlock until after the IMASK register has been updated. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/MIPS/CI20_linux/issues/19 Fixes: 61bfbdb85687 ("MMC: Add support for the controller on JZ4740 SoCs.") Tested-by: Mathieu Malaterre Signed-off-by: Alex Smith Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c index 76e8bce6f46e..ad572a0f2124 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/jz4740_mmc.c @@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ static void jz4740_mmc_set_irq_enabled(struct jz4740_mmc_host *host, host->irq_mask &= ~irq; else host->irq_mask |= irq; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&host->lock, flags); writew(host->irq_mask, host->base + JZ_REG_MMC_IMASK); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&host->lock, flags); } static void jz4740_mmc_clock_enable(struct jz4740_mmc_host *host, -- cgit v1.2.3 From caf996ebc7962864978043add39deed63881e0cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ralph Sennhauser Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 16:58:52 +0200 Subject: clk: mvebu: armada-38x: add support for 1866MHz variants commit 9593f4f56cf5d1c443f66660a0c7f01de38f979d upstream. The Linksys WRT3200ACM CPU is clocked at 1866MHz. Add 1866MHz to the list of supported CPU frequencies. Also update multiplier and divisor for the l2clk and ddrclk. Noticed by the following warning: [ 0.000000] Selected CPU frequency (16) unsupported Signed-off-by: Ralph Sennhauser Reviewed-by: Gregory CLEMENT Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c b/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c index 8bccf4ecdab6..394aa6f03f01 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c +++ b/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c @@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ static const u32 armada_38x_cpu_frequencies[] __initconst = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 1066 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0, 1332 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0, - 1600 * 1000 * 1000, + 1600 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0, + 1866 * 1000 * 1000, }; static u32 __init armada_38x_get_cpu_freq(void __iomem *sar) @@ -79,7 +80,7 @@ static const int armada_38x_cpu_l2_ratios[32][2] __initconst = { {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, - {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, + {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, @@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ static const int armada_38x_cpu_ddr_ratios[32][2] __initconst = { {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, - {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, + {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, -- cgit v1.2.3 From b7b4411c8990623148aa97e5ca8c99abef11d28e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Genoud Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 16:27:02 +0100 Subject: clk: mvebu: armada-38x: add support for missing clocks commit 6a4a4595804548e173f0763a0e7274a3521c59a9 upstream. Clearfog boards can come with a CPU clocked at 1600MHz (commercial) or 1333MHz (industrial). They have also some dip-switches to select a different clock (666, 800, 1066, 1200). The funny thing is that the recovery button is on the MPP34 fq selector. So, when booting an industrial board with this button down, the frequency 666MHz is selected (and the kernel didn't boot). This patch add all the missing clocks. The only mode I didn't test is 2GHz (uboot found 4294MHz instead :/ ). Fixes: 0e85aeced4d6 ("clk: mvebu: add clock support for Armada 380/385") Cc: # 3.16.x: 9593f4f56cf5: clk: mvebu: armada-38x: add support for 1866MHz variants Cc: # 3.16.x Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud Acked-by: Gregory CLEMENT Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c b/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c index 394aa6f03f01..9ff4ea63932d 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c +++ b/drivers/clk/mvebu/armada-38x.c @@ -46,11 +46,11 @@ static u32 __init armada_38x_get_tclk_freq(void __iomem *sar) } static const u32 armada_38x_cpu_frequencies[] __initconst = { - 0, 0, 0, 0, - 1066 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0, + 666 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 800 * 1000 * 1000, 0, + 1066 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 1200 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 1332 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0, 1600 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 0, - 1866 * 1000 * 1000, + 1866 * 1000 * 1000, 0, 0, 2000 * 1000 * 1000, }; static u32 __init armada_38x_get_cpu_freq(void __iomem *sar) @@ -76,11 +76,11 @@ static const struct coreclk_ratio armada_38x_coreclk_ratios[] __initconst = { }; static const int armada_38x_cpu_l2_ratios[32][2] __initconst = { - {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, - {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, - {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, + {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, + {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, + {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static const int armada_38x_cpu_ddr_ratios[32][2] __initconst = { {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, - {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, + {1, 2}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {7, 15}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, {0, 1}, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5fd7232783fcbf8945a5cabb4276467a6b87750c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Boris Brezillon Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 10:11:30 +0100 Subject: clk: bcm2835: De-assert/assert PLL reset signal when appropriate commit 753872373b599384ac7df809aa61ea12d1c4d5d1 upstream. In order to enable a PLL, not only the PLL has to be powered up and locked, but you also have to de-assert the reset signal. The last part was missing. Add it so PLLs that were not enabled by the FW/bootloader can be enabled from Linux. Fixes: 41691b8862e2 ("clk: bcm2835: Add support for programming the audio domain clocks") Cc: Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon Reviewed-by: Eric Anholt Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c b/drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c index 7c4b1ffe874f..d56ba46e6b78 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c +++ b/drivers/clk/bcm/clk-bcm2835.c @@ -891,9 +891,7 @@ static void bcm2835_pll_off(struct clk_hw *hw) const struct bcm2835_pll_data *data = pll->data; spin_lock(&cprman->regs_lock); - cprman_write(cprman, data->cm_ctrl_reg, - cprman_read(cprman, data->cm_ctrl_reg) | - CM_PLL_ANARST); + cprman_write(cprman, data->cm_ctrl_reg, CM_PLL_ANARST); cprman_write(cprman, data->a2w_ctrl_reg, cprman_read(cprman, data->a2w_ctrl_reg) | A2W_PLL_CTRL_PWRDN); @@ -929,6 +927,10 @@ static int bcm2835_pll_on(struct clk_hw *hw) cpu_relax(); } + cprman_write(cprman, data->a2w_ctrl_reg, + cprman_read(cprman, data->a2w_ctrl_reg) | + A2W_PLL_CTRL_PRST_DISABLE); + return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8af69306a7b7286d98d0354e9128f3e3bc30f07e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikhail Lappo Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2018 16:17:46 -0200 Subject: thermal: imx: Fix race condition in imx_thermal_probe() commit cf1ba1d73a33944d8c1a75370a35434bf146b8a7 upstream. When device boots with T > T_trip_1 and requests interrupt, the race condition takes place. The interrupt comes before THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED is set. This leads to an attempt to reading sensor value from irq and disabling the sensor, based on the data->mode field, which expected to be THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED, but still stays as THERMAL_DEVICE_DISABLED. Afher this issue sensor is never re-enabled, as the driver state is wrong. Fix this problem by setting the 'data' members prior to requesting the interrupts. Fixes: 37713a1e8e4c ("thermal: imx: implement thermal alarm interrupt handling") Cc: Signed-off-by: Mikhail Lappo Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam Reviewed-by: Philipp Zabel Acked-by: Dong Aisheng Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c b/drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c index c5547bd711db..6a8300108148 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/imx_thermal.c @@ -589,6 +589,9 @@ static int imx_thermal_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) regmap_write(map, TEMPSENSE0 + REG_CLR, TEMPSENSE0_POWER_DOWN); regmap_write(map, TEMPSENSE0 + REG_SET, TEMPSENSE0_MEASURE_TEMP); + data->irq_enabled = true; + data->mode = THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED; + ret = devm_request_threaded_irq(&pdev->dev, data->irq, imx_thermal_alarm_irq, imx_thermal_alarm_irq_thread, 0, "imx_thermal", data); @@ -600,9 +603,6 @@ static int imx_thermal_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return ret; } - data->irq_enabled = true; - data->mode = THERMAL_DEVICE_ENABLED; - return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4533f7e1785faab49c867ae19bf00840fe351b0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Igor Pylypiv Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 23:47:25 -0800 Subject: watchdog: f71808e_wdt: Fix WD_EN register read commit 977f6f68331f94bb72ad84ee96b7b87ce737d89d upstream. F71808FG_FLAG_WD_EN defines bit position, not a bitmask Signed-off-by: Igor Pylypiv Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c index 016bd9355190..aa93df5833dc 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static bool watchdog_is_running(void) is_running = (superio_inb(watchdog.sioaddr, SIO_REG_ENABLE) & BIT(0)) && (superio_inb(watchdog.sioaddr, F71808FG_REG_WDT_CONF) - & F71808FG_FLAG_WD_EN); + & BIT(F71808FG_FLAG_WD_EN)); superio_exit(watchdog.sioaddr); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a12b4e2bb49518eba08bf269df8f8d0bb163e55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Mc Guire Date: Sat, 19 Dec 2015 15:23:13 +0100 Subject: ALSA: oss: consolidate kmalloc/memset 0 call to kzalloc commit 46325371b230cc66c743925c930a17e7d0b8211e upstream. This is an API consolidation only. The use of kmalloc + memset to 0 is equivalent to kzalloc. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Mc Guire Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c index 6cd8aec146f2..672f3acfca0b 100644 --- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c +++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c @@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, return -EAGAIN; } else if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) return -EINTR; - sw_params = kmalloc(sizeof(*sw_params), GFP_KERNEL); + sw_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_params), GFP_KERNEL); params = kmalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL); sparams = kmalloc(sizeof(*sparams), GFP_KERNEL); if (!sw_params || !params || !sparams) { @@ -991,7 +991,6 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, goto failure; } - memset(sw_params, 0, sizeof(*sw_params)); if (runtime->oss.trigger) { sw_params->start_threshold = 1; } else { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 60dd12fdf0e80e4399783f622392c1db84c5d8f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 08:51:02 +0100 Subject: ALSA: pcm: Use ERESTARTSYS instead of EINTR in OSS emulation commit c64ed5dd9feba193c76eb460b451225ac2a0d87b upstream. Fix the last standing EINTR in the whole subsystem. Use more correct ERESTARTSYS for pending signals. Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c index 672f3acfca0b..3e22f14126ae 100644 --- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c +++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, if (!(mutex_trylock(&runtime->oss.params_lock))) return -EAGAIN; } else if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) - return -EINTR; + return -ERESTARTSYS; sw_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_params), GFP_KERNEL); params = kmalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL); sparams = kmalloc(sizeof(*sparams), GFP_KERNEL); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f3e4c937c8b7c309abc6d8b98ddcc5bfabd0a653 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 18:10:14 +0100 Subject: ALSA: pcm: Avoid potential races between OSS ioctls and read/write commit 02a5d6925cd34c3b774bdb8eefb057c40a30e870 upstream. Although we apply the params_lock mutex to the whole read and write operations as well as snd_pcm_oss_change_params(), we may still face some races. First off, the params_lock is taken inside the read and write loop. This is intentional for avoiding the too long locking, but it allows the in-between parameter change, which might lead to invalid pointers. We check the readiness of the stream and set up via snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() at the beginning of read and write, but it's called only once, by assuming that it remains ready in the rest. Second, many ioctls that may change the actual parameters (i.e. setting runtime->oss.params=1) aren't protected, hence they can be processed in a half-baked state. This patch is an attempt to plug these holes. The stream readiness check is moved inside the read/write inner loop, so that the stream is always set up in a proper state before further processing. Also, each ioctl that may change the parameter is wrapped with the params_lock for avoiding the races. The issues were triggered by syzkaller in a few different scenarios, particularly the one below appearing as GPF in loopback_pos_update. Reported-by: syzbot+c4227aec125487ec3efa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 134 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 106 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c index 3e22f14126ae..ff90bc4e965a 100644 --- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c +++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c @@ -833,8 +833,8 @@ static int choose_rate(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, return snd_pcm_hw_param_near(substream, params, SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE, best_rate, NULL); } -static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, - bool trylock) +/* call with params_lock held */ +static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) { struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime; struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params, *sparams; @@ -848,11 +848,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, struct snd_mask sformat_mask; struct snd_mask mask; - if (trylock) { - if (!(mutex_trylock(&runtime->oss.params_lock))) - return -EAGAIN; - } else if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) - return -ERESTARTSYS; + if (!runtime->oss.params) + return 0; sw_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_params), GFP_KERNEL); params = kmalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL); sparams = kmalloc(sizeof(*sparams), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1078,6 +1075,23 @@ failure: kfree(sw_params); kfree(params); kfree(sparams); + return err; +} + +/* this one takes the lock by itself */ +static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, + bool trylock) +{ + struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime; + int err; + + if (trylock) { + if (!(mutex_trylock(&runtime->oss.params_lock))) + return -EAGAIN; + } else if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + + err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(substream); mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); return err; } @@ -1106,11 +1120,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_get_active_substream(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_fil return 0; } +/* call with params_lock held */ static int snd_pcm_oss_prepare(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) { int err; struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime; + if (!runtime->oss.prepare) + return 0; err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_PREPARE, NULL); if (err < 0) { pcm_dbg(substream->pcm, @@ -1130,14 +1147,35 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; int err; - if (substream == NULL) - return 0; runtime = substream->runtime; if (runtime->oss.params) { err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params(substream, false); if (err < 0) return err; } + if (runtime->oss.prepare) { + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + err = snd_pcm_oss_prepare(substream); + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } + return 0; +} + +/* call with params_lock held */ +static int snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) +{ + struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; + int err; + + runtime = substream->runtime; + if (runtime->oss.params) { + err = snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(substream); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } if (runtime->oss.prepare) { err = snd_pcm_oss_prepare(substream); if (err < 0) @@ -1366,13 +1404,14 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, const cha if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count)) return -ENXIO; - if ((tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0) - return tmp; while (bytes > 0) { if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) { tmp = -ERESTARTSYS; break; } + tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked(substream); + if (tmp < 0) + goto err; if (bytes < runtime->oss.period_bytes || runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) { tmp = bytes; if (tmp + runtime->oss.buffer_used > runtime->oss.period_bytes) @@ -1473,13 +1512,14 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, char __use if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count)) return -ENXIO; - if ((tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0) - return tmp; while (bytes > 0) { if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) { tmp = -ERESTARTSYS; break; } + tmp = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked(substream); + if (tmp < 0) + goto err; if (bytes < runtime->oss.period_bytes || runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) { if (runtime->oss.buffer_used == 0) { tmp = snd_pcm_oss_read2(substream, runtime->oss.buffer, runtime->oss.period_bytes, 1); @@ -1535,10 +1575,12 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_reset(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP, NULL); + mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); runtime->oss.prepare = 1; runtime->oss.buffer_used = 0; runtime->oss.prev_hw_ptr_period = 0; runtime->oss.period_ptr = 0; + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); } return 0; } @@ -1624,9 +1666,10 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) goto __direct; if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0) return err; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; format = snd_pcm_oss_format_from(runtime->oss.format); width = snd_pcm_format_physical_width(format); - mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); if (runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) { #ifdef OSS_DEBUG pcm_dbg(substream->pcm, "sync: buffer_used\n"); @@ -1694,7 +1737,9 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) substream->f_flags = saved_f_flags; if (err < 0) return err; + mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); runtime->oss.prepare = 1; + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); } substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE]; @@ -1705,8 +1750,10 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP, NULL); if (err < 0) return err; + mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); runtime->oss.buffer_used = 0; runtime->oss.prepare = 1; + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); } return 0; } @@ -1725,10 +1772,13 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_rate(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int rate) rate = 1000; else if (rate > 192000) rate = 192000; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; if (runtime->oss.rate != rate) { runtime->oss.params = 1; runtime->oss.rate = rate; } + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); } return snd_pcm_oss_get_rate(pcm_oss_file); } @@ -1756,10 +1806,13 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_channels(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, unsig if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; if (runtime->oss.channels != channels) { runtime->oss.params = 1; runtime->oss.channels = channels; } + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); } return snd_pcm_oss_get_channels(pcm_oss_file); } @@ -1845,10 +1898,13 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_format(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int for if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; if (runtime->oss.format != format) { runtime->oss.params = 1; runtime->oss.format = format; } + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); } } return snd_pcm_oss_get_format(pcm_oss_file); @@ -1868,8 +1924,6 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int s { struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; - if (substream == NULL) - return 0; runtime = substream->runtime; if (subdivide == 0) { subdivide = runtime->oss.subdivision; @@ -1893,9 +1947,16 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int for (idx = 1; idx >= 0; --idx) { struct snd_pcm_substream *substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[idx]; + struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; + if (substream == NULL) continue; - if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(substream, subdivide)) < 0) + runtime = substream->runtime; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + err = snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(substream, subdivide); + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + if (err < 0) return err; } return err; @@ -1905,8 +1966,6 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, unsign { struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; - if (substream == NULL) - return 0; runtime = substream->runtime; if (runtime->oss.subdivision || runtime->oss.fragshift) return -EINVAL; @@ -1926,9 +1985,16 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, unsig for (idx = 1; idx >= 0; --idx) { struct snd_pcm_substream *substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[idx]; + struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; + if (substream == NULL) continue; - if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(substream, val)) < 0) + runtime = substream->runtime; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + err = snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(substream, val); + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + if (err < 0) return err; } return err; @@ -2012,6 +2078,9 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int tr } if (psubstream) { runtime = psubstream->runtime; + cmd = 0; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; if (trigger & PCM_ENABLE_OUTPUT) { if (runtime->oss.trigger) goto _skip1; @@ -2029,13 +2098,19 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int tr cmd = SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP; runtime->oss.prepare = 1; } - err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(psubstream, cmd, NULL); - if (err < 0) - return err; - } _skip1: + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + if (cmd) { + err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(psubstream, cmd, NULL); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } + } if (csubstream) { runtime = csubstream->runtime; + cmd = 0; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; if (trigger & PCM_ENABLE_INPUT) { if (runtime->oss.trigger) goto _skip2; @@ -2050,11 +2125,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int tr cmd = SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_DROP; runtime->oss.prepare = 1; } - err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(csubstream, cmd, NULL); - if (err < 0) - return err; - } _skip2: + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + if (cmd) { + err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(csubstream, cmd, NULL); + if (err < 0) + return err; + } + } return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 68ba825a3988d4c491953f3792f13da74e302963 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 23 Mar 2018 08:03:26 +0100 Subject: ALSA: pcm: Return -EBUSY for OSS ioctls changing busy streams commit 40cab6e88cb0b6c56d3f30b7491a20e803f948f6 upstream. OSS PCM stream management isn't modal but it allows ioctls issued at any time for changing the parameters. In the previous hardening patch ("ALSA: pcm: Avoid potential races between OSS ioctls and read/write"), we covered these races and prevent the corruption by protecting the concurrent accesses via params_lock mutex. However, this means that some ioctls that try to change the stream parameter (e.g. channels or format) would be blocked until the read/write finishes, and it may take really long. Basically changing the parameter while reading/writing is an invalid operation, hence it's even more user-friendly from the API POV if it returns -EBUSY in such a situation. This patch adds such checks in the relevant ioctls with the addition of read/write access refcount. Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/sound/pcm_oss.h | 1 + sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/sound/pcm_oss.h b/include/sound/pcm_oss.h index 760c969d885d..12bbf8c81112 100644 --- a/include/sound/pcm_oss.h +++ b/include/sound/pcm_oss.h @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct snd_pcm_oss_runtime { char *buffer; /* vmallocated period */ size_t buffer_used; /* used length from period buffer */ struct mutex params_lock; + atomic_t rw_ref; /* concurrent read/write accesses */ #ifdef CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS_PLUGINS struct snd_pcm_plugin *plugin_first; struct snd_pcm_plugin *plugin_last; diff --git a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c index ff90bc4e965a..d17b1709e1bc 100644 --- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c +++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c @@ -1404,6 +1404,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, const cha if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count)) return -ENXIO; + atomic_inc(&runtime->oss.rw_ref); while (bytes > 0) { if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) { tmp = -ERESTARTSYS; @@ -1467,6 +1468,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_write1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, const cha } tmp = 0; } + atomic_dec(&runtime->oss.rw_ref); return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : tmp; } @@ -1512,6 +1514,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, char __use if (atomic_read(&substream->mmap_count)) return -ENXIO; + atomic_inc(&runtime->oss.rw_ref); while (bytes > 0) { if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) { tmp = -ERESTARTSYS; @@ -1560,6 +1563,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_pcm_oss_read1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, char __use } tmp = 0; } + atomic_dec(&runtime->oss.rw_ref); return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : tmp; } @@ -1666,8 +1670,11 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) goto __direct; if ((err = snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(substream)) < 0) return err; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + atomic_inc(&runtime->oss.rw_ref); + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) { + atomic_dec(&runtime->oss.rw_ref); return -ERESTARTSYS; + } format = snd_pcm_oss_format_from(runtime->oss.format); width = snd_pcm_format_physical_width(format); if (runtime->oss.buffer_used > 0) { @@ -1679,10 +1686,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) runtime->oss.buffer + runtime->oss.buffer_used, size); err = snd_pcm_oss_sync1(substream, runtime->oss.period_bytes); - if (err < 0) { - mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); - return err; - } + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; } else if (runtime->oss.period_ptr > 0) { #ifdef OSS_DEBUG pcm_dbg(substream->pcm, "sync: period_ptr\n"); @@ -1692,10 +1697,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) runtime->oss.buffer, size * 8 / width); err = snd_pcm_oss_sync1(substream, size); - if (err < 0) { - mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); - return err; - } + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; } /* * The ALSA's period might be a bit large than OSS one. @@ -1726,7 +1729,11 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_sync(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) snd_pcm_lib_writev(substream, buffers, size); } } +unlock: mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + atomic_dec(&runtime->oss.rw_ref); + if (err < 0) + return err; /* * finish sync: drain the buffer */ @@ -1774,6 +1781,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_rate(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int rate) rate = 192000; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) return -ERESTARTSYS; + if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) + return -EBUSY; if (runtime->oss.rate != rate) { runtime->oss.params = 1; runtime->oss.rate = rate; @@ -1808,6 +1817,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_channels(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, unsig runtime = substream->runtime; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) return -ERESTARTSYS; + if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) + return -EBUSY; if (runtime->oss.channels != channels) { runtime->oss.params = 1; runtime->oss.channels = channels; @@ -1898,6 +1909,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_format(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int for if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; + if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) + return -EBUSY; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) return -ERESTARTSYS; if (runtime->oss.format != format) { @@ -1952,6 +1965,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; + if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) + return -EBUSY; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) return -ERESTARTSYS; err = snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(substream, subdivide); @@ -1990,6 +2005,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, unsig if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; + if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) + return -EBUSY; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) return -ERESTARTSYS; err = snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(substream, val); @@ -2384,6 +2401,7 @@ static void snd_pcm_oss_init_substream(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, runtime->oss.maxfrags = 0; runtime->oss.subdivision = 0; substream->pcm_release = snd_pcm_oss_release_substream; + atomic_set(&runtime->oss.rw_ref, 0); } static int snd_pcm_oss_release_file(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) -- cgit v1.2.3 From a2b3309a2c1c58560abd3eef1f2a0ff47713e3bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 14:32:23 +0200 Subject: ALSA: pcm: Fix mutex unbalance in OSS emulation ioctls commit f6d297df4dd47ef949540e4a201230d0c5308325 upstream. The previous fix 40cab6e88cb0 ("ALSA: pcm: Return -EBUSY for OSS ioctls changing busy streams") introduced some mutex unbalance; the check of runtime->oss.rw_ref was inserted in a wrong place after the mutex lock. This patch fixes the inconsistency by rewriting with the helper functions to lock/unlock parameters with the stream check. Fixes: 40cab6e88cb0 ("ALSA: pcm: Return -EBUSY for OSS ioctls changing busy streams") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c index d17b1709e1bc..9df14f7899b3 100644 --- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c +++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c @@ -833,6 +833,23 @@ static int choose_rate(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, return snd_pcm_hw_param_near(substream, params, SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_RATE, best_rate, NULL); } +/* parameter locking: returns immediately if tried during streaming */ +static int lock_params(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime) +{ + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) + return -ERESTARTSYS; + if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) { + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + return -EBUSY; + } + return 0; +} + +static void unlock_params(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime) +{ + mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); +} + /* call with params_lock held */ static int snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) { @@ -1772,6 +1789,8 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_rate(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int rate) for (idx = 1; idx >= 0; --idx) { struct snd_pcm_substream *substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[idx]; struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; + int err; + if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; @@ -1779,15 +1798,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_rate(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int rate) rate = 1000; else if (rate > 192000) rate = 192000; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) - return -ERESTARTSYS; - if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) - return -EBUSY; + err = lock_params(runtime); + if (err < 0) + return err; if (runtime->oss.rate != rate) { runtime->oss.params = 1; runtime->oss.rate = rate; } - mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + unlock_params(runtime); } return snd_pcm_oss_get_rate(pcm_oss_file); } @@ -1812,18 +1830,19 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_channels(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, unsig for (idx = 1; idx >= 0; --idx) { struct snd_pcm_substream *substream = pcm_oss_file->streams[idx]; struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime; + int err; + if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) - return -ERESTARTSYS; - if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) - return -EBUSY; + err = lock_params(runtime); + if (err < 0) + return err; if (runtime->oss.channels != channels) { runtime->oss.params = 1; runtime->oss.channels = channels; } - mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + unlock_params(runtime); } return snd_pcm_oss_get_channels(pcm_oss_file); } @@ -1896,6 +1915,7 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_get_formats(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file) static int snd_pcm_oss_set_format(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int format) { int formats, idx; + int err; if (format != AFMT_QUERY) { formats = snd_pcm_oss_get_formats(pcm_oss_file); @@ -1909,15 +1929,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_format(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int for if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; - if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) - return -EBUSY; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) - return -ERESTARTSYS; + err = lock_params(runtime); + if (err < 0) + return err; if (runtime->oss.format != format) { runtime->oss.params = 1; runtime->oss.format = format; } - mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + unlock_params(runtime); } } return snd_pcm_oss_get_format(pcm_oss_file); @@ -1965,12 +1984,11 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, int if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; - if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) - return -EBUSY; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) - return -ERESTARTSYS; + err = lock_params(runtime); + if (err < 0) + return err; err = snd_pcm_oss_set_subdivide1(substream, subdivide); - mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + unlock_params(runtime); if (err < 0) return err; } @@ -2005,12 +2023,11 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file, unsig if (substream == NULL) continue; runtime = substream->runtime; - if (atomic_read(&runtime->oss.rw_ref)) - return -EBUSY; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&runtime->oss.params_lock)) - return -ERESTARTSYS; + err = lock_params(runtime); + if (err < 0) + return err; err = snd_pcm_oss_set_fragment1(substream, val); - mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock); + unlock_params(runtime); if (err < 0) return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0c8c443eb10937f98b47a4c82a75982593359ee0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Sat, 7 Apr 2018 11:48:58 +0200 Subject: ALSA: pcm: Fix endless loop for XRUN recovery in OSS emulation commit e15dc99dbb9cf99f6432e8e3c0b3a8f7a3403a86 upstream. The commit 02a5d6925cd3 ("ALSA: pcm: Avoid potential races between OSS ioctls and read/write") split the PCM preparation code to a locked version, and it added a sanity check of runtime->oss.prepare flag along with the change. This leaded to an endless loop when the stream gets XRUN: namely, snd_pcm_oss_write3() and co call snd_pcm_oss_prepare() without setting runtime->oss.prepare flag and the loop continues until the PCM state reaches to another one. As the function is supposed to execute the preparation unconditionally, drop the invalid state check there. The bug was triggered by syzkaller. Fixes: 02a5d6925cd3 ("ALSA: pcm: Avoid potential races between OSS ioctls and read/write") Reported-by: syzbot+150189c103427d31a053@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+7e3f31a52646f939c052@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+4f2016cf5185da7759dc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c index 9df14f7899b3..07feb35f1935 100644 --- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c +++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c @@ -1138,13 +1138,14 @@ static int snd_pcm_oss_get_active_substream(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_fil } /* call with params_lock held */ +/* NOTE: this always call PREPARE unconditionally no matter whether + * runtime->oss.prepare is set or not + */ static int snd_pcm_oss_prepare(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) { int err; struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime; - if (!runtime->oss.prepare) - return 0; err = snd_pcm_kernel_ioctl(substream, SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL_PREPARE, NULL); if (err < 0) { pcm_dbg(substream->pcm, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1639df89e6b5841975bbf2f98200248df3210f85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Williamson Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 13:52:16 -0600 Subject: vfio-pci: Virtualize PCIe & AF FLR commit ddf9dc0eb5314d6dac8b19b1cc37c739c6896e7e upstream. We use a BAR restore trick to try to detect when a user has performed a device reset, possibly through FLR or other backdoors, to put things back into a working state. This is important for backdoor resets, but we can actually just virtualize the "front door" resets provided via PCIe and AF FLR. Set these bits as virtualized + writable, allowing the default write to set them in vconfig, then we can simply check the bit, perform an FLR of our own, and clear the bit. We don't actually have the granularity in PCI to specify the type of reset we want to do, but generally devices don't implement both PCIe and AF FLR and we'll favor these over other types of reset, so we should generally lineup. We do test whether the device provides the requested FLR type to stay consistent with hardware capabilities though. This seems to fix several instance of devices getting into bad states with userspace drivers, like dpdk, running inside a VM. Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Reviewed-by: Greg Rose Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c index fe2b470d7ec6..7a6b85f767da 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c @@ -752,6 +752,40 @@ static int __init init_pci_cap_pcix_perm(struct perm_bits *perm) return 0; } +static int vfio_exp_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos, + int count, struct perm_bits *perm, + int offset, __le32 val) +{ + __le16 *ctrl = (__le16 *)(vdev->vconfig + pos - + offset + PCI_EXP_DEVCTL); + + count = vfio_default_config_write(vdev, pos, count, perm, offset, val); + if (count < 0) + return count; + + /* + * The FLR bit is virtualized, if set and the device supports PCIe + * FLR, issue a reset_function. Regardless, clear the bit, the spec + * requires it to be always read as zero. NB, reset_function might + * not use a PCIe FLR, we don't have that level of granularity. + */ + if (*ctrl & cpu_to_le16(PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR)) { + u32 cap; + int ret; + + *ctrl &= ~cpu_to_le16(PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR); + + ret = pci_user_read_config_dword(vdev->pdev, + pos - offset + PCI_EXP_DEVCAP, + &cap); + + if (!ret && (cap & PCI_EXP_DEVCAP_FLR)) + pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev); + } + + return count; +} + /* Permissions for PCI Express capability */ static int __init init_pci_cap_exp_perm(struct perm_bits *perm) { @@ -759,26 +793,64 @@ static int __init init_pci_cap_exp_perm(struct perm_bits *perm) if (alloc_perm_bits(perm, PCI_CAP_EXP_ENDPOINT_SIZEOF_V2)) return -ENOMEM; + perm->writefn = vfio_exp_config_write; + p_setb(perm, PCI_CAP_LIST_NEXT, (u8)ALL_VIRT, NO_WRITE); /* - * Allow writes to device control fields (includes FLR!) - * but not to devctl_phantom which could confuse IOMMU - * or to the ARI bit in devctl2 which is set at probe time + * Allow writes to device control fields, except devctl_phantom, + * which could confuse IOMMU, and the ARI bit in devctl2, which + * is set at probe time. FLR gets virtualized via our writefn. */ - p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL, NO_VIRT, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PHANTOM); + p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL, + PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PHANTOM); p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2, NO_VIRT, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ARI); return 0; } +static int vfio_af_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos, + int count, struct perm_bits *perm, + int offset, __le32 val) +{ + u8 *ctrl = vdev->vconfig + pos - offset + PCI_AF_CTRL; + + count = vfio_default_config_write(vdev, pos, count, perm, offset, val); + if (count < 0) + return count; + + /* + * The FLR bit is virtualized, if set and the device supports AF + * FLR, issue a reset_function. Regardless, clear the bit, the spec + * requires it to be always read as zero. NB, reset_function might + * not use an AF FLR, we don't have that level of granularity. + */ + if (*ctrl & PCI_AF_CTRL_FLR) { + u8 cap; + int ret; + + *ctrl &= ~PCI_AF_CTRL_FLR; + + ret = pci_user_read_config_byte(vdev->pdev, + pos - offset + PCI_AF_CAP, + &cap); + + if (!ret && (cap & PCI_AF_CAP_FLR) && (cap & PCI_AF_CAP_TP)) + pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev); + } + + return count; +} + /* Permissions for Advanced Function capability */ static int __init init_pci_cap_af_perm(struct perm_bits *perm) { if (alloc_perm_bits(perm, pci_cap_length[PCI_CAP_ID_AF])) return -ENOMEM; + perm->writefn = vfio_af_config_write; + p_setb(perm, PCI_CAP_LIST_NEXT, (u8)ALL_VIRT, NO_WRITE); - p_setb(perm, PCI_AF_CTRL, NO_VIRT, PCI_AF_CTRL_FLR); + p_setb(perm, PCI_AF_CTRL, PCI_AF_CTRL_FLR, PCI_AF_CTRL_FLR); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 737e33da96b4bcd54bc7cc98d4d27cc694f67024 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Williamson Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 12:39:09 -0600 Subject: vfio/pci: Virtualize Maximum Payload Size commit 523184972b282cd9ca17a76f6ca4742394856818 upstream. With virtual PCI-Express chipsets, we now see userspace/guest drivers trying to match the physical MPS setting to a virtual downstream port. Of course a lone physical device surrounded by virtual interconnects cannot make a correct decision for a proper MPS setting. Instead, let's virtualize the MPS control register so that writes through to hardware are disallowed. Userspace drivers like QEMU assume they can write anything to the device and we'll filter out anything dangerous. Since mismatched MPS can lead to AER and other faults, let's add it to the kernel side rather than relying on userspace virtualization to handle it. Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Reviewed-by: Eric Auger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c index 7a6b85f767da..90c4fd2b33cf 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c @@ -799,11 +799,13 @@ static int __init init_pci_cap_exp_perm(struct perm_bits *perm) /* * Allow writes to device control fields, except devctl_phantom, - * which could confuse IOMMU, and the ARI bit in devctl2, which + * which could confuse IOMMU, MPS, which can break communication + * with other physical devices, and the ARI bit in devctl2, which * is set at probe time. FLR gets virtualized via our writefn. */ p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL, - PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PHANTOM); + PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR | PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD, + ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PHANTOM); p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2, NO_VIRT, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ARI); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7b0278ca9f280cab9a6fe2ca8c868db8df951427 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Williamson Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 12:39:10 -0600 Subject: vfio/pci: Virtualize Maximum Read Request Size commit cf0d53ba4947aad6e471491d5b20a567cbe92e56 upstream. MRRS defines the maximum read request size a device is allowed to make. Drivers will often increase this to allow more data transfer with a single request. Completions to this request are bound by the MPS setting for the bus. Aside from device quirks (none known), it doesn't seem to make sense to set an MRRS value less than MPS, yet this is a likely scenario given that user drivers do not have a system-wide view of the PCI topology. Virtualize MRRS such that the user can set MRRS >= MPS, but use MPS as the floor value that we'll write to hardware. Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c index 90c4fd2b33cf..c55c632a3b24 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c @@ -758,6 +758,7 @@ static int vfio_exp_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos, { __le16 *ctrl = (__le16 *)(vdev->vconfig + pos - offset + PCI_EXP_DEVCTL); + int readrq = le16_to_cpu(*ctrl) & PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ; count = vfio_default_config_write(vdev, pos, count, perm, offset, val); if (count < 0) @@ -783,6 +784,27 @@ static int vfio_exp_config_write(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos, pci_try_reset_function(vdev->pdev); } + /* + * MPS is virtualized to the user, writes do not change the physical + * register since determining a proper MPS value requires a system wide + * device view. The MRRS is largely independent of MPS, but since the + * user does not have that system-wide view, they might set a safe, but + * inefficiently low value. Here we allow writes through to hardware, + * but we set the floor to the physical device MPS setting, so that + * we can at least use full TLPs, as defined by the MPS value. + * + * NB, if any devices actually depend on an artificially low MRRS + * setting, this will need to be revisited, perhaps with a quirk + * though pcie_set_readrq(). + */ + if (readrq != (le16_to_cpu(*ctrl) & PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ)) { + readrq = 128 << + ((le16_to_cpu(*ctrl) & PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ) >> 12); + readrq = max(readrq, pcie_get_mps(vdev->pdev)); + + pcie_set_readrq(vdev->pdev, readrq); + } + return count; } @@ -801,11 +823,12 @@ static int __init init_pci_cap_exp_perm(struct perm_bits *perm) * Allow writes to device control fields, except devctl_phantom, * which could confuse IOMMU, MPS, which can break communication * with other physical devices, and the ARI bit in devctl2, which - * is set at probe time. FLR gets virtualized via our writefn. + * is set at probe time. FLR and MRRS get virtualized via our + * writefn. */ p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL, - PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR | PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD, - ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PHANTOM); + PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_BCR_FLR | PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PAYLOAD | + PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_READRQ, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_PHANTOM); p_setw(perm, PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2, NO_VIRT, ~PCI_EXP_DEVCTL2_ARI); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4845fefe6d13a28702f92102dff11c1b773f00d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 22:10:35 -0400 Subject: ext4: don't allow r/w mounts if metadata blocks overlap the superblock commit 18db4b4e6fc31eda838dd1c1296d67dbcb3dc957 upstream. If some metadata block, such as an allocation bitmap, overlaps the superblock, it's very likely that if the file system is mounted read/write, the results will not be pretty. So disallow r/w mounts for file systems corrupted in this particular way. Backport notes: 3.18.y is missing bc98a42c1f7d ("VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)") and e462ec50cb5f ("VFS: Differentiate mount flags (MS_*) from internal superblock flags") so we simply use the sb MS_RDONLY check from pre bc98a42c1f7d in place of the sb_rdonly function used in the upstream variant of the patch. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Harsh Shandilya Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/super.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 742455292dfe..0e0438b5ddbe 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2131,6 +2131,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb, ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " "Block bitmap for group %u overlaps " "superblock", i); + if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) + return 0; } if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " @@ -2143,6 +2145,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb, ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " "Inode bitmap for group %u overlaps " "superblock", i); + if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) + return 0; } if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " @@ -2155,6 +2159,8 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct super_block *sb, ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: " "Inode table for group %u overlaps " "superblock", i); + if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) + return 0; } if (inode_table < first_block || inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From ba250be92484186b63ad52b7f9bcb66662e7ff2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Parsons Date: Sat, 2 Apr 2016 12:32:30 +0100 Subject: drm/radeon: Fix PCIe lane width calculation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 85e290d92b4b794d0c758c53007eb4248d385386 upstream. Two years ago I tried an AMD Radeon E8860 embedded GPU with the drm driver. The dmesg output included driver warnings about an invalid PCIe lane width. Tracking the problem back led to si_set_pcie_lane_width_in_smc(). The calculation of the lane widths via ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_MASK and ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_SHIFT macros did not increment the resulting value, per the comment in pptable.h ("lanes - 1"), and per usage elsewhere. Applying the increment silenced the warnings. The code has not changed since, so either my analysis was incorrect or the bug has gone unnoticed. Hence submitting this as an RFC. Acked-by: Christian König Acked-by: Chunming Zhou Signed-off-by: Paul Parsons Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c index d9007cc37be1..892d0a71d766 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/si_dpm.c @@ -5964,9 +5964,9 @@ static void si_set_pcie_lane_width_in_smc(struct radeon_device *rdev, { u32 lane_width; u32 new_lane_width = - (radeon_new_state->caps & ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_MASK) >> ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_SHIFT; + ((radeon_new_state->caps & ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_MASK) >> ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_SHIFT) + 1; u32 current_lane_width = - (radeon_current_state->caps & ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_MASK) >> ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_SHIFT; + ((radeon_current_state->caps & ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_MASK) >> ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_SHIFT) + 1; if (new_lane_width != current_lane_width) { radeon_set_pcie_lanes(rdev, new_lane_width); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b9b98c26705b8d5fba8f15faeb923b1c6f48d223 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 00:33:21 -0500 Subject: ext4: fix crashes in dioread_nolock mode commit 74dae4278546b897eb81784fdfcce872ddd8b2b8 upstream. Competing overwrite DIO in dioread_nolock mode will just overwrite pointer to io_end in the inode. This may result in data corruption or extent conversion happening from IO completion interrupt because we don't properly set buffer_defer_completion() when unlocked DIO races with locked DIO to unwritten extent. Since unlocked DIO doesn't need io_end for anything, just avoid allocating it and corrupting pointer from inode for locked DIO. A cleaner fix would be to avoid these games with io_end pointer from the inode but that requires more intrusive changes so we leave that for later. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 6e8dbc1e4f95..2c056a529a37 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -3256,29 +3256,29 @@ static ssize_t ext4_ext_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, * case, we allocate an io_end structure to hook to the iocb. */ iocb->private = NULL; - ext4_inode_aio_set(inode, NULL); - if (!is_sync_kiocb(iocb)) { - io_end = ext4_init_io_end(inode, GFP_NOFS); - if (!io_end) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto retake_lock; - } - /* - * Grab reference for DIO. Will be dropped in ext4_end_io_dio() - */ - iocb->private = ext4_get_io_end(io_end); - /* - * we save the io structure for current async direct - * IO, so that later ext4_map_blocks() could flag the - * io structure whether there is a unwritten extents - * needs to be converted when IO is completed. - */ - ext4_inode_aio_set(inode, io_end); - } - if (overwrite) { get_block_func = ext4_get_block_write_nolock; } else { + ext4_inode_aio_set(inode, NULL); + if (!is_sync_kiocb(iocb)) { + io_end = ext4_init_io_end(inode, GFP_NOFS); + if (!io_end) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto retake_lock; + } + /* + * Grab reference for DIO. Will be dropped in + * ext4_end_io_dio() + */ + iocb->private = ext4_get_io_end(io_end); + /* + * we save the io structure for current async direct + * IO, so that later ext4_map_blocks() could flag the + * io structure whether there is a unwritten extents + * needs to be converted when IO is completed. + */ + ext4_inode_aio_set(inode, io_end); + } get_block_func = ext4_get_block_write; dio_flags = DIO_LOCKING; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9b06cce3ca4d60d442c39bfa7c058b71b1cee6c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 21:50:46 -0500 Subject: ext4: fix deadlock between inline_data and ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() commit c755e251357a0cee0679081f08c3f4ba797a8009 upstream. The xattr_sem deadlock problems fixed in commit 2e81a4eeedca: "ext4: avoid deadlock when expanding inode size" didn't include the use of xattr_sem in fs/ext4/inline.c. With the addition of project quota which added a new extra inode field, this exposed deadlocks in the inline_data code similar to the ones fixed by 2e81a4eeedca. The deadlock can be reproduced via: dmesg -n 7 mke2fs -t ext4 -O inline_data -Fq -I 256 /dev/vdc 32768 mount -t ext4 -o debug_want_extra_isize=24 /dev/vdc /vdc mkdir /vdc/a umount /vdc mount -t ext4 /dev/vdc /vdc echo foo > /vdc/a/foo and looks like this: [ 11.158815] [ 11.160276] ============================================= [ 11.161960] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 11.161960] 4.10.0-rc3-00015-g011b30a8a3cf #160 Tainted: G W [ 11.161960] --------------------------------------------- [ 11.161960] bash/2519 is trying to acquire lock: [ 11.161960] (&ei->xattr_sem){++++..}, at: [] ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x3d/0x4cd [ 11.161960] [ 11.161960] but task is already holding lock: [ 11.161960] (&ei->xattr_sem){++++..}, at: [] ext4_try_add_inline_entry+0x3a/0x152 [ 11.161960] [ 11.161960] other info that might help us debug this: [ 11.161960] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 11.161960] [ 11.161960] CPU0 [ 11.161960] ---- [ 11.161960] lock(&ei->xattr_sem); [ 11.161960] lock(&ei->xattr_sem); [ 11.161960] [ 11.161960] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 11.161960] [ 11.161960] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 11.161960] [ 11.161960] 4 locks held by bash/2519: [ 11.161960] #0: (sb_writers#3){.+.+.+}, at: [] mnt_want_write+0x1e/0x3e [ 11.161960] #1: (&type->i_mutex_dir_key){++++++}, at: [] path_openat+0x338/0x67a [ 11.161960] #2: (jbd2_handle){++++..}, at: [] start_this_handle+0x582/0x622 [ 11.161960] #3: (&ei->xattr_sem){++++..}, at: [] ext4_try_add_inline_entry+0x3a/0x152 [ 11.161960] [ 11.161960] stack backtrace: [ 11.161960] CPU: 0 PID: 2519 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 4.10.0-rc3-00015-g011b30a8a3cf #160 [ 11.161960] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1 04/01/2014 [ 11.161960] Call Trace: [ 11.161960] dump_stack+0x72/0xa3 [ 11.161960] __lock_acquire+0xb7c/0xcb9 [ 11.161960] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1f/0x29 [ 11.161960] ? __lock_is_held+0x36/0x66 [ 11.161960] ? __lock_is_held+0x36/0x66 [ 11.161960] lock_acquire+0x106/0x18a [ 11.161960] ? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x3d/0x4cd [ 11.161960] down_write+0x39/0x72 [ 11.161960] ? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x3d/0x4cd [ 11.161960] ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x3d/0x4cd [ 11.161960] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x22/0x2c [ 11.161960] ? jbd2_journal_extend+0x1e2/0x262 [ 11.161960] ? __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0x3d/0x60 [ 11.161960] ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x17d/0x26d [ 11.161960] ? ext4_add_dirent_to_inline.isra.12+0xa5/0xb2 [ 11.161960] ext4_add_dirent_to_inline.isra.12+0xa5/0xb2 [ 11.161960] ext4_try_add_inline_entry+0x69/0x152 [ 11.161960] ext4_add_entry+0xa3/0x848 [ 11.161960] ? __brelse+0x14/0x2f [ 11.161960] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x4f [ 11.161960] ext4_add_nondir+0x17/0x5b [ 11.161960] ext4_create+0xcf/0x133 [ 11.161960] ? ext4_mknod+0x12f/0x12f [ 11.161960] lookup_open+0x39e/0x3fb [ 11.161960] ? __wake_up+0x1a/0x40 [ 11.161960] ? lock_acquire+0x11e/0x18a [ 11.161960] path_openat+0x35c/0x67a [ 11.161960] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd7/0xf2 [ 11.161960] do_filp_open+0x36/0x7c [ 11.161960] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x22/0x2c [ 11.161960] ? __alloc_fd+0x169/0x173 [ 11.161960] do_sys_open+0x59/0xcc [ 11.161960] SyS_open+0x1d/0x1f [ 11.161960] do_int80_syscall_32+0x4f/0x61 [ 11.161960] entry_INT80_32+0x2f/0x2f [ 11.161960] EIP: 0xb76ad469 [ 11.161960] EFLAGS: 00000286 CPU: 0 [ 11.161960] EAX: ffffffda EBX: 08168ac8 ECX: 00008241 EDX: 000001b6 [ 11.161960] ESI: b75e46bc EDI: b7755000 EBP: bfbdb108 ESP: bfbdafc0 [ 11.161960] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10 (requires 2e81a4eeedca as a prereq) Reported-by: George Spelvin Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inline.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------ fs/ext4/xattr.c | 30 +++++++++++--------------- fs/ext4/xattr.h | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index dad8e7bdf0a6..3006b81c107f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ out: static int ext4_prepare_inline_data(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, unsigned int len) { - int ret, size; + int ret, size, no_expand; struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode); if (!ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) @@ -386,15 +386,14 @@ static int ext4_prepare_inline_data(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, if (size < len) return -ENOSPC; - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); if (ei->i_inline_off) ret = ext4_update_inline_data(handle, inode, len); else ret = ext4_create_inline_data(handle, inode, len); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); - + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); return ret; } @@ -523,7 +522,7 @@ static int ext4_convert_inline_data_to_extent(struct address_space *mapping, struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) { - int ret, needed_blocks; + int ret, needed_blocks, no_expand; handle_t *handle = NULL; int retries = 0, sem_held = 0; struct page *page = NULL; @@ -563,7 +562,7 @@ retry: goto out; } - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); sem_held = 1; /* If some one has already done this for us, just exit. */ if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { @@ -599,7 +598,7 @@ retry: page_cache_release(page); page = NULL; ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); sem_held = 0; ext4_journal_stop(handle); handle = NULL; @@ -625,7 +624,7 @@ out: page_cache_release(page); } if (sem_held) - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); if (handle) ext4_journal_stop(handle); brelse(iloc.bh); @@ -718,7 +717,7 @@ convert: int ext4_write_inline_data_end(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned copied, struct page *page) { - int ret; + int ret, no_expand; void *kaddr; struct ext4_iloc iloc; @@ -736,7 +735,7 @@ int ext4_write_inline_data_end(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, unsigned len, goto out; } - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); BUG_ON(!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)); kaddr = kmap_atomic(page); @@ -746,7 +745,7 @@ int ext4_write_inline_data_end(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, unsigned len, /* clear page dirty so that writepages wouldn't work for us. */ ClearPageDirty(page); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); brelse(iloc.bh); out: return copied; @@ -757,7 +756,7 @@ ext4_journalled_write_inline_data(struct inode *inode, unsigned len, struct page *page) { - int ret; + int ret, no_expand; void *kaddr; struct ext4_iloc iloc; @@ -767,11 +766,11 @@ ext4_journalled_write_inline_data(struct inode *inode, return NULL; } - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); kaddr = kmap_atomic(page); ext4_write_inline_data(inode, &iloc, kaddr, 0, len); kunmap_atomic(kaddr); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); return iloc.bh; } @@ -1255,7 +1254,7 @@ out: int ext4_try_add_inline_entry(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { - int ret, inline_size; + int ret, inline_size, no_expand; void *inline_start; struct ext4_iloc iloc; struct inode *dir = d_inode(dentry->d_parent); @@ -1264,7 +1263,7 @@ int ext4_try_add_inline_entry(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, if (ret) return ret; - down_write(&EXT4_I(dir)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(dir, &no_expand); if (!ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) goto out; @@ -1310,7 +1309,7 @@ int ext4_try_add_inline_entry(handle_t *handle, struct ext4_filename *fname, out: ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir); - up_write(&EXT4_I(dir)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(dir, &no_expand); brelse(iloc.bh); return ret; } @@ -1670,7 +1669,7 @@ int ext4_delete_inline_entry(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh, int *has_inline_data) { - int err, inline_size; + int err, inline_size, no_expand; struct ext4_iloc iloc; void *inline_start; @@ -1678,7 +1677,7 @@ int ext4_delete_inline_entry(handle_t *handle, if (err) return err; - down_write(&EXT4_I(dir)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(dir, &no_expand); if (!ext4_has_inline_data(dir)) { *has_inline_data = 0; goto out; @@ -1713,7 +1712,7 @@ int ext4_delete_inline_entry(handle_t *handle, ext4_show_inline_dir(dir, iloc.bh, inline_start, inline_size); out: - up_write(&EXT4_I(dir)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(dir, &no_expand); brelse(iloc.bh); if (err != -ENOENT) ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err); @@ -1812,11 +1811,11 @@ out: int ext4_destroy_inline_data(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) { - int ret; + int ret, no_expand; - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); ret = ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock(handle, inode); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); return ret; } @@ -1901,7 +1900,7 @@ out: void ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline) { handle_t *handle; - int inline_size, value_len, needed_blocks; + int inline_size, value_len, needed_blocks, no_expand; size_t i_size; void *value = NULL; struct ext4_xattr_ibody_find is = { @@ -1918,7 +1917,7 @@ void ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline) if (IS_ERR(handle)) return; - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { *has_inline = 0; ext4_journal_stop(handle); @@ -1976,7 +1975,7 @@ out_error: up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem); out: brelse(is.iloc.bh); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); kfree(value); if (inode->i_nlink) ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode); @@ -1992,7 +1991,7 @@ out: int ext4_convert_inline_data(struct inode *inode) { - int error, needed_blocks; + int error, needed_blocks, no_expand; handle_t *handle; struct ext4_iloc iloc; @@ -2014,15 +2013,10 @@ int ext4_convert_inline_data(struct inode *inode) goto out_free; } - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); - if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); - goto out; - } - - error = ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock(handle, inode, &iloc); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); -out: + ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); + if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) + error = ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock(handle, inode, &iloc); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); ext4_journal_stop(handle); out_free: brelse(iloc.bh); diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c index 8d661b3c47b6..c7cad05aed27 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c @@ -1117,16 +1117,14 @@ ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int name_index, struct ext4_xattr_block_find bs = { .s = { .not_found = -ENODATA, }, }; - unsigned long no_expand; + int no_expand; int error; if (!name) return -EINVAL; if (strlen(name) > 255) return -ERANGE; - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); - no_expand = ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); - ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); + ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); error = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &is.iloc); if (error) @@ -1187,7 +1185,7 @@ ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int name_index, ext4_xattr_update_super_block(handle, inode->i_sb); inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode); if (!value) - ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); + no_expand = 0; error = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &is.iloc); /* * The bh is consumed by ext4_mark_iloc_dirty, even with @@ -1201,9 +1199,7 @@ ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, int name_index, cleanup: brelse(is.iloc.bh); brelse(bs.bh); - if (no_expand == 0) - ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); return error; } @@ -1287,12 +1283,11 @@ int ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea(struct inode *inode, int new_extra_isize, int error = 0, tried_min_extra_isize = 0; int s_min_extra_isize = le16_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_min_extra_isize); int isize_diff; /* How much do we need to grow i_extra_isize */ + int no_expand; + + if (ext4_write_trylock_xattr(inode, &no_expand) == 0) + return 0; - down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); - /* - * Set EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND to avoid recursion when marking inode dirty - */ - ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); retry: isize_diff = new_extra_isize - EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize; if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize >= new_extra_isize) @@ -1486,8 +1481,7 @@ retry: } brelse(bh); out: - ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); return 0; cleanup: @@ -1499,10 +1493,10 @@ cleanup: kfree(bs); brelse(bh); /* - * We deliberately leave EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND set here since inode - * size expansion failed. + * Inode size expansion failed; don't try again */ - up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + no_expand = 1; + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); return error; } diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.h b/fs/ext4/xattr.h index ddc0957760ba..c000ed398555 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.h +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.h @@ -101,6 +101,38 @@ extern const struct xattr_handler ext4_xattr_security_handler; #define EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "c" +/* + * The EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND is overloaded and used for two purposes. + * The first is to signal that there the inline xattrs and data are + * taking up so much space that we might as well not keep trying to + * expand it. The second is that xattr_sem is taken for writing, so + * we shouldn't try to recurse into the inode expansion. For this + * second case, we need to make sure that we take save and restore the + * NO_EXPAND state flag appropriately. + */ +static inline void ext4_write_lock_xattr(struct inode *inode, int *save) +{ + down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); + *save = ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); + ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); +} + +static inline int ext4_write_trylock_xattr(struct inode *inode, int *save) +{ + if (down_write_trylock(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem) == 0) + return 0; + *save = ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); + ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); + return 1; +} + +static inline void ext4_write_unlock_xattr(struct inode *inode, int *save) +{ + if (*save == 0) + ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND); + up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem); +} + extern ssize_t ext4_listxattr(struct dentry *, char *, size_t); extern int ext4_xattr_get(struct inode *, int, const char *, void *, size_t); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 68fc6f74b516447bbbddde1b08437787d0063c6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabián Inostroza Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2018 00:37:35 -0300 Subject: ALSA: line6: Use correct endpoint type for midi output MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 7ecb46e9ee9af18e304eb9e7d6804c59a408e846 upstream. Sending MIDI messages to a PODxt through the USB connection shows "usb_submit_urb failed" in dmesg and the message is not received by the POD. The error is caused because in the funcion send_midi_async() in midi.c there is a call to usb_sndbulkpipe() for endpoint 3 OUT, but the PODxt USB descriptor shows that this endpoint it's an interrupt endpoint. Patch tested with PODxt only. [ The bug has been present from the very beginning in the staging driver time, but Fixes below points to the commit moving to sound/ directory so that the fix can be cleanly applied -- tiwai ] Fixes: 61864d844c29 ("ALSA: move line6 usb driver into sound/usb") Signed-off-by: Fabián Inostroza Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/line6/midi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/line6/midi.c b/sound/usb/line6/midi.c index cebea9b7f769..6a9be1df7851 100644 --- a/sound/usb/line6/midi.c +++ b/sound/usb/line6/midi.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int send_midi_async(struct usb_line6 *line6, unsigned char *data, } usb_fill_int_urb(urb, line6->usbdev, - usb_sndbulkpipe(line6->usbdev, + usb_sndintpipe(line6->usbdev, line6->properties->ep_ctrl_w), transfer_buffer, length, midi_sent, line6, line6->interval); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fc338748e3e7740113c1c26e2248d919dd8cc05c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 18:16:15 +0200 Subject: ALSA: rawmidi: Fix missing input substream checks in compat ioctls commit 8a56ef4f3ffba9ebf4967b61ef600b0a7ba10f11 upstream. Some rawmidi compat ioctls lack of the input substream checks (although they do check only for rfile->output). This many eventually lead to an Oops as NULL substream is passed to the rawmidi core functions. Fix it by adding the proper checks before each function call. The bug was spotted by syzkaller. Reported-by: syzbot+f7a0348affc3b67bc617@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c b/sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c index 09a89094dcf7..4e304a24924a 100644 --- a/sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c +++ b/sound/core/rawmidi_compat.c @@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ static int snd_rawmidi_ioctl_params_compat(struct snd_rawmidi_file *rfile, struct snd_rawmidi_params params; unsigned int val; - if (rfile->output == NULL) - return -EINVAL; if (get_user(params.stream, &src->stream) || get_user(params.buffer_size, &src->buffer_size) || get_user(params.avail_min, &src->avail_min) || @@ -46,8 +44,12 @@ static int snd_rawmidi_ioctl_params_compat(struct snd_rawmidi_file *rfile, params.no_active_sensing = val; switch (params.stream) { case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_OUTPUT: + if (!rfile->output) + return -EINVAL; return snd_rawmidi_output_params(rfile->output, ¶ms); case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_INPUT: + if (!rfile->input) + return -EINVAL; return snd_rawmidi_input_params(rfile->input, ¶ms); } return -EINVAL; @@ -67,16 +69,18 @@ static int snd_rawmidi_ioctl_status_compat(struct snd_rawmidi_file *rfile, int err; struct snd_rawmidi_status status; - if (rfile->output == NULL) - return -EINVAL; if (get_user(status.stream, &src->stream)) return -EFAULT; switch (status.stream) { case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_OUTPUT: + if (!rfile->output) + return -EINVAL; err = snd_rawmidi_output_status(rfile->output, &status); break; case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_INPUT: + if (!rfile->input) + return -EINVAL; err = snd_rawmidi_input_status(rfile->input, &status); break; default: @@ -113,16 +117,18 @@ static int snd_rawmidi_ioctl_status_x32(struct snd_rawmidi_file *rfile, int err; struct snd_rawmidi_status status; - if (rfile->output == NULL) - return -EINVAL; if (get_user(status.stream, &src->stream)) return -EFAULT; switch (status.stream) { case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_OUTPUT: + if (!rfile->output) + return -EINVAL; err = snd_rawmidi_output_status(rfile->output, &status); break; case SNDRV_RAWMIDI_STREAM_INPUT: + if (!rfile->input) + return -EINVAL; err = snd_rawmidi_input_status(rfile->input, &status); break; default: -- cgit v1.2.3 From cebd9b67fe0bdbb55b45533a3d911b86bde88174 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Wang Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2018 17:48:09 +0800 Subject: ALSA: hda - New VIA controller suppor no-snoop path commit af52f9982e410edac21ca4b49563053ffc9da1eb upstream. This patch is used to tell kernel that new VIA HDAC controller also support no-snoop path. [ minor coding style fix by tiwai ] Signed-off-by: David Wang Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c index fbd00821e326..3be91696ac35 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c @@ -1549,7 +1549,8 @@ static void azx_check_snoop_available(struct azx *chip) */ u8 val; pci_read_config_byte(chip->pci, 0x42, &val); - if (!(val & 0x80) && chip->pci->revision == 0x30) + if (!(val & 0x80) && (chip->pci->revision == 0x30 || + chip->pci->revision == 0x20)) snoop = false; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c3a5626fd5c704c8deaeedcbf837579781dc6d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rodrigo Rivas Costa Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2018 01:09:36 +0200 Subject: HID: hidraw: Fix crash on HIDIOCGFEATURE with a destroyed device commit a955358d54695e4ad9f7d6489a7ac4d69a8fc711 upstream. Doing `ioctl(HIDIOCGFEATURE)` in a tight loop on a hidraw device and then disconnecting the device, or unloading the driver, can cause a NULL pointer dereference. When a hidraw device is destroyed it sets 0 to `dev->exist`. Most functions check 'dev->exist' before doing its work, but `hidraw_get_report()` was missing that check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Rivas Costa Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hidraw.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hidraw.c b/drivers/hid/hidraw.c index 9c2d7c23f296..c0c4df198725 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hidraw.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hidraw.c @@ -197,6 +197,11 @@ static ssize_t hidraw_get_report(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t int ret = 0, len; unsigned char report_number; + if (!hidraw_table[minor] || !hidraw_table[minor]->exist) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto out; + } + dev = hidraw_table[minor]->hid; if (!dev->ll_driver->raw_request) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6a5722cb3043570b6d9664634ca5fed9188fd027 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Redfearn Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 16:40:01 +0100 Subject: MIPS: uaccess: Add micromips clobbers to bzero invocation commit b3d7e55c3f886493235bfee08e1e5a4a27cbcce8 upstream. The micromips implementation of bzero additionally clobbers registers t7 & t8. Specify this in the clobbers list when invoking bzero. Fixes: 26c5e07d1478 ("MIPS: microMIPS: Optimise 'memset' core library function.") Reported-by: James Hogan Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: # 3.10+ Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19110/ Signed-off-by: James Hogan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h index c74c32ccc647..4f281768937f 100644 --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -1238,6 +1238,13 @@ __clear_user(void __user *addr, __kernel_size_t size) { __kernel_size_t res; +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_MICROMIPS +/* micromips memset / bzero also clobbers t7 & t8 */ +#define bzero_clobbers "$4", "$5", "$6", __UA_t0, __UA_t1, "$15", "$24", "$31" +#else +#define bzero_clobbers "$4", "$5", "$6", __UA_t0, __UA_t1, "$31" +#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_MICROMIPS */ + if (eva_kernel_access()) { __asm__ __volatile__( "move\t$4, %1\n\t" @@ -1247,7 +1254,7 @@ __clear_user(void __user *addr, __kernel_size_t size) "move\t%0, $6" : "=r" (res) : "r" (addr), "r" (size) - : "$4", "$5", "$6", __UA_t0, __UA_t1, "$31"); + : bzero_clobbers); } else { might_fault(); __asm__ __volatile__( @@ -1258,7 +1265,7 @@ __clear_user(void __user *addr, __kernel_size_t size) "move\t%0, $6" : "=r" (res) : "r" (addr), "r" (size) - : "$4", "$5", "$6", __UA_t0, __UA_t1, "$31"); + : bzero_clobbers); } return res; -- cgit v1.2.3 From be204694cad3827d230b6dcd9f6fc83f3c7caeab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Redfearn Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 10:28:23 +0100 Subject: MIPS: memset.S: EVA & fault support for small_memset commit 8a8158c85e1e774a44fbe81106fa41138580dfd1 upstream. The MIPS kernel memset / bzero implementation includes a small_memset branch which is used when the region to be set is smaller than a long (4 bytes on 32bit, 8 bytes on 64bit). The current small_memset implementation uses a simple store byte loop to write the destination. There are 2 issues with this implementation: 1. When EVA mode is active, user and kernel address spaces may overlap. Currently the use of the sb instruction means kernel mode addressing is always used and an intended write to userspace may actually overwrite some critical kernel data. 2. If the write triggers a page fault, for example by calling __clear_user(NULL, 2), instead of gracefully handling the fault, an OOPS is triggered. Fix these issues by replacing the sb instruction with the EX() macro, which will emit EVA compatible instuctions as required. Additionally implement a fault fixup for small_memset which sets a2 to the number of bytes that could not be cleared (as defined by __clear_user). Reported-by: Chuanhua Lei Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/18975/ Signed-off-by: James Hogan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/lib/memset.S | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S index 8f0019a2e5c8..1e88105a4364 100644 --- a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S +++ b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ 1: PTR_ADDIU a0, 1 /* fill bytewise */ R10KCBARRIER(0(ra)) bne t1, a0, 1b - sb a1, -1(a0) + EX(sb, a1, -1(a0), .Lsmall_fixup\@) 2: jr ra /* done */ move a2, zero @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ jr ra andi v1, a2, STORMASK +.Lsmall_fixup\@: + PTR_SUBU a2, t1, a0 + jr ra + PTR_ADDIU a2, 1 + .endm /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From af878d5176be5df2c2d84d1e86a3722c8f638207 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Redfearn Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 15:52:21 +0100 Subject: MIPS: memset.S: Fix return of __clear_user from Lpartial_fixup commit daf70d89f80c6e1772233da9e020114b1254e7e0 upstream. The __clear_user function is defined to return the number of bytes that could not be cleared. From the underlying memset / bzero implementation this means setting register a2 to that number on return. Currently if a page fault is triggered within the memset_partial block, the value loaded into a2 on return is meaningless. The label .Lpartial_fixup\@ is jumped to on page fault. In order to work out how many bytes failed to copy, the exception handler should find how many bytes left in the partial block (andi a2, STORMASK), add that to the partial block end address (a2), and subtract the faulting address to get the remainder. Currently it incorrectly subtracts the partial block start address (t1), which has additionally been clobbered to generate a jump target in memset_partial. Fix this by adding the block end address instead. This issue was found with the following test code: int j, k; for (j = 0; j < 512; j++) { if ((k = clear_user(NULL, j)) != j) { pr_err("clear_user (NULL %d) returned %d\n", j, k); } } Which now passes on Creator Ci40 (MIPS32) and Cavium Octeon II (MIPS64). Suggested-by: James Hogan Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19108/ Signed-off-by: James Hogan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/lib/memset.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S index 1e88105a4364..a02d98beefc4 100644 --- a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S +++ b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S @@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ PTR_L t0, TI_TASK($28) andi a2, STORMASK LONG_L t0, THREAD_BUADDR(t0) - LONG_ADDU a2, t1 + LONG_ADDU a2, a0 jr ra LONG_SUBU a2, t0 -- cgit v1.2.3 From d37aca471b6fa59cd7d52a9c4d1de12149d713cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Redfearn Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 16:40:00 +0100 Subject: MIPS: memset.S: Fix clobber of v1 in last_fixup commit c96eebf07692e53bf4dd5987510d8b550e793598 upstream. The label .Llast_fixup\@ is jumped to on page fault within the final byte set loop of memset (on < MIPSR6 architectures). For some reason, in this fault handler, the v1 register is randomly set to a2 & STORMASK. This clobbers v1 for the calling function. This can be observed with the following test code: static int __init __attribute__((optimize("O0"))) test_clear_user(void) { register int t asm("v1"); char *test; int j, k; pr_info("\n\n\nTesting clear_user\n"); test = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE); for (j = 256; j < 512; j++) { t = 0xa5a5a5a5; if ((k = clear_user(test + PAGE_SIZE - 256, j)) != j - 256) { pr_err("clear_user (%px %d) returned %d\n", test + PAGE_SIZE - 256, j, k); } if (t != 0xa5a5a5a5) { pr_err("v1 was clobbered to 0x%x!\n", t); } } return 0; } late_initcall(test_clear_user); Which demonstrates that v1 is indeed clobbered (MIPS64): Testing clear_user v1 was clobbered to 0x1! v1 was clobbered to 0x2! v1 was clobbered to 0x3! v1 was clobbered to 0x4! v1 was clobbered to 0x5! v1 was clobbered to 0x6! v1 was clobbered to 0x7! Since the number of bytes that could not be set is already contained in a2, the andi placing a value in v1 is not necessary and actively harmful in clobbering v1. Reported-by: James Hogan Signed-off-by: Matt Redfearn Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19109/ Signed-off-by: James Hogan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/lib/memset.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S index a02d98beefc4..2d33cf2185d9 100644 --- a/arch/mips/lib/memset.S +++ b/arch/mips/lib/memset.S @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ .Llast_fixup\@: jr ra - andi v1, a2, STORMASK + nop .Lsmall_fixup\@: PTR_SUBU a2, t1, a0 -- cgit v1.2.3 From 286427ed951d5673f171f007a29deb7b4abee694 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Neuling Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 13:37:58 +1000 Subject: powerpc/eeh: Fix enabling bridge MMIO windows commit 13a83eac373c49c0a081cbcd137e79210fe78acd upstream. On boot we save the configuration space of PCIe bridges. We do this so when we get an EEH event and everything gets reset that we can restore them. Unfortunately we save this state before we've enabled the MMIO space on the bridges. Hence if we have to reset the bridge when we come back MMIO is not enabled and we end up taking an PE freeze when the driver starts accessing again. This patch forces the memory/MMIO and bus mastering on when restoring bridges on EEH. Ideally we'd do this correctly by saving the configuration space writes later, but that will have to come later in a larger EEH rewrite. For now we have this simple fix. The original bug can be triggered on a boston machine by doing: echo 0x8000000000000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/PCI0001/err_injct_outbound On boston, this PHB has a PCIe switch on it. Without this patch, you'll see two EEH events, 1 expected and 1 the failure we are fixing here. The second EEH event causes the anything under the PHB to disappear (i.e. the i40e eth). With this patch, only 1 EEH event occurs and devices properly recover. Fixes: 652defed4875 ("powerpc/eeh: Check PCIe link after reset") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+ Reported-by: Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling Acked-by: Russell Currey Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c index 98f81800e00c..304f07cfa262 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh_pe.c @@ -788,7 +788,8 @@ static void eeh_restore_bridge_bars(struct eeh_dev *edev) eeh_ops->write_config(pdn, 15*4, 4, edev->config_space[15]); /* PCI Command: 0x4 */ - eeh_ops->write_config(pdn, PCI_COMMAND, 4, edev->config_space[1]); + eeh_ops->write_config(pdn, PCI_COMMAND, 4, edev->config_space[1] | + PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY | PCI_COMMAND_MASTER); /* Check the PCIe link is ready */ eeh_bridge_check_link(edev); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 263b8d4ebe5b0632a82a7cfe9e82e49af85b2a91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Ellerman Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2018 23:25:19 +1000 Subject: powerpc/lib: Fix off-by-one in alternate feature patching commit b8858581febb050688e276b956796bc4a78299ed upstream. When we patch an alternate feature section, we have to adjust any relative branches that branch out of the alternate section. But currently we have a bug if we have a branch that points to past the last instruction of the alternate section, eg: FTR_SECTION_ELSE 1: b 2f or 6,6,6 2: ALT_FTR_SECTION_END(...) nop This will result in a relative branch at 1 with a target that equals the end of the alternate section. That branch does not need adjusting when it's moved to the non-else location. Currently we do adjust it, resulting in a branch that goes off into the link-time location of the else section, which is junk. The fix is to not patch branches that have a target == end of the alternate section. Fixes: d20fe50a7b3c ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Branch inside feature section") Fixes: 9b1a735de64c ("powerpc: Add logic to patch alternative feature sections") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.27+ Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c index a18d648d31a6..3af014684872 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static int patch_alt_instruction(unsigned int *src, unsigned int *dest, unsigned int *target = (unsigned int *)branch_target(src); /* Branch within the section doesn't need translating */ - if (target < alt_start || target >= alt_end) { + if (target < alt_start || target > alt_end) { instr = translate_branch(dest, src); if (!instr) return 1; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2154ecea6d72f9290d201fed637afb5178db5665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2018 23:56:44 -0400 Subject: jffs2_kill_sb(): deal with failed allocations commit c66b23c2840446a82c389e4cb1a12eb2a71fa2e4 upstream. jffs2_fill_super() might fail to allocate jffs2_sb_info; jffs2_kill_sb() must survive that. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jffs2/super.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/super.c b/fs/jffs2/super.c index d86c5e3176a1..600da1a4df29 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/super.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/super.c @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static void jffs2_put_super (struct super_block *sb) static void jffs2_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb) { struct jffs2_sb_info *c = JFFS2_SB_INFO(sb); - if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) + if (c && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)) jffs2_stop_garbage_collect_thread(c); kill_mtd_super(sb); kfree(c); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 873b214be5693bdafcfe5ff205d6ace37e1e3ecd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2018 23:50:31 -0400 Subject: hypfs_kill_super(): deal with failed allocations commit a24cd490739586a7d2da3549a1844e1d7c4f4fc4 upstream. hypfs_fill_super() might fail to allocate sbi; hypfs_kill_super() should not oops on that. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c b/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c index b2e5902bd8f4..c670279b33f0 100644 --- a/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c +++ b/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static void hypfs_kill_super(struct super_block *sb) if (sb->s_root) hypfs_delete_tree(sb->s_root); - if (sb_info->update_file) + if (sb_info && sb_info->update_file) hypfs_remove(sb_info->update_file); kfree(sb->s_fs_info); sb->s_fs_info = NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 20e96d9038ca54a738561aa8b4c06fd84349e730 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 01:15:46 -0400 Subject: rpc_pipefs: fix double-dput() commit 4a3877c4cedd95543f8726b0a98743ed8db0c0fb upstream. if we ever hit rpc_gssd_dummy_depopulate() dentry passed to it has refcount equal to 1. __rpc_rmpipe() drops it and dput() done after that hits an already freed dentry. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c b/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c index d81186d34558..9103dd15511c 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c @@ -1375,6 +1375,7 @@ rpc_gssd_dummy_depopulate(struct dentry *pipe_dentry) struct dentry *clnt_dir = pipe_dentry->d_parent; struct dentry *gssd_dir = clnt_dir->d_parent; + dget(pipe_dentry); __rpc_rmpipe(d_inode(clnt_dir), pipe_dentry); __rpc_depopulate(clnt_dir, gssd_dummy_info_file, 0, 1); __rpc_depopulate(gssd_dir, gssd_dummy_clnt_dir, 0, 1); -- cgit v1.2.3 From d10a274ada79aa5612126a77f10fa0c3af33bdb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Al Viro Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2018 22:03:08 -0400 Subject: Don't leak MNT_INTERNAL away from internal mounts commit 16a34adb9392b2fe4195267475ab5b472e55292c upstream. We want it only for the stuff created by SB_KERNMOUNT mounts, *not* for their copies. As it is, creating a deep stack of bindings of /proc/*/ns/* somewhere in a new namespace and exiting yields a stack overflow. Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Alexander Aring Bisected-by: Kirill Tkhai Tested-by: Kirill Tkhai Tested-by: Alexander Aring Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/namespace.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index ec4078d16eb7..a879560ea144 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -1018,7 +1018,8 @@ static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root, goto out_free; } - mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags & ~(MNT_WRITE_HOLD|MNT_MARKED); + mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = old->mnt.mnt_flags; + mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_WRITE_HOLD|MNT_MARKED|MNT_INTERNAL); /* Don't allow unprivileged users to change mount flags */ if (flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) { mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_ATIME; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ce98dd37cc5d5bcfde9ae899113e5f90d93f8acf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Kent Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 14:55:59 -0700 Subject: autofs: mount point create should honour passed in mode commit 1e6306652ba18723015d1b4967fe9de55f042499 upstream. The autofs file system mkdir inode operation blindly sets the created directory mode to S_IFDIR | 0555, ingoring the passed in mode, which can cause selinux dac_override denials. But the function also checks if the caller is the daemon (as no-one else should be able to do anything here) so there's no point in not honouring the passed in mode, allowing the daemon to set appropriate mode when required. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/152361593601.8051.14014139124905996173.stgit@pluto.themaw.net Signed-off-by: Ian Kent Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/autofs4/root.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/autofs4/root.c b/fs/autofs4/root.c index 7a54c6a867c8..500098cdb960 100644 --- a/fs/autofs4/root.c +++ b/fs/autofs4/root.c @@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ static int autofs4_dir_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m autofs4_del_active(dentry); - inode = autofs4_get_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | 0555); + inode = autofs4_get_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | mode); if (!inode) return -ENOMEM; d_add(dentry, inode); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 820ca5772277c6690e18d48042a9569942d336bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michal Hocko Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 15:20:12 -0800 Subject: mm: allow GFP_{FS,IO} for page_cache_read page cache allocation commit c20cd45eb01748f0fba77a504f956b000df4ea73 upstream. page_cache_read has been historically using page_cache_alloc_cold to allocate a new page. This means that mapping_gfp_mask is used as the base for the gfp_mask. Many filesystems are setting this mask to GFP_NOFS to prevent from fs recursion issues. page_cache_read is called from the vm_operations_struct::fault() context during the page fault. This context doesn't need the reclaim protection normally. ceph and ocfs2 which call filemap_fault from their fault handlers seem to be OK because they are not taking any fs lock before invoking generic implementation. xfs which takes XFS_MMAPLOCK_SHARED is safe from the reclaim recursion POV because this lock serializes truncate and punch hole with the page faults and it doesn't get involved in the reclaim. There is simply no reason to deliberately use a weaker allocation context when a __GFP_FS | __GFP_IO can be used. The GFP_NOFS protection might be even harmful. There is a push to fail GFP_NOFS allocations rather than loop within allocator indefinitely with a very limited reclaim ability. Once we start failing those requests the OOM killer might be triggered prematurely because the page cache allocation failure is propagated up the page fault path and end up in pagefault_out_of_memory. We cannot play with mapping_gfp_mask directly because that would be racy wrt. parallel page faults and it might interfere with other users who really rely on NOFS semantic from the stored gfp_mask. The mask is also inode proper so it would even be a layering violation. What we can do instead is to push the gfp_mask into struct vm_fault and allow fs layer to overwrite it should the callback need to be called with a different allocation context. Initialize the default to (mapping_gfp_mask | __GFP_FS | __GFP_IO) because this should be safe from the page fault path normally. Why do we care about mapping_gfp_mask at all then? Because this doesn't hold only reclaim protection flags but it also might contain zone and movability restrictions (GFP_DMA32, __GFP_MOVABLE and others) so we have to respect those. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa Acked-by: Jan Kara Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Tetsuo Handa Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Dave Chinner Cc: Mark Fasheh Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/mm.h | 4 ++++ mm/filemap.c | 9 ++++----- mm/memory.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 55f950afb60d..a100946607a5 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -225,10 +225,14 @@ extern pgprot_t protection_map[16]; * ->fault function. The vma's ->fault is responsible for returning a bitmask * of VM_FAULT_xxx flags that give details about how the fault was handled. * + * MM layer fills up gfp_mask for page allocations but fault handler might + * alter it if its implementation requires a different allocation context. + * * pgoff should be used in favour of virtual_address, if possible. */ struct vm_fault { unsigned int flags; /* FAULT_FLAG_xxx flags */ + gfp_t gfp_mask; /* gfp mask to be used for allocations */ pgoff_t pgoff; /* Logical page offset based on vma */ void __user *virtual_address; /* Faulting virtual address */ diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c index 69f75c77c098..270e5b5287c0 100644 --- a/mm/filemap.c +++ b/mm/filemap.c @@ -1827,19 +1827,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_file_read_iter); * This adds the requested page to the page cache if it isn't already there, * and schedules an I/O to read in its contents from disk. */ -static int page_cache_read(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset) +static int page_cache_read(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset, gfp_t gfp_mask) { struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping; struct page *page; int ret; do { - page = page_cache_alloc_cold(mapping); + page = __page_cache_alloc(gfp_mask|__GFP_COLD); if (!page) return -ENOMEM; - ret = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, - mapping_gfp_constraint(mapping, GFP_KERNEL)); + ret = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp_mask & GFP_KERNEL); if (ret == 0) ret = mapping->a_ops->readpage(file, page); else if (ret == -EEXIST) @@ -2020,7 +2019,7 @@ no_cached_page: * We're only likely to ever get here if MADV_RANDOM is in * effect. */ - error = page_cache_read(file, offset); + error = page_cache_read(file, offset, vmf->gfp_mask); /* * The page we want has now been added to the page cache. diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index 31ca97f7ebbc..177cb7d111a9 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -1990,6 +1990,20 @@ static inline void cow_user_page(struct page *dst, struct page *src, unsigned lo copy_user_highpage(dst, src, va, vma); } +static gfp_t __get_fault_gfp_mask(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + struct file *vm_file = vma->vm_file; + + if (vm_file) + return mapping_gfp_mask(vm_file->f_mapping) | __GFP_FS | __GFP_IO; + + /* + * Special mappings (e.g. VDSO) do not have any file so fake + * a default GFP_KERNEL for them. + */ + return GFP_KERNEL; +} + /* * Notify the address space that the page is about to become writable so that * it can prohibit this or wait for the page to get into an appropriate state. @@ -2005,6 +2019,7 @@ static int do_page_mkwrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page, vmf.virtual_address = (void __user *)(address & PAGE_MASK); vmf.pgoff = page->index; vmf.flags = FAULT_FLAG_WRITE|FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE; + vmf.gfp_mask = __get_fault_gfp_mask(vma); vmf.page = page; vmf.cow_page = NULL; @@ -2770,6 +2785,7 @@ static int __do_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, vmf.pgoff = pgoff; vmf.flags = flags; vmf.page = NULL; + vmf.gfp_mask = __get_fault_gfp_mask(vma); vmf.cow_page = cow_page; ret = vma->vm_ops->fault(vma, &vmf); @@ -2936,6 +2952,7 @@ static void do_fault_around(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, vmf.pgoff = pgoff; vmf.max_pgoff = max_pgoff; vmf.flags = flags; + vmf.gfp_mask = __get_fault_gfp_mask(vma); vma->vm_ops->map_pages(vma, &vmf); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d47a5ca386aaa6b8d17c7b8cdbdc7d2631c68278 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matthew Wilcox Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 14:56:20 -0700 Subject: mm/filemap.c: fix NULL pointer in page_cache_tree_insert() commit abc1be13fd113ddef5e2d807a466286b864caed3 upstream. f2fs specifies the __GFP_ZERO flag for allocating some of its pages. Unfortunately, the page cache also uses the mapping's GFP flags for allocating radix tree nodes. It always masked off the __GFP_HIGHMEM flag, and masks off __GFP_ZERO in some paths, but not all. That causes radix tree nodes to be allocated with a NULL list_head, which causes backtraces like: __list_del_entry+0x30/0xd0 list_lru_del+0xac/0x1ac page_cache_tree_insert+0xd8/0x110 The __GFP_DMA and __GFP_DMA32 flags would also be able to sneak through if they are ever used. Fix them all by using GFP_RECLAIM_MASK at the innermost location, and remove it from earlier in the callchain. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180411060320.14458-2-willy@infradead.org Fixes: 449dd6984d0e ("mm: keep page cache radix tree nodes in check") Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox Reported-by: Chris Fries Debugged-by: Minchan Kim Acked-by: Johannes Weiner Acked-by: Michal Hocko Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/filemap.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c index 270e5b5287c0..b15f1d8bba43 100644 --- a/mm/filemap.c +++ b/mm/filemap.c @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ int replace_page_cache_page(struct page *old, struct page *new, gfp_t gfp_mask) VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(new), new); VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(new->mapping, new); - error = radix_tree_preload(gfp_mask & ~__GFP_HIGHMEM); + error = radix_tree_preload(gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK); if (!error) { struct address_space *mapping = old->mapping; void (*freepage)(struct page *); @@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ static int __add_to_page_cache_locked(struct page *page, return error; } - error = radix_tree_maybe_preload(gfp_mask & ~__GFP_HIGHMEM); + error = radix_tree_maybe_preload(gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK); if (error) { if (!huge) mem_cgroup_cancel_charge(page, memcg); @@ -1192,8 +1192,7 @@ no_page: if (fgp_flags & FGP_ACCESSED) __SetPageReferenced(page); - err = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, - gfp_mask & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK); + err = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp_mask); if (unlikely(err)) { page_cache_release(page); page = NULL; @@ -1838,7 +1837,7 @@ static int page_cache_read(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset, gfp_t gfp_mask) if (!page) return -ENOMEM; - ret = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp_mask & GFP_KERNEL); + ret = add_to_page_cache_lru(page, mapping, offset, gfp_mask); if (ret == 0) ret = mapping->a_ops->readpage(file, page); else if (ret == -EEXIST) -- cgit v1.2.3 From a529f29a3ea9cb7e2c90053c02c8213f527374df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: wangguang Date: Thu, 15 Sep 2016 11:32:46 -0400 Subject: ext4: bugfix for mmaped pages in mpage_release_unused_pages() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 4e800c0359d9a53e6bf0ab216954971b2515247f upstream. Pages clear buffers after ext4 delayed block allocation failed, However, it does not clean its pte_dirty flag. if the pages unmap ,in cording to the pte_dirty , unmap_page_range may try to call __set_page_dirty, which may lead to the bugon at mpage_prepare_extent_to_map:head = page_buffers(page);. This patch just call clear_page_dirty_for_io to clean pte_dirty at mpage_release_unused_pages for pages mmaped. Steps to reproduce the bug: （1） mmap a file in ext4 addr = (char *)mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); memset(addr, 'i', 4096); （2） return EIO at ext4_writepages->mpage_map_and_submit_extent->mpage_map_one_extent which causes this log message to be print: ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "Delayed block allocation failed for " "inode %lu at logical offset %llu with" " max blocks %u with error %d", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, (unsigned)map->m_len, -err); (3）Unmap the addr cause warning at __set_page_dirty:WARN_ON_ONCE(warn && !PageUptodate(page)); (4) wait for a minute,then bugon happen. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: wangguang Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o [@nathanchance: Resolved conflict from lack of 09cbfeaf1a5a6] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 2c056a529a37..56ce7fd0f0d0 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -1515,6 +1515,8 @@ static void mpage_release_unused_pages(struct mpage_da_data *mpd, BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page)); BUG_ON(PageWriteback(page)); if (invalidate) { + if (page_mapped(page)) + clear_page_dirty_for_io(page); block_invalidatepage(page, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE); ClearPageUptodate(page); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 87d7ccbf09a7846818c30edf9bc8192719bfb05f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amir Goldstein Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2018 23:42:18 +0300 Subject: fanotify: fix logic of events on child commit 54a307ba8d3cd00a3902337ffaae28f436eeb1a4 upstream. When event on child inodes are sent to the parent inode mark and parent inode mark was not marked with FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD, the event will not be delivered to the listener process. However, if the same process also has a mount mark, the event to the parent inode will be delivered regadless of the mount mark mask. This behavior is incorrect in the case where the mount mark mask does not contain the specific event type. For example, the process adds a mark on a directory with mask FAN_MODIFY (without FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD) and a mount mark with mask FAN_CLOSE_NOWRITE (without FAN_ONDIR). A modify event on a file inside that directory (and inside that mount) should not create a FAN_MODIFY event, because neither of the marks requested to get that event on the file. Fixes: 1968f5eed54c ("fanotify: use both marks when possible") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Jan Kara [natechancellor: Fix small conflict due to lack of 3cd5eca8d7a2f] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 34 +++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c index e0e5f7c3c99f..8a459b179183 100644 --- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c +++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static bool fanotify_should_send_event(struct fsnotify_mark *inode_mark, u32 event_mask, void *data, int data_type) { - __u32 marks_mask, marks_ignored_mask; + __u32 marks_mask = 0, marks_ignored_mask = 0; struct path *path = data; pr_debug("%s: inode_mark=%p vfsmnt_mark=%p mask=%x data=%p" @@ -108,24 +108,20 @@ static bool fanotify_should_send_event(struct fsnotify_mark *inode_mark, !d_can_lookup(path->dentry)) return false; - if (inode_mark && vfsmnt_mark) { - marks_mask = (vfsmnt_mark->mask | inode_mark->mask); - marks_ignored_mask = (vfsmnt_mark->ignored_mask | inode_mark->ignored_mask); - } else if (inode_mark) { - /* - * if the event is for a child and this inode doesn't care about - * events on the child, don't send it! - */ - if ((event_mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD) && - !(inode_mark->mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD)) - return false; - marks_mask = inode_mark->mask; - marks_ignored_mask = inode_mark->ignored_mask; - } else if (vfsmnt_mark) { - marks_mask = vfsmnt_mark->mask; - marks_ignored_mask = vfsmnt_mark->ignored_mask; - } else { - BUG(); + /* + * if the event is for a child and this inode doesn't care about + * events on the child, don't send it! + */ + if (inode_mark && + (!(event_mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD) || + (inode_mark->mask & FS_EVENT_ON_CHILD))) { + marks_mask |= inode_mark->mask; + marks_ignored_mask |= inode_mark->ignored_mask; + } + + if (vfsmnt_mark) { + marks_mask |= vfsmnt_mark->mask; + marks_ignored_mask |= vfsmnt_mark->ignored_mask; } if (d_is_dir(path->dentry) && -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6f051f8986a89d0c482ea1dfc96bc226fb12389f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Thelen Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 14:55:42 -0700 Subject: writeback: safer lock nesting commit 2e898e4c0a3897ccd434adac5abb8330194f527b upstream. lock_page_memcg()/unlock_page_memcg() use spin_lock_irqsave/restore() if the page's memcg is undergoing move accounting, which occurs when a process leaves its memcg for a new one that has memory.move_charge_at_immigrate set. unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin,end() use spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq() if the given inode is switching writeback domains. Switches occur when enough writes are issued from a new domain. This existing pattern is thus suspicious: lock_page_memcg(page); unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked); ... unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked); unlock_page_memcg(page); If both inode switch and process memcg migration are both in-flight then unlocked_inode_to_wb_end() will unconditionally enable interrupts while still holding the lock_page_memcg() irq spinlock. This suggests the possibility of deadlock if an interrupt occurs before unlock_page_memcg(). truncate __cancel_dirty_page lock_page_memcg unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin unlocked_inode_to_wb_end end_page_writeback test_clear_page_writeback lock_page_memcg unlock_page_memcg Due to configuration limitations this deadlock is not currently possible because we don't mix cgroup writeback (a cgroupv2 feature) and memory.move_charge_at_immigrate (a cgroupv1 feature). If the kernel is hacked to always claim inode switching and memcg moving_account, then this script triggers lockup in less than a minute: cd /mnt/cgroup/memory mkdir a b echo 1 > a/memory.move_charge_at_immigrate echo 1 > b/memory.move_charge_at_immigrate ( echo $BASHPID > a/cgroup.procs while true; do dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/big bs=1M count=256 done ) & while true; do sync done & sleep 1h & SLEEP=$! while true; do echo $SLEEP > a/cgroup.procs echo $SLEEP > b/cgroup.procs done The deadlock does not seem possible, so it's debatable if there's any reason to modify the kernel. I suggest we should to prevent future surprises. And Wang Long said "this deadlock occurs three times in our environment", so there's more reason to apply this, even to stable. Stable 4.4 has minor conflicts applying this patch. For a clean 4.4 patch see "[PATCH for-4.4] writeback: safer lock nesting" https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/11/146 Wang Long said "this deadlock occurs three times in our environment" [gthelen@google.com: v4] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180411084653.254724-1-gthelen@google.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: comment tweaks, struct initialization simplification] Change-Id: Ibb773e8045852978f6207074491d262f1b3fb613 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180410005908.167976-1-gthelen@google.com Fixes: 682aa8e1a6a1 ("writeback: implement unlocked_inode_to_wb transaction and use it for stat updates") Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen Reported-by: Wang Long Acked-by: Wang Long Acked-by: Michal Hocko Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Nicholas Piggin Cc: [v4.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds [natechancellor: Applied to 4.4 based on Greg's backport on lkml.org] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fs-writeback.c | 7 ++++--- include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h | 5 +++++ include/linux/backing-dev.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++-------------- mm/page-writeback.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fs-writeback.c b/fs/fs-writeback.c index 22b30249fbcb..0fe667875852 100644 --- a/fs/fs-writeback.c +++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c @@ -747,11 +747,12 @@ int inode_congested(struct inode *inode, int cong_bits) */ if (inode && inode_to_wb_is_valid(inode)) { struct bdi_writeback *wb; - bool locked, congested; + struct wb_lock_cookie lock_cookie = {}; + bool congested; - wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked); + wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &lock_cookie); congested = wb_congested(wb, cong_bits); - unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked); + unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, &lock_cookie); return congested; } diff --git a/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h b/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h index 140c29635069..a307c37c2e6c 100644 --- a/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h +++ b/include/linux/backing-dev-defs.h @@ -191,6 +191,11 @@ static inline void set_bdi_congested(struct backing_dev_info *bdi, int sync) set_wb_congested(bdi->wb.congested, sync); } +struct wb_lock_cookie { + bool locked; + unsigned long flags; +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK /** diff --git a/include/linux/backing-dev.h b/include/linux/backing-dev.h index 89d3de3e096b..361274ce5815 100644 --- a/include/linux/backing-dev.h +++ b/include/linux/backing-dev.h @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static inline struct bdi_writeback *inode_to_wb(struct inode *inode) /** * unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin - begin unlocked inode wb access transaction * @inode: target inode - * @lockedp: temp bool output param, to be passed to the end function + * @cookie: output param, to be passed to the end function * * The caller wants to access the wb associated with @inode but isn't * holding inode->i_lock, mapping->tree_lock or wb->list_lock. This @@ -374,12 +374,12 @@ static inline struct bdi_writeback *inode_to_wb(struct inode *inode) * association doesn't change until the transaction is finished with * unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(). * - * The caller must call unlocked_inode_to_wb_end() with *@lockdep - * afterwards and can't sleep during transaction. IRQ may or may not be - * disabled on return. + * The caller must call unlocked_inode_to_wb_end() with *@cookie afterwards and + * can't sleep during the transaction. IRQs may or may not be disabled on + * return. */ static inline struct bdi_writeback * -unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, bool *lockedp) +unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, struct wb_lock_cookie *cookie) { rcu_read_lock(); @@ -387,10 +387,10 @@ unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, bool *lockedp) * Paired with store_release in inode_switch_wb_work_fn() and * ensures that we see the new wb if we see cleared I_WB_SWITCH. */ - *lockedp = smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_state) & I_WB_SWITCH; + cookie->locked = smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_state) & I_WB_SWITCH; - if (unlikely(*lockedp)) - spin_lock_irq(&inode->i_mapping->tree_lock); + if (unlikely(cookie->locked)) + spin_lock_irqsave(&inode->i_mapping->tree_lock, cookie->flags); /* * Protected by either !I_WB_SWITCH + rcu_read_lock() or tree_lock. @@ -402,12 +402,14 @@ unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, bool *lockedp) /** * unlocked_inode_to_wb_end - end inode wb access transaction * @inode: target inode - * @locked: *@lockedp from unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin() + * @cookie: @cookie from unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin() */ -static inline void unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(struct inode *inode, bool locked) +static inline void unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(struct inode *inode, + struct wb_lock_cookie *cookie) { - if (unlikely(locked)) - spin_unlock_irq(&inode->i_mapping->tree_lock); + if (unlikely(cookie->locked)) + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&inode->i_mapping->tree_lock, + cookie->flags); rcu_read_unlock(); } @@ -454,12 +456,13 @@ static inline struct bdi_writeback *inode_to_wb(struct inode *inode) } static inline struct bdi_writeback * -unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, bool *lockedp) +unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(struct inode *inode, struct wb_lock_cookie *cookie) { return inode_to_wb(inode); } -static inline void unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(struct inode *inode, bool locked) +static inline void unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(struct inode *inode, + struct wb_lock_cookie *cookie) { } diff --git a/mm/page-writeback.c b/mm/page-writeback.c index 6d0dbde4503b..3309dbda7ffa 100644 --- a/mm/page-writeback.c +++ b/mm/page-writeback.c @@ -2510,13 +2510,13 @@ void account_page_redirty(struct page *page) if (mapping && mapping_cap_account_dirty(mapping)) { struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct bdi_writeback *wb; - bool locked; + struct wb_lock_cookie cookie = {}; - wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked); + wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &cookie); current->nr_dirtied--; dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_DIRTIED); dec_wb_stat(wb, WB_DIRTIED); - unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked); + unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, &cookie); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(account_page_redirty); @@ -2622,15 +2622,15 @@ void cancel_dirty_page(struct page *page) struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct bdi_writeback *wb; struct mem_cgroup *memcg; - bool locked; + struct wb_lock_cookie cookie = {}; memcg = mem_cgroup_begin_page_stat(page); - wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked); + wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &cookie); if (TestClearPageDirty(page)) account_page_cleaned(page, mapping, memcg, wb); - unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked); + unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, &cookie); mem_cgroup_end_page_stat(memcg); } else { ClearPageDirty(page); @@ -2663,7 +2663,7 @@ int clear_page_dirty_for_io(struct page *page) struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct bdi_writeback *wb; struct mem_cgroup *memcg; - bool locked; + struct wb_lock_cookie cookie = {}; /* * Yes, Virginia, this is indeed insane. @@ -2701,14 +2701,14 @@ int clear_page_dirty_for_io(struct page *page) * exclusion. */ memcg = mem_cgroup_begin_page_stat(page); - wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &locked); + wb = unlocked_inode_to_wb_begin(inode, &cookie); if (TestClearPageDirty(page)) { mem_cgroup_dec_page_stat(memcg, MEM_CGROUP_STAT_DIRTY); dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_FILE_DIRTY); dec_wb_stat(wb, WB_RECLAIMABLE); ret = 1; } - unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, locked); + unlocked_inode_to_wb_end(inode, &cookie); mem_cgroup_end_page_stat(memcg); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8e2def054b2b088d18d7009aecf470aa62ab360e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 09:32:12 +0200 Subject: Linux 4.4.129 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 575459bb47eb..096d7e867b6c 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 4 -SUBLEVEL = 128 +SUBLEVEL = 129 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Blurry Fish Butt -- cgit v1.2.3