From e491eaf3c0b02b5325535a2de3e4fa15a3093190 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 21:15:37 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Pass only crypto context to SMP crypto functions

In order to make unit testing possible we need to make the SMP crypto
functions only take the crypto context instead of the full SMP context
(the latter would require having hci_dev, hci_conn, l2cap_chan,
l2cap_conn, etc around). The drawback is that we no-longer get the
involved hdev in the debug logs, but this is really the only way to make
simple unit tests for the code.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 30 ++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index f09b6b65cf6b..fea3782989f4 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -191,16 +191,13 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7],
-		  u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra,
-		  u8 res[16])
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
+		  u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat,
+		  bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
 {
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
 	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
-
 	memset(p1, 0, 16);
 
 	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
@@ -218,7 +215,7 @@ static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7],
 	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
 
 	/* res = e(k, res) */
-	err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res);
+	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 		return err;
@@ -228,26 +225,23 @@ static int smp_c1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7],
 	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
 
 	/* res = e(k, res) */
-	err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, res);
+	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
 	if (err)
 		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_s1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16],
-		  u8 _r[16])
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
+		  u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
 {
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
-
 	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
 	memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
 	memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
 
-	err = smp_e(smp->tfm_aes, k, _r);
+	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
 	if (err)
 		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 
@@ -547,7 +541,7 @@ static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
-	ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+	ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 		     conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
 		     conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
 		     cp.confirm_val);
@@ -578,7 +572,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
-	ret = smp_c1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+	ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
 		     hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
 		     hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
 	if (ret)
@@ -594,7 +588,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		__le64 rand = 0;
 		__le16 ediv = 0;
 
-		smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
+		smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
 
 		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
 		       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
@@ -613,7 +607,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
 
-		smp_s1(smp, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
+		smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
 
 		memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
 		       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4cd3362da899a59955146851dd860198b0aaaa75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 21:15:38 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Add skeleton for SMP self-tests

This patch adds a basic skeleton for SMP self-tests. The tests are put
behind a new configuration option since running them will slow down the
boot process. For now there are no actual tests defined but those will
come in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/Kconfig |  6 ++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c   | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
index 600fb29288f4..2675b4106b00 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
+++ b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
@@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ config BT_6LOWPAN
 	help
 	  IPv6 compression over Bluetooth Low Energy.
 
+config BT_SELFTEST
+	bool "Run self-tests on boot"
+	depends on BT && DEBUG_KERNEL
+	help
+	  Run self-tests during boot. Currently limited to SMP.
+
 source "net/bluetooth/rfcomm/Kconfig"
 
 source "net/bluetooth/bnep/Kconfig"
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index fea3782989f4..9821dc938e2c 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1743,3 +1743,36 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 	hdev->smp_data = NULL;
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST
+
+static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_smp(void)
+{
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+	int err;
+
+	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
+	}
+
+	err = run_selftests(tfm_aes);
+	if (err < 0)
+		BT_ERR("Self tests failed");
+	else
+		BT_INFO("Self-tests passed");
+
+	crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+module_init(test_smp);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c6992e9ef2a17e9738b7bb8a03a7fe581a8f9977 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2014 21:15:39 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Add self-tests for SMP crypto functions

This patch adds self-tests for the c1 and s1 crypto functions used for
SMP pairing. The data used is the sample data from the core
specification.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 9821dc938e2c..983d1e0793f6 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1746,8 +1746,95 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST
 
+static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+	u8 irk[16] = {	0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
+			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
+	u8 r[3] = {	0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
+	u8 exp[3] = {	0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
+	u8 res[3];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 3) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+	u8 k[16] = {	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	u8 r[16] = {	0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
+			0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
+	u8 preq[7] = {	0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
+	u8 pres[7] = {	0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
+	u8 _iat =	0x01;
+	u8 _rat =	0x00;
+	bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
+	bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
+	u8 exp[16] = {	0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
+			0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
+{
+	u8 k[16] = {	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	u8 r1[16] = {	0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
+	u8 r2[16] = {	0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
+	u8 exp[16] = {	0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
+			0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
+	u8 res[16];
+	int err;
+
+	err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
 {
+	int err;
+
+	err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From da213f8e0cf03146925205b663413e4589b5b359 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 15:22:12 +0100
Subject: Bluetooth: Revert SMP self-test patches

This reverts commits c6992e9ef2a17e9738b7bb8a03a7fe581a8f9977 and
4cd3362da899a59955146851dd860198b0aaaa75.

The reason for the revert is that we cannot have more than one module
initialization function and the SMP one breaks the build with modular
kernels. As the proper fix for this is right now looking non-trivial
it's better to simply revert the problematic patches in order to keep
the upstream tree compilable.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/Kconfig |   6 ---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c   | 120 --------------------------------------------------
 2 files changed, 126 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
index 2675b4106b00..600fb29288f4 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
+++ b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
@@ -45,12 +45,6 @@ config BT_6LOWPAN
 	help
 	  IPv6 compression over Bluetooth Low Energy.
 
-config BT_SELFTEST
-	bool "Run self-tests on boot"
-	depends on BT && DEBUG_KERNEL
-	help
-	  Run self-tests during boot. Currently limited to SMP.
-
 source "net/bluetooth/rfcomm/Kconfig"
 
 source "net/bluetooth/bnep/Kconfig"
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 983d1e0793f6..fea3782989f4 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1743,123 +1743,3 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 	hdev->smp_data = NULL;
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST
-
-static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
-{
-	u8 irk[16] = {	0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
-			0x05, 0xad, 0xc8, 0x57, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x02, 0xec };
-	u8 r[3] = {	0x94, 0x81, 0x70 };
-	u8 exp[3] = {	0xaa, 0xfb, 0x0d };
-	u8 res[3];
-	int err;
-
-	err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	if (memcmp(res, exp, 3) != 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
-{
-	u8 k[16] = {	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
-	u8 r[16] = {	0xe0, 0x2e, 0x70, 0xc6, 0x4e, 0x27, 0x88, 0x63,
-			0x0e, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x56, 0x21, 0xd5, 0x83, 0x57 };
-	u8 preq[7] = {	0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x07, 0x07 };
-	u8 pres[7] = {	0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x05 };
-	u8 _iat =	0x01;
-	u8 _rat =	0x00;
-	bdaddr_t ra = { { 0xb6, 0xb5, 0xb4, 0xb3, 0xb2, 0xb1 } };
-	bdaddr_t ia = { { 0xa6, 0xa5, 0xa4, 0xa3, 0xa2, 0xa1 } };
-	u8 exp[16] = {	0x86, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0xbe, 0xc5, 0x4d, 0xa7, 0xd2,
-			0xea, 0x88, 0x89, 0x87, 0xef, 0x3f, 0x1e, 0x1e };
-	u8 res[16];
-	int err;
-
-	err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16) != 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
-{
-	u8 k[16] = {	0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
-			0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
-	u8 r1[16] = {	0x88, 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44, 0x33, 0x22, 0x11 };
-	u8 r2[16] = {	0x00, 0xff, 0xee, 0xdd, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x99 };
-	u8 exp[16] = {	0x62, 0xa0, 0x6d, 0x79, 0xae, 0x16, 0x42, 0x5b,
-			0x9b, 0xf4, 0xb0, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0xe1, 0x1f, 0x9a };
-	u8 res[16];
-	int err;
-
-	err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	if (memcmp(res, exp, 16) != 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes)
-{
-	int err;
-
-	err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
-	if (err) {
-		BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
-		return err;
-	}
-
-	err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
-	if (err) {
-		BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
-		return err;
-	}
-
-	err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
-	if (err) {
-		BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
-		return err;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int __init test_smp(void)
-{
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
-	int err;
-
-	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
-		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
-		return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
-	}
-
-	err = run_selftests(tfm_aes);
-	if (err < 0)
-		BT_ERR("Self tests failed");
-	else
-		BT_INFO("Self-tests passed");
-
-	crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-module_init(test_smp);
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_BT_SELFTEST */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 49c922bb1ec01ac3a98e5881f6c85ea7ef52d53f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 21:12:20 -0700
Subject: Bluetooth: spelling fixes

Fix spelling errors in comments.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c   | 6 +++---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c  | 2 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c   | 2 +-
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 2 +-
 net/bluetooth/smp.c        | 4 ++--
 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index cb05d7f16a34..ddf33900f7f3 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -4477,7 +4477,7 @@ int hci_req_run(struct hci_request *req, hci_req_complete_t complete)
 
 	BT_DBG("length %u", skb_queue_len(&req->cmd_q));
 
-	/* If an error occured during request building, remove all HCI
+	/* If an error occurred during request building, remove all HCI
 	 * commands queued on the HCI request queue.
 	 */
 	if (req->err) {
@@ -4546,7 +4546,7 @@ int hci_send_cmd(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 opcode, __u32 plen,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	/* Stand-alone HCI commands must be flaged as
+	/* Stand-alone HCI commands must be flagged as
 	 * single-command requests.
 	 */
 	bt_cb(skb)->req.start = true;
@@ -4566,7 +4566,7 @@ void hci_req_add_ev(struct hci_request *req, u16 opcode, u32 plen,
 
 	BT_DBG("%s opcode 0x%4.4x plen %d", hdev->name, opcode, plen);
 
-	/* If an error occured during request building, there is no point in
+	/* If an error occurred during request building, there is no point in
 	 * queueing the HCI command. We can simply return.
 	 */
 	if (req->err)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 96291530606d..f5704bae67a2 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ static void hci_cc_le_set_adv_enable(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
 
-	/* If we're doing connection initation as peripheral. Set a
+	/* If we're doing connection initiation as peripheral. Set a
 	 * timeout in case something goes wrong.
 	 */
 	if (*sent) {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
index 115f149362ba..bbc4ac748263 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c
@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ static int hci_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 			skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
 			queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
 		} else {
-			/* Stand-alone HCI commands must be flaged as
+			/* Stand-alone HCI commands must be flagged as
 			 * single-command requests.
 			 */
 			bt_cb(skb)->req.start = true;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index d46c5127f6c3..fc15174c612c 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -4082,7 +4082,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_config_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 		chan->num_conf_req++;
 	}
 
-	/* Got Conf Rsp PENDING from remote side and asume we sent
+	/* Got Conf Rsp PENDING from remote side and assume we sent
 	   Conf Rsp PENDING in the code above */
 	if (test_bit(CONF_REM_CONF_PEND, &chan->conf_state) &&
 	    test_bit(CONF_LOC_CONF_PEND, &chan->conf_state)) {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index fea3782989f4..3ebf65b50881 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
 		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
 
-	/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
+	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
 	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
 		u8 method;
 
@@ -1022,7 +1022,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
 
-	/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
+	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
 	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
 		u8 method;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a930430b047a0cc118bfc47ca54fcdfbadf091d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 09:17:08 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Remove unnecessary hci_dev_lock/unlock in smp.c

The mgmt_user_passkey_request and related functions do not do anything
else except read access to hdev->id. This member never changes after the
hdev creation so there is no need to acquire a lock to read it.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 3ebf65b50881..3d38553eb526 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -514,8 +514,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 	}
 
-	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
-
 	if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
 		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
@@ -528,8 +526,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
 						passkey, 0);
 
-	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
-
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From abe84903a8efc6b83fa92161429e0e3a28bde15c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 22:22:21 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Use proper nesting annotation for l2cap_chan lock

By default lockdep considers all L2CAP channels equal. This would mean
that we get warnings if a channel is locked when another one's lock is
tried to be acquired in the same thread. This kind of inter-channel
locking dependencies exist in the form of parent-child channels as well
as any channel wishing to elevate the security by requesting procedures
on the SMP channel.

To eliminate the chance for these lockdep warnings we introduce a
nesting level for each channel and use that when acquiring the channel
lock. For now there exists the earlier mentioned three identified
categories: SMP, "normal" channels and parent channels (i.e. those in
BT_LISTEN state). The nesting level is defined as atomic_t since we need
access to it before the lock is actually acquired.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c    |  9 +++++++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c           | 10 ++++++++++
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index ead99f032f7a..061e648052c8 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #define __L2CAP_H
 
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
 
 /* L2CAP defaults */
 #define L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU		672
@@ -481,6 +482,7 @@ struct l2cap_chan {
 	struct hci_conn		*hs_hcon;
 	struct hci_chan		*hs_hchan;
 	struct kref	kref;
+	atomic_t	nesting;
 
 	__u8		state;
 
@@ -713,6 +715,17 @@ enum {
 	FLAG_HOLD_HCI_CONN,
 };
 
+/* Lock nesting levels for L2CAP channels. We need these because lockdep
+ * otherwise considers all channels equal and will e.g. complain about a
+ * connection oriented channel triggering SMP procedures or a listening
+ * channel creating and locking a child channel.
+ */
+enum {
+	L2CAP_NESTING_SMP,
+	L2CAP_NESTING_NORMAL,
+	L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT,
+};
+
 enum {
 	L2CAP_TX_STATE_XMIT,
 	L2CAP_TX_STATE_WAIT_F,
@@ -778,7 +791,7 @@ void l2cap_chan_put(struct l2cap_chan *c);
 
 static inline void l2cap_chan_lock(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
-	mutex_lock(&chan->lock);
+	mutex_lock_nested(&chan->lock, atomic_read(&chan->nesting));
 }
 
 static inline void l2cap_chan_unlock(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index ad1cf82fee02..f1a51564b8fd 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -285,6 +285,12 @@ static int l2cap_sock_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 	sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
 	sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
 
+	/* Listening channels need to use nested locking in order not to
+	 * cause lockdep warnings when the created child channels end up
+	 * being locked in the same thread as the parent channel.
+	 */
+	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
+
 	chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
 	sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN;
 
@@ -1497,6 +1503,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent)
 		l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
 	}
 
+	/* Set default lock nesting level */
+	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_NORMAL);
+
 	/* Default config options */
 	chan->flush_to = L2CAP_DEFAULT_FLUSH_TO;
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 3d38553eb526..3b63c7f09dd5 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1658,6 +1658,13 @@ static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
 	chan->omtu	= pchan->omtu;
 	chan->mode	= pchan->mode;
 
+	/* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to
+	 * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel
+	 * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep
+	 * warnings.
+	 */
+	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP);
+
 	BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
 
 	return chan;
@@ -1715,6 +1722,9 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 	chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
 	chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
 
+	/* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
+	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
+
 	hdev->smp_data = chan;
 
 	return 0;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 35dc6f834c9dc888391c7b700130d0831a907ca1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 10:55:18 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Add key preference parameter to smp_sufficient_security

So far smp_sufficient_security() has returned false if we're encrypted
with an STK but do have an LTK available. However, for the sake of LE
CoC servers we do want to let the incoming connection through even
though we're only encrypted with the STK.

This patch adds a key preference parameter to smp_sufficient_security()
with two possible values (enum used instead of bool for readability).

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |  3 ++-
 net/bluetooth/smp.c        | 20 +++++++++++---------
 net/bluetooth/smp.h        |  9 ++++++++-
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 76045497eaa1..a37f809591ad 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -5391,7 +5391,8 @@ static int l2cap_le_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	mutex_lock(&conn->chan_lock);
 	l2cap_chan_lock(pchan);
 
-	if (!smp_sufficient_security(conn->hcon, pchan->sec_level)) {
+	if (!smp_sufficient_security(conn->hcon, pchan->sec_level,
+				     SMP_ALLOW_STK)) {
 		result = L2CAP_CR_AUTHENTICATION;
 		chan = NULL;
 		goto response_unlock;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 3b63c7f09dd5..3dc5f0e66405 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1122,18 +1122,20 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
 	return true;
 }
 
-bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level)
+bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
+			     enum smp_key_pref key_pref)
 {
 	if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
 		return true;
 
-	/* If we're encrypted with an STK always claim insufficient
-	 * security. This way we allow the connection to be re-encrypted
-	 * with an LTK, even if the LTK provides the same level of
-	 * security. Only exception is if we don't have an LTK (e.g.
-	 * because of key distribution bits).
+	/* If we're encrypted with an STK but the caller prefers using
+	 * LTK claim insufficient security. This way we allow the
+	 * connection to be re-encrypted with an LTK, even if the LTK
+	 * provides the same level of security. Only exception is if we
+	 * don't have an LTK (e.g. because of key distribution bits).
 	 */
-	if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
+	if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
+	    test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
 	    hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
 				 hcon->role))
 		return false;
@@ -1167,7 +1169,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	else
 		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
 
-	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
+	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
@@ -1217,7 +1219,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
 		return 1;
 
-	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
+	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
 		return 1;
 
 	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index 86a683a8b491..f76083b85005 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -133,8 +133,15 @@ static inline u8 smp_ltk_sec_level(struct smp_ltk *key)
 	return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
 }
 
+/* Key preferences for smp_sufficient security */
+enum smp_key_pref {
+	SMP_ALLOW_STK,
+	SMP_USE_LTK,
+};
+
 /* SMP Commands */
-bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level);
+bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
+			     enum smp_key_pref key_pref);
 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level);
 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 970d0f1b280372cfd46b6de5529d96f8448de943 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 14:37:47 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Convert LTK list to RCU

This patch set converts the hdev->long_term_keys list to use RCU to
eliminate the need to use hci_dev_lock/unlock.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |  1 +
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c         | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        |  4 ++--
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              | 10 ++++------
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index 4e39a5adfcab..a4adef22ad7c 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ struct smp_csrk {
 
 struct smp_ltk {
 	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 	bdaddr_t bdaddr;
 	u8 bdaddr_type;
 	u8 authenticated;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index 6c162c8809cf..c9495fb9f595 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -778,17 +778,15 @@ static const struct file_operations identity_resolving_keys_fops = {
 static int long_term_keys_show(struct seq_file *f, void *ptr)
 {
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = f->private;
-	struct list_head *p, *n;
+	struct smp_ltk *ltk;
 
-	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
-	list_for_each_safe(p, n, &hdev->long_term_keys) {
-		struct smp_ltk *ltk = list_entry(p, struct smp_ltk, list);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ltk, &hdev->long_term_keys, list)
 		seq_printf(f, "%pMR (type %u) %u 0x%02x %u %.4x %.16llx %*phN\n",
 			   &ltk->bdaddr, ltk->bdaddr_type, ltk->authenticated,
 			   ltk->type, ltk->enc_size, __le16_to_cpu(ltk->ediv),
 			   __le64_to_cpu(ltk->rand), 16, ltk->val);
-	}
-	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3106,11 +3104,11 @@ void hci_link_keys_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 
 void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 {
-	struct smp_ltk *k, *tmp;
+	struct smp_ltk *k;
 
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(k, tmp, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
-		list_del(&k->list);
-		kfree(k);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
+		list_del_rcu(&k->list);
+		kfree_rcu(k, rcu);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -3184,15 +3182,18 @@ struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, __le16 ediv, __le64 rand,
 {
 	struct smp_ltk *k;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
 		if (k->ediv != ediv || k->rand != rand)
 			continue;
 
 		if (ltk_role(k->type) != role)
 			continue;
 
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return k;
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -3202,11 +3203,16 @@ struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk_by_addr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
 {
 	struct smp_ltk *k;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list)
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
 		if (addr_type == k->bdaddr_type &&
 		    bacmp(bdaddr, &k->bdaddr) == 0 &&
-		    ltk_role(k->type) == role)
+		    ltk_role(k->type) == role) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return k;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -3309,7 +3315,7 @@ struct smp_ltk *hci_add_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
 		key = kzalloc(sizeof(*key), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!key)
 			return NULL;
-		list_add(&key->list, &hdev->long_term_keys);
+		list_add_rcu(&key->list, &hdev->long_term_keys);
 	}
 
 	bacpy(&key->bdaddr, bdaddr);
@@ -3365,17 +3371,17 @@ int hci_remove_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
 
 int hci_remove_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type)
 {
-	struct smp_ltk *k, *tmp;
+	struct smp_ltk *k;
 	int removed = 0;
 
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(k, tmp, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->long_term_keys, list) {
 		if (bacmp(bdaddr, &k->bdaddr) || k->bdaddr_type != bdaddr_type)
 			continue;
 
 		BT_DBG("%s removing %pMR", hdev->name, bdaddr);
 
-		list_del(&k->list);
-		kfree(k);
+		list_del_rcu(&k->list);
+		kfree_rcu(k, rcu);
 		removed++;
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index aec3b1dce1cc..09d76547d985 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -4578,8 +4578,8 @@ static void hci_le_ltk_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 */
 	if (ltk->type == SMP_STK) {
 		set_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags);
-		list_del(&ltk->list);
-		kfree(ltk);
+		list_del_rcu(&ltk->list);
+		kfree_rcu(ltk, rcu);
 	} else {
 		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags);
 	}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 3dc5f0e66405..fd2dfe5222bc 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -383,13 +383,13 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
 	if (!complete) {
 		if (smp->ltk) {
-			list_del(&smp->ltk->list);
-			kfree(smp->ltk);
+			list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
 		}
 
 		if (smp->slave_ltk) {
-			list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
-			kfree(smp->slave_ltk);
+			list_del_rcu(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(smp->slave_ltk, rcu);
 		}
 
 		if (smp->remote_irk) {
@@ -1321,7 +1321,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
-	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
 	authenticated = (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH);
 	ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, SMP_LTK,
 			  authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
@@ -1329,7 +1328,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	smp->ltk = ltk;
 	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
 		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
-	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From adae20cb2d20e5151b866945f802b0c2312f0f82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 14:37:48 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Convert IRK list to RCU

This patch set converts the hdev->identity_resolving_keys list to use
RCU to eliminate the need to use hci_dev_lock/unlock.

An additional change that must be done is to remove use of
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC for the hdev-specific AES crypto context. The reason is
that this context is used for matching RPAs and the loop that does the
matching is under the RCU read lock, i.e. is an atomic section which
cannot sleep.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |  1 +
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c         | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              | 10 ++++-----
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index a4adef22ad7c..fe2d5f299e12 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ struct smp_ltk {
 
 struct smp_irk {
 	struct list_head list;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 	bdaddr_t rpa;
 	bdaddr_t bdaddr;
 	u8 addr_type;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index c9495fb9f595..90ea0b7670d2 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -748,16 +748,15 @@ static const struct file_operations white_list_fops = {
 static int identity_resolving_keys_show(struct seq_file *f, void *ptr)
 {
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = f->private;
-	struct list_head *p, *n;
+	struct smp_irk *irk;
 
-	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
-	list_for_each_safe(p, n, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys) {
-		struct smp_irk *irk = list_entry(p, struct smp_irk, list);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(irk, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
 		seq_printf(f, "%pMR (type %u) %*phN %pMR\n",
 			   &irk->bdaddr, irk->addr_type,
 			   16, irk->val, &irk->rpa);
 	}
-	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3114,11 +3113,11 @@ void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 
 void hci_smp_irks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 {
-	struct smp_irk *k, *tmp;
+	struct smp_irk *k;
 
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(k, tmp, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
-		list_del(&k->list);
-		kfree(k);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
+		list_del_rcu(&k->list);
+		kfree_rcu(k, rcu);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -3221,17 +3220,22 @@ struct smp_irk *hci_find_irk_by_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *rpa)
 {
 	struct smp_irk *irk;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(irk, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
-		if (!bacmp(&irk->rpa, rpa))
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(irk, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
+		if (!bacmp(&irk->rpa, rpa)) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return irk;
+		}
 	}
 
-	list_for_each_entry(irk, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(irk, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
 		if (smp_irk_matches(hdev, irk->val, rpa)) {
 			bacpy(&irk->rpa, rpa);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return irk;
 		}
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -3245,11 +3249,15 @@ struct smp_irk *hci_find_irk_by_addr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
 	if (addr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_RANDOM && (bdaddr->b[5] & 0xc0) != 0xc0)
 		return NULL;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(irk, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(irk, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
 		if (addr_type == irk->addr_type &&
-		    bacmp(bdaddr, &irk->bdaddr) == 0)
+		    bacmp(bdaddr, &irk->bdaddr) == 0) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return irk;
+		}
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -3344,7 +3352,7 @@ struct smp_irk *hci_add_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
 		bacpy(&irk->bdaddr, bdaddr);
 		irk->addr_type = addr_type;
 
-		list_add(&irk->list, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys);
+		list_add_rcu(&irk->list, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys);
 	}
 
 	memcpy(irk->val, val, 16);
@@ -3390,16 +3398,16 @@ int hci_remove_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type)
 
 void hci_remove_irk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 addr_type)
 {
-	struct smp_irk *k, *tmp;
+	struct smp_irk *k;
 
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(k, tmp, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(k, &hdev->identity_resolving_keys, list) {
 		if (bacmp(bdaddr, &k->bdaddr) || k->addr_type != addr_type)
 			continue;
 
 		BT_DBG("%s removing %pMR", hdev->name, bdaddr);
 
-		list_del(&k->list);
-		kfree(k);
+		list_del_rcu(&k->list);
+		kfree_rcu(k, rcu);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index fd2dfe5222bc..7b610f615257 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		}
 
 		if (smp->remote_irk) {
-			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
-			kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+			list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -655,8 +655,8 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		 * just remove it.
 		 */
 		if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
-			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
-			kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+			list_del_rcu(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+			kfree_rcu(smp->remote_irk, rcu);
 			smp->remote_irk = NULL;
 		}
 	}
@@ -1696,7 +1696,7 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 
 	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
 
-	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
 		BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d88b5bbf1a985c338967f3c41351b32b747a55fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2014 14:37:49 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Remove unnecessary hdev locking in smp.c

Now that the SMP related key lists are converted to RCU there is nothing
in smp_cmd_sign_info() or smp_cmd_ident_addr_info() that would require
taking the hdev lock (including the smp_distribute_keys call). This
patch removes this unnecessary locking.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 7 -------
 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 7b610f615257..069b76e03b57 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1374,8 +1374,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
 
-	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
-
 	/* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending
 	 * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK
 	 * as "identity information". However, since such
@@ -1403,8 +1401,6 @@ distribute:
 	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
 		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
 
-	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1413,7 +1409,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_csrk *csrk;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -1426,7 +1421,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
-	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
 	csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (csrk) {
 		csrk->master = 0x01;
@@ -1434,7 +1428,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 	smp->csrk = csrk;
 	smp_distribute_keys(smp);
-	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0edb14de5606e145d14ae218103030269abcc152 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 13:29:28 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Make auth_req mask dependent on SC enabled or not

If we haven't enabled SC support on our side we should use the same mask
for the authentication requirement as we were using before SC support
was added, otherwise we should use the extended mask for SC.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 069b76e03b57..bfa839eed89b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@
 
 #define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
 
-#define AUTH_REQ_MASK   0x07
-#define KEY_DIST_MASK	0x07
+#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev)	(test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &(dev)->dev_flags) ? \
+				 0x1f : 0x07)
+#define KEY_DIST_MASK		0x07
 
 enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
@@ -332,7 +333,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 		req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 		req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
 		req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
-		req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
+		req->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
 
 		smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
 		return;
@@ -343,7 +344,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
 	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
-	rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK);
+	rsp->auth_req = (authreq & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev));
 
 	smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
 }
@@ -942,7 +943,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
-	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
 	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
@@ -997,6 +998,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	u8 key_size, auth;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1016,7 +1018,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
-	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
 	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
 	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
@@ -1151,6 +1153,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u8 sec_level, auth;
 
@@ -1162,7 +1165,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
-	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
 	if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
 		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 656687769487b736674f111b92cef6ba6a31dea6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 11:03:34 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add SMP flag for SC and set it when necessary.

This patch adds a new SMP flag for tracking whether Secure Connections
is in use and sets the flag when both remote and local side have elected
to use Secure Connections.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index bfa839eed89b..3808ade96d08 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH,
 	SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
 	SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+	SMP_FLAG_SC,
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
@@ -973,6 +974,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
 
+	if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
 	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
@@ -1020,6 +1024,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
+	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
 	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
 	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
 		u8 method;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d2eb9e10f74fc1fe5e7e7abc9965ff965e1b4f54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 16 May 2014 10:59:06 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Update SMP security level to/from auth_req for SC

This patch updates the functions which map the SMP authentication
request to a security level and vice-versa to take into account the
Secure Connections feature.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 3808ade96d08..4ecbf2774fbd 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -284,17 +284,22 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 	schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
 }
 
-static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
+static u8 authreq_to_seclevel(u8 authreq)
 {
-	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
-		return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
-	else
+	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM) {
+		if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+			return BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+		else
+			return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+	} else {
 		return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	}
 }
 
 static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
 {
 	switch (sec_level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_FIPS:
 	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
 		return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
@@ -1026,6 +1031,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+	else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
 
 	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
 	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
@@ -1255,6 +1262,9 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
+
 	/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
 	 * requires it.
 	 */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f3a73d97b3b78584e111478d07dfd063453f112e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 29 May 2014 15:02:59 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Rename hci_find_ltk_by_addr to hci_find_ltk

Now that hci_find_ltk_by_addr is the only LTK lookup function there's no
need to keep the long name anymore. This patch shortens the function
name to simply hci_find_ltk.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 4 ++--
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c         | 6 +++---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        | 3 +--
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              | 6 ++----
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index b41969b561d8..90929641d0f0 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -924,8 +924,8 @@ struct link_key *hci_add_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn,
 struct smp_ltk *hci_add_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
 			    u8 addr_type, u8 type, u8 authenticated,
 			    u8 tk[16], u8 enc_size, __le16 ediv, __le64 rand);
-struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk_by_addr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
-				     u8 addr_type, u8 role);
+struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
+			     u8 addr_type, u8 role);
 int hci_remove_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, u8 bdaddr_type);
 void hci_smp_ltks_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev);
 int hci_remove_link_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index cb9bc8e2c58d..6c3220e9484f 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -3185,8 +3185,8 @@ static u8 ltk_role(u8 type)
 	return HCI_ROLE_SLAVE;
 }
 
-struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk_by_addr(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
-				     u8 addr_type, u8 role)
+struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
+			     u8 addr_type, u8 role)
 {
 	struct smp_ltk *k;
 
@@ -3313,7 +3313,7 @@ struct smp_ltk *hci_add_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
 	struct smp_ltk *key, *old_key;
 	u8 role = ltk_role(type);
 
-	old_key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type, role);
+	old_key = hci_find_ltk(hdev, bdaddr, addr_type, role);
 	if (old_key)
 		key = old_key;
 	else {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index 0058b545c5ed..34ecbf0b7e5b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -4590,8 +4590,7 @@ static void hci_le_ltk_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (conn == NULL)
 		goto not_found;
 
-	ltk = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hdev, &conn->dst, conn->dst_type,
-				   conn->role);
+	ltk = hci_find_ltk(hdev, &conn->dst, conn->dst_type, conn->role);
 	if (!ltk)
 		goto not_found;
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 4ecbf2774fbd..0973e37073e2 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1118,8 +1118,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
 	struct smp_ltk *key;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
-	key = hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				   hcon->role);
+	key = hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role);
 	if (!key)
 		return false;
 
@@ -1152,8 +1151,7 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
 	 */
 	if (key_pref == SMP_USE_LTK &&
 	    test_bit(HCI_CONN_STK_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags) &&
-	    hci_find_ltk_by_addr(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				 hcon->role))
+	    hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, hcon->role))
 		return false;
 
 	if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From df8e1a4c7339f6447e75430e7c8172deddb489a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 10:39:56 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Set link key generation bit if necessary for LE SC

Depending on whether Secure Connections is enabled or not we may need to add
the link key generation bit to the key distribution. This patch does the
necessary modifications to the build_pairing_cmd() function.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 0973e37073e2..d993d7d4fcc8 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -333,6 +333,16 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
 		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		if ((authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) &&
+		    test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+			local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+			remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
+		}
+	} else {
+		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
+	}
+
 	if (rsp == NULL) {
 		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 		req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 407cecf6c71e13da04f6b591bdbec76ab9a251c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 14:19:47 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add basic support for AES-CMAC

Most of the LE Secure Connections SMP crypto functions build on top of
the AES-CMAC function. This patch adds access to AES-CMAC in the kernel
crypto subsystem by allocating a crypto_hash handle for it in a similar
way that we have one for AES-CBC.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/Kconfig |  1 +
 net/bluetooth/smp.c   | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
index 5e97a8ff850b..29bcafc41adf 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
+++ b/net/bluetooth/Kconfig
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ menuconfig BT
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
 	select CRYPTO_AES
+	select CRYPTO_CMAC
 	select CRYPTO_ECB
 	select CRYPTO_SHA256
 	help
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index d993d7d4fcc8..4fed367da380 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	unsigned long	flags;
 
 	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
+	struct crypto_hash	*tfm_cmac;
 };
 
 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
@@ -396,6 +397,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
 
 	crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+	crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
 
 	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
 	if (!complete) {
@@ -861,6 +863,14 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
+	smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+		kfree(smp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	smp->conn = conn;
 	chan->data = smp;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3b19146d23884172fe9d05f90924d4da3cdeb468 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 10:50:15 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add basic support for sending our LE SC public key

When the initial pairing request & response PDUs have been exchanged and
both have had the LE SC bit set the next step is to generate a ECDH
key pair and to send the public key to the remote side. This patch adds
basic support for generating the key pair and sending the public key
using the new Public Key SMP PDU. It is the initiating device that sends
the public key first and the non-initiating device responds by sending
its public key respectively (in a subsequent patch).

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 4fed367da380..9317583751eb 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -29,10 +29,14 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
 
+#include "ecc.h"
 #include "smp.h"
 
 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code)	set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
 
+/* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
+#define SMP_SC_NO_DIST (SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY);
+
 #define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
 
 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev)	(test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &(dev)->dev_flags) ? \
@@ -71,6 +75,10 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
 	unsigned long	flags;
 
+	/* Secure Connections variables */
+	u8			local_pk[64];
+	u8			local_sk[32];
+
 	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 	struct crypto_hash	*tfm_cmac;
 };
@@ -1012,7 +1020,18 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
-	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		/* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+	}
 
 	/* Request setup of TK */
 	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
@@ -1022,6 +1041,23 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	BT_DBG("");
+
+	/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
+	if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	BT_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+	BT_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]);
+	BT_DBG("Local Private Key:  %32phN", smp->local_sk);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -1074,6 +1110,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 */
 	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+		return sc_send_public_key(smp);
+	}
+
 	auth |= req->auth_req;
 
 	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d8f8edbe93979bdf1f74cd768e68c7705806f0b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 11:09:28 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add handler function for receiving LE SC public key

This patch adds a handler function for the LE SC SMP Public Key PDU.
When we receive the key we proceed with generating the shared DHKey
value from the remote public key and local private key.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 9317583751eb..1cc438c9c2cb 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE,
 	SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
 	SMP_FLAG_SC,
+	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
@@ -78,6 +79,8 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	/* Secure Connections variables */
 	u8			local_pk[64];
 	u8			local_sk[32];
+	u8			remote_pk[64];
+	u8			dhkey[32];
 
 	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 	struct crypto_hash	*tfm_cmac;
@@ -1513,6 +1516,43 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*key))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
+
+	/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
+	 * the key from the initiating device.
+	 */
+	if (!hcon->out) {
+		err = sc_send_public_key(smp);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	BT_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
+	BT_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]);
+
+	if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	BT_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -1597,6 +1637,10 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+		reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
 		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cbbbe3e242f5629fd34836e7e41737235c049ce2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 11:30:08 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add support for sending LE SC Confirm value

Once the public key exchange is complete the next step is for the
non-initiating device to send a SMP Pairing Confirm PDU to the
initiating device. This requires the use of a new smp_f4 confirm value
generation function which in turn builds on the AES-CMAC cryptographic
function.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 1cc438c9c2cb..0980b86574bd 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
 				 0x1f : 0x07)
 #define KEY_DIST_MASK		0x07
 
+/* Maximum message length that can be passed to aes_cmac */
+#define CMAC_MSG_MAX	80
+
 enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
 	SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING,
@@ -94,6 +97,84 @@ static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
 		dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
 }
 
+static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
+		    size_t len, u8 mac[16])
+{
+	uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
+	struct hash_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	int err;
+
+	if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
+		return -EFBIG;
+
+	if (!tfm) {
+		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	desc.tfm = tfm;
+	desc.flags = 0;
+
+	crypto_hash_init(&desc);
+
+	/* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
+	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
+	swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
+
+	BT_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
+	BT_DBG("key %16phN", k);
+
+	err = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(&sg, msg_msb, len);
+
+	err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, len);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Hash update error %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, mac_msb);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Hash final error %d", err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
+
+	BT_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
+		  const u8 x[16], u8 z, u8 res[16])
+{
+	u8 m[65];
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+	BT_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+	BT_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
+
+	m[0] = z;
+	memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
+	memcpy(m + 33, u, 32);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	BT_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 {
 	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
@@ -1522,6 +1603,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
 	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -1550,6 +1632,20 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
 
+	/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
+	 * send the confirm value.
+	 */
+	if (conn->hcon->out)
+		return 0;
+
+	err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd,
+		     0, cfm.confirm_val);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From dcee2b32216ffa62195cac394d50fd801b51a41c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 11:36:38 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add LE SC support for responding to Pairing Confirm PDU

When LE SC is being used we should always respond to it by sending our
local random number. This patch adds a convenience function for it which
also contains a check for the pre-requisite public key exchange
completion

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 0980b86574bd..6207f32d1c6b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1216,6 +1216,25 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+	BT_DBG("");
+
+	/* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+			     smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -1229,6 +1248,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+
 	if (conn->hcon->out) {
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 191dc7fe2d3a8dde70b37a1fd086a32c1f4e1dcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 11:39:49 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add support for LE SC numeric comparison

After the Pairing Confirm and Random PDUs have been exchanged in LE SC
it's time to generate a numeric comparison value using a new smp_g2
cryptographic function (which also builds on AES-CMAC). This patch adds
the smp_g2 implementation and updates the Pairing Random PDU handler to
proceed with the value genration and user confirmation.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 6207f32d1c6b..103f05aff7e9 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -175,6 +175,32 @@ static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
+		  const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
+{
+	u8 m[80], tmp[16];
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+	BT_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+	BT_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
+
+	memcpy(m, y, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
+	memcpy(m + 48, u, 32);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, x, m, sizeof(m), tmp);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	*val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
+	*val %= 1000000;
+
+	BT_DBG("val %06u", *val);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 {
 	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
@@ -1270,6 +1296,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
+	u32 passkey;
+	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
@@ -1279,7 +1309,46 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
 
-	return smp_random(smp);
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return smp_random(smp);
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		u8 cfm[16];
+
+		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+			     smp->rrnd, 0, cfm);
+		if (err)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+		pkax = smp->local_pk;
+		pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
+		na   = smp->prnd;
+		nb   = smp->rrnd;
+	} else {
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
+			     smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+		pkax = smp->remote_pk;
+		pkbx = smp->local_pk;
+		na   = smp->rrnd;
+		nb   = smp->prnd;
+	}
+
+	err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+					hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
+					passkey, 0);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 760b018b6cf08ee16fed37249a0a0d52d930c356 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 11:44:05 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add support for handling LE SC user response

With LE SC, once the user has responded to the numeric comparison it's
time to send DHKey check values in both directions. The DHKey check
value is generated using new smp_f5 and smp_f6 cryptographic functions.
The smp_f5 function is responsible for generating the LTK and the MacKey
values whereas the smp_f6 function takes the MacKey as input and
generates the DHKey Check value.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 154 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 103f05aff7e9..b12f076d78b1 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	u8			local_sk[32];
 	u8			remote_pk[64];
 	u8			dhkey[32];
+	u8			mackey[16];
 
 	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 	struct crypto_hash	*tfm_cmac;
@@ -175,6 +176,86 @@ static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16],
+		  u8 a1[7], u8 a2[7], u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	/* The btle, salt and length "magic" values are as defined in
+	 * the SMP section of the Bluetooth core specification. In ASCII
+	 * the btle value ends up being 'btle'. The salt is just a
+	 * random number whereas length is the value 256 in little
+	 * endian format.
+	 */
+	const u8 btle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x62 };
+	const u8 salt[16] = { 0xbe, 0x83, 0x60, 0x5a, 0xdb, 0x0b, 0x37, 0x60,
+			      0x38, 0xa5, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x91, 0x83, 0x88, 0x6c };
+	const u8 length[2] = { 0x00, 0x01 };
+	u8 m[53], t[16];
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("w %32phN", w);
+	BT_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+	BT_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	BT_DBG("t %16phN", t);
+
+	memcpy(m, length, 2);
+	memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 9, a1, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 16, n2, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 32, n1, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 48, btle, 4);
+
+	m[52] = 0; /* Counter */
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), mackey);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	BT_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
+
+	m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, t, m, sizeof(m), ltk);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	BT_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+		  const u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16], const u8 r[16],
+		  const u8 io_cap[3], const u8 a1[7], const u8 a2[7],
+		  u8 res[16])
+{
+	u8 m[65];
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("w %16phN", w);
+	BT_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+	BT_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
+
+	memcpy(m, a2, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
+	memcpy(m + 14, io_cap, 3);
+	memcpy(m + 17, r, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 33, n2, 16);
+	memcpy(m + 49, n1, 16);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, m, sizeof(m), res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	BT_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 		  const u8 x[16], const u8 y[16], u32 *val)
 {
@@ -1001,6 +1082,69 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	return smp;
 }
 
+static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	u8 *na, *nb, a[7], b[7];
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		na   = smp->prnd;
+		nb   = smp->rrnd;
+	} else {
+		na   = smp->rrnd;
+		nb   = smp->prnd;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
+}
+
+static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
+	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+	u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
+
+	switch (mgmt_op) {
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local_addr = a;
+		remote_addr = b;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+	} else {
+		local_addr = b;
+		remote_addr = a;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+	}
+
+	memcpy(r, &passkey, sizeof(passkey));
+	memset(r + sizeof(passkey), 0, sizeof(r) - sizeof(passkey));
+
+	smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
+	       local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
+
+	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
@@ -1026,6 +1170,11 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 
 	smp = chan->data;
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		err = sc_user_reply(smp, mgmt_op, passkey);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
 	switch (mgmt_op) {
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
 		value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
@@ -1338,6 +1487,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		nb   = smp->prnd;
 	}
 
+	/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+	err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
 	err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
 	if (err)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6433a9a2c47e5b3ddfdb86ee5b57a6eada1f6da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 11:47:30 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add support for LE SC DHKey check PDU

Once we receive the DHKey check PDU it's time to first verify that the
value is correct and then proceed with encrypting the link.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index b12f076d78b1..f59f0510e0b0 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1894,6 +1894,58 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check *check = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
+	u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	if (skb->len < sizeof(*check))
+		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
+	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
+	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
+	b[6] = hcon->resp_addr_type;
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local_addr = a;
+		remote_addr = b;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
+	} else {
+		local_addr = b;
+		remote_addr = a;
+		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->preq[1], 3);
+	}
+
+	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+	err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
+		     io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
+		return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
+
+	smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			       SMP_LTK_P256, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+			       0, 0);
+
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk);
+		hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -1982,6 +2034,10 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		reason = smp_cmd_public_key(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK:
+		reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
 		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6a77083af57f2dc515a01c8ec82610ab0e7baa59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 11:54:04 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add support for LE SC key generation

As the last step of the LE SC pairing process it's time to generate and
distribute keys. The generation part is unique to LE SC and so this
patch adds a dedicated function for it. We also clear the distribution
bits for keys which are not distributed with LE SC, so that the code
shared with legacy SMP will not go ahead and try to distribute them.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index f59f0510e0b0..20fa07aa9364 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	struct smp_ltk	*ltk;
 	struct smp_ltk	*slave_ltk;
 	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
+	u8		*link_key;
 	unsigned long	flags;
 
 	/* Secure Connections variables */
@@ -321,6 +322,22 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+		  const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
+{
+	int err;
+
+	BT_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	BT_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
 {
 	u8 _res[16];
@@ -594,6 +611,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	kfree(smp->csrk);
 	kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+	kfree(smp->link_key);
 
 	crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
 	crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
@@ -907,6 +925,37 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
 		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
 	}
+
+	if (smp->link_key) {
+		hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
+				 smp->link_key, HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256,
+				 0, NULL);
+	}
+}
+
+static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
+	 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp1' and 'lebr'.
+	 */
+	const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+	const u8 lebr[4] = { 0x72, 0x62, 0x65, 0x6c };
+
+	smp->link_key = kzalloc(16, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!smp->link_key)
+		return;
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
+		kfree(smp->link_key);
+		smp->link_key = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
+		kfree(smp->link_key);
+		smp->link_key = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
 }
 
 static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
@@ -951,6 +1000,14 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
 	}
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)
+			sc_generate_link_key(smp);
+
+		/* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+	}
+
 	BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
 
 	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 783e057462d514441fbd371bbb398cf886fe3376 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 18:48:26 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Track authentication method in SMP context

For Secure Connections we'll select the authentication method as soon as
we receive the public key, but only use it later (both when actually
triggering the method as well as when determining the quality of the
resulting LTK). Store the method therefore in the SMP context.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 20fa07aa9364..45e527d3c741 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	struct smp_irk	*remote_irk;
 	u8		*link_key;
 	unsigned long	flags;
+	u8		method;
 
 	/* Secure Connections variables */
 	u8			local_pk[64];
@@ -688,7 +689,6 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
-	u8 method;
 	u32 passkey = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -705,26 +705,28 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	 * table.
 	 */
 	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
-		method = JUST_CFM;
+		smp->method = JUST_CFM;
 	else
-		method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+		smp->method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
 
 	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
-	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
-		method = JUST_WORKS;
+	if (smp->method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
+						&smp->flags))
+		smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
 
 	/* Don't bother user space with no IO capabilities */
-	if (method == JUST_CFM && hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
-		method = JUST_WORKS;
+	if (smp->method == JUST_CFM &&
+	    hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+		smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
 
 	/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
-	if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
-	if (method != JUST_CFM) {
+	if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
 		if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
 			hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
@@ -733,15 +735,15 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
 	 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
 	 */
-	if (method == OVERLAP) {
+	if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
 		if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
-			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+			smp->method = CFM_PASSKEY;
 		else
-			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+			smp->method = REQ_PASSKEY;
 	}
 
 	/* Generate random passkey. */
-	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+	if (smp->method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
 		memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
 		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
 		passkey %= 1000000;
@@ -750,10 +752,10 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
 	}
 
-	if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY)
 		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type);
-	else if (method == JUST_CFM)
+	else if (smp->method == JUST_CFM)
 		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 						hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
 						passkey, 1);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5e3d3d9b3c0119e6ac86bf77c6ff9f6b0d09bcf5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 18:51:02 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add selection of the SC authentication method

This patch adds code to select the authentication method for Secure
Connections based on the local and remote capabilities. A new
DSP_PASSKEY method is also added for displaying the passkey - something
that is not part of legacy SMP pairing.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 45e527d3c741..9e1193174064 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -661,6 +661,7 @@ static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
 #define REQ_PASSKEY	0x02
 #define CFM_PASSKEY	0x03
 #define REQ_OOB		0x04
+#define DSP_PASSKEY	0x05
 #define OVERLAP		0xFF
 
 static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
@@ -671,6 +672,14 @@ static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
 	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP     },
 };
 
+static const u8 sc_method[5][5] = {
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+	{ DSP_PASSKEY, DSP_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, DSP_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM    },
+	{ DSP_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+};
+
 static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 {
 	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST_CFM (which gets
@@ -680,6 +689,9 @@ static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 	    remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
 		return JUST_CFM;
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return sc_method[remote_io][local_io];
+
 	return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
 }
 
@@ -1305,6 +1317,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
+
+	if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
 	if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
 		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
 	else
@@ -1323,11 +1340,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
 	}
 
-	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
-
-	if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
-		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
-
 	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
@@ -1901,12 +1913,54 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
+	u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
+
+	/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
+	 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
+	 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
+	 * first byte which contains the opcode.
+	 */
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		local = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+		remote = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+	} else {
+		local = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+		remote = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+	}
+
+	local_io = local->io_capability;
+	remote_io = remote->io_capability;
+
+	local_mitm = (local->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+	remote_mitm = (remote->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_MITM);
+
+	/* If either side wants MITM, look up the method from the table,
+	 * otherwise use JUST WORKS.
+	 */
+	if (local_mitm || remote_mitm)
+		method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
+	else
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	/* Don't confirm locally initiated pairing attempts */
+	if (method == JUST_CFM && test_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags))
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	return method;
+}
+
 static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_public_key *key = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
 	int err;
 
@@ -1936,6 +1990,16 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
 
+	smp->method = sc_select_method(smp);
+
+	BT_DBG("%s selected method 0x%02x", hdev->name, smp->method);
+
+	/* JUST_WORKS and JUST_CFM result in an unauthenticated key */
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == JUST_CFM)
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	else
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
+
 	/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
 	 * send the confirm value.
 	 */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From aeb7d461f9c895bb6d09e9d175696849e9f290c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 18:52:28 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Detect SMP SC debug keys

We need to be able to detect if the remote side used a debug key for the
pairing. This patch adds the debug key defines and sets a flag to
indicate that a debug key was used. The debug private key (debug_sk) is
also added in this patch but will only be used in a subsequent patch
when local debug key support is implemented.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 9e1193174064..ddc76cf45cfb 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR,
 	SMP_FLAG_SC,
 	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
+	SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
@@ -92,6 +93,29 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	struct crypto_hash	*tfm_cmac;
 };
 
+/* These debug key values are defined in the SMP section of the core
+ * specification. debug_pk is the public debug key and debug_sk the
+ * private debug key.
+ */
+static const u8 debug_pk[64] = {
+		0xe6, 0x9d, 0x35, 0x0e, 0x48, 0x01, 0x03, 0xcc,
+		0xdb, 0xfd, 0xf4, 0xac, 0x11, 0x91, 0xf4, 0xef,
+		0xb9, 0xa5, 0xf9, 0xe9, 0xa7, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x5e,
+		0x2c, 0xbe, 0x97, 0xf2, 0xd2, 0x03, 0xb0, 0x20,
+
+		0x8b, 0xd2, 0x89, 0x15, 0xd0, 0x8e, 0x1c, 0x74,
+		0x24, 0x30, 0xed, 0x8f, 0xc2, 0x45, 0x63, 0x76,
+		0x5c, 0x15, 0x52, 0x5a, 0xbf, 0x9a, 0x32, 0x63,
+		0x6d, 0xeb, 0x2a, 0x65, 0x49, 0x9c, 0x80, 0xdc,
+};
+
+static const u8 debug_sk[32] = {
+		0xbd, 0x1a, 0x3c, 0xcd, 0xa6, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x58,
+		0x99, 0xb7, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0x60, 0xff, 0x4a,
+		0x50, 0x3f, 0x10, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0xc9, 0x74,
+		0x38, 0x5f, 0xc5, 0xa3, 0xd4, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x3f,
+};
+
 static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
 {
 	size_t i;
@@ -2000,6 +2024,9 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	else
 		hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_FIPS;
 
+	if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
 	/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
 	 * send the confirm value.
 	 */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6c0dcc5014caeb9c39db816a7e0169255923ccba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 15:33:30 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add check for accidentally generating a debug key

It is very unlikely, but to have a 100% guarantee of the generated key
type we need to reject any keys which happen to match the debug key.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index ddc76cf45cfb..63d5ba7774e0 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1399,9 +1399,17 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
 	BT_DBG("");
 
-	/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
-	if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+	while (true) {
+		/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
+		if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that we didn't
+		 * accidentially generate a debug key.
+		 */
+		if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+			break;
+	}
 
 	BT_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
 	BT_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d378a2d77618464f511d35687bbbc6614b1bacda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sat, 31 May 2014 18:53:36 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Set correct LTK type and authentication for SC

After generating the LTK we should set the correct type (normal SC or
debug) and authentication information for it.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 63d5ba7774e0..30439368a55a 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -2060,6 +2060,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
 	u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
+	u8 key_type, auth;
 	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -2092,8 +2093,18 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
 		return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
+	else
+		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
+
+	if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+		auth = 1;
+	else
+		auth = 0;
+
 	smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-			       SMP_LTK_P256, 0, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+			       key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
 			       0, 0);
 
 	if (hcon->out) {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From dddd3059e3bdd02c4850b14b925b3bb37c23f248 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2014 15:38:09 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add support for SC just-works pairing

If the just-works method was chosen we shouldn't send anything to user
space but simply proceed with sending the DHKey Check PDU. This patch
adds the necessary code for it.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 30439368a55a..b6cdb553ccd3 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1198,22 +1198,13 @@ static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
 	return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
 }
 
-static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp, __le32 passkey)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
 	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
 	u8 io_cap[3], r[16];
 
-	switch (mgmt_op) {
-	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
-		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
-		return 0;
-	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
-		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	memcpy(a, &hcon->init_addr, 6);
 	memcpy(b, &hcon->resp_addr, 6);
 	a[6] = hcon->init_addr_type;
@@ -1229,13 +1220,29 @@ static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 		memcpy(io_cap, &smp->prsp[1], 3);
 	}
 
-	memcpy(r, &passkey, sizeof(passkey));
-	memset(r + sizeof(passkey), 0, sizeof(r) - sizeof(passkey));
+	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		memcpy(r, &passkey, sizeof(passkey));
 
 	smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
 	       local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
 
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
+}
+
+static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+	switch (mgmt_op) {
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	sc_dhkey_check(smp, passkey);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1599,6 +1606,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (err)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
+		if (hcon->out) {
+			sc_dhkey_check(smp, passkey);
+			SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
 					hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
 					passkey, 0);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e3befab970a0230a80f7732fd59bc19df26f805f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Jun 2014 16:33:39 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Fix BR/EDR Link Key type when derived through LE SC

We need to set the correct Link Key type based on the properties of the
LE SC pairing that it was derived from. If debug keys were used the type
should be a debug key, and the authenticated vs unauthenticated
information should be set on what kind of security level was reached.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c |  4 ++++
 net/bluetooth/smp.c      | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index 6c3220e9484f..2fa9f2b2bee3 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -3160,6 +3160,10 @@ static bool hci_persistent_key(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn,
 	if (!conn)
 		return true;
 
+	/* BR/EDR key derived using SC from an LE link */
+	if (conn->type == LE_LINK)
+		return true;
+
 	/* Neither local nor remote side had no-bonding as requirement */
 	if (conn->auth_type > 0x01 && conn->remote_auth > 0x01)
 		return true;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index b6cdb553ccd3..a322019610eb 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -965,9 +965,30 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	}
 
 	if (smp->link_key) {
-		hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
-				 smp->link_key, HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256,
-				 0, NULL);
+		struct link_key *key;
+		u8 type;
+
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+			type = HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION;
+		else if (hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+			type = HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+		else
+			type = HCI_LK_UNAUTH_COMBINATION_P256;
+
+		key = hci_add_link_key(hdev, smp->conn->hcon, &hcon->dst,
+				       smp->link_key, type, 0, &persistent);
+		if (key) {
+			mgmt_new_link_key(hdev, key, persistent);
+
+			/* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
+			 * flag is not set.
+			 */
+			if (!test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+			    key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
+				list_del_rcu(&key->list);
+				kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+			}
+		}
 	}
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 38606f1418cc9c0ac4230f4d9133a2cae5e02416 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 11:10:28 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add passkey entry support for LE SC

The passkey entry mechanism involves either both sides requesting the
user for a passkey, or one side requesting the passkey while the other
one displays it. The behavior as far as SMP PDUs are concerned are
considerably different from numeric comparison and therefore requires
several new functions to handle it.

In essence passkey entry involves both sides gradually committing to
each bit of the passkey which involves 20 rounds of pairing confirm and
pairing random PDUS being sent in both directions.

This patch adds a new smp->passkey_round variable to track the current
round of the passkey commitment and reuses the variables already present
in struct hci_conn for the passkey and entered key count.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 180 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index a322019610eb..8cfa1c1b205c 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_SC,
 	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
 	SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
+	SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
@@ -81,6 +82,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	u8		*link_key;
 	unsigned long	flags;
 	u8		method;
+	u8		passkey_round;
 
 	/* Secure Connections variables */
 	u8			local_pk[64];
@@ -1219,7 +1221,7 @@ static int sc_mackey_and_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 mackey[16], u8 ltk[16])
 	return smp_f5(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, mackey, ltk);
 }
 
-static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp, __le32 passkey)
+static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_cmd_dhkey_check check;
@@ -1244,7 +1246,7 @@ static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp, __le32 passkey)
 	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
 
 	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
-		memcpy(r, &passkey, sizeof(passkey));
+		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
 
 	smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
 	       local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
@@ -1252,8 +1254,124 @@ static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp, __le32 passkey)
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK, sizeof(check), &check);
 }
 
+static u8 sc_passkey_send_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cfm;
+	u8 r;
+
+	r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+	r |= 0x80;
+
+	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
+
+	if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->remote_pk, smp->prnd, r,
+		   cfm.confirm_val))
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cfm), &cfm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	u8 cfm[16], r;
+
+	/* Ignore the PDU if we've already done 20 rounds (0 - 19) */
+	if (smp->passkey_round >= 20)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (smp_op) {
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+		r = ((hcon->passkey_notify >> smp->passkey_round) & 0x01);
+		r |= 0x80;
+
+		if (smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->local_pk,
+			   smp->rrnd, r, cfm))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+		smp->passkey_round++;
+
+		if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
+			/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
+			if (sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk))
+				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		}
+
+		/* The round is only complete when the initiator
+		 * receives pairing random.
+		 */
+		if (!hcon->out) {
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+			if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
+				sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+			} else {
+				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+			}
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Start the next round */
+		if (smp->passkey_round != 20)
+			return sc_passkey_round(smp, 0);
+
+		/* Passkey rounds are complete - start DHKey Check */
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+		break;
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+		if (hcon->out) {
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+
+	case SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	default:
+		/* Initiating device starts the round */
+		if (!hcon->out)
+			return 0;
+
+		BT_DBG("%s Starting passkey round %u", hdev->name,
+		       smp->passkey_round + 1);
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+		return sc_passkey_send_confirm(smp);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 {
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	u8 smp_op;
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
 	switch (mgmt_op) {
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
 		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
@@ -1261,9 +1379,22 @@ static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
 		smp_failure(smp->conn, SMP_NUMERIC_COMP_FAILED);
 		return 0;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+		hcon->passkey_notify = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+		smp->passkey_round = 0;
+
+		if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags))
+			smp_op = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
+		else
+			smp_op = 0;
+
+		if (sc_passkey_round(smp, smp_op))
+			return -EIO;
+
+		return 0;
 	}
 
-	sc_dhkey_check(smp, passkey);
+	sc_dhkey_check(smp);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1532,6 +1663,9 @@ static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
 	if (conn->hcon->out) {
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
@@ -1592,6 +1726,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
 		return smp_random(smp);
 
+	/* Passkey entry has special treatment */
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
 	if (hcon->out) {
 		u8 cfm[16];
 
@@ -1623,24 +1761,25 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (err)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
-	if (err)
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-
 	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
 		if (hcon->out) {
-			sc_dhkey_check(smp, passkey);
+			sc_dhkey_check(smp);
 			SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
 		}
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
-					hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
-					passkey, 0);
+	err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
+	if (err)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
 	if (err)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2071,6 +2210,33 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!memcmp(debug_pk, smp->remote_pk, 64))
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
 
+	if (smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY) {
+		get_random_bytes(&hcon->passkey_notify,
+				 sizeof(hcon->passkey_notify));
+		hcon->passkey_notify %= 1000000;
+		hcon->passkey_entered = 0;
+		smp->passkey_round = 0;
+		if (mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					     hcon->dst_type,
+					     hcon->passkey_notify,
+					     hcon->passkey_entered))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+	}
+
+	if (hcon->out)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY) {
+		if (mgmt_user_passkey_request(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
+					      hcon->dst_type))
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* The Initiating device waits for the non-initiating device to
 	 * send the confirm value.
 	 */
@@ -2121,6 +2287,9 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
 
+	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
+		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+
 	err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
 		     io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
 	if (err)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d3e54a876e35120b3355e22d78861e73a6acab6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2014 11:07:40 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Fix DHKey Check sending order for slave role

According to the LE SC specification the initiating device sends its
DHKey check first and the non-initiating devices sends its DHKey check
as a response to this. It's also important that the non-initiating
device doesn't send the response if it's still waiting for user input.
In order to synchronize all this a new flag is added.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 8cfa1c1b205c..9a4ce4581475 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK,
 	SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
 	SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
+	SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
@@ -994,6 +995,29 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	}
 }
 
+static void sc_add_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	u8 key_type, auth;
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
+		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
+	else
+		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
+
+	if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
+		auth = 1;
+	else
+		auth = 0;
+
+	memset(smp->tk + smp->enc_key_size, 0,
+	       SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size);
+
+	smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+			       key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
+			       0, 0);
+}
+
 static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
 	/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
@@ -1312,12 +1336,10 @@ static u8 sc_passkey_round(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 smp_op)
 		if (!hcon->out) {
 			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
 				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
-			if (smp->passkey_round == 20) {
-				sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+			if (smp->passkey_round == 20)
 				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
-			} else {
+			else
 				SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
-			}
 			return 0;
 		}
 
@@ -1394,7 +1416,14 @@ static int sc_user_reply(struct smp_chan *smp, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+	/* Initiator sends DHKey check first */
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+	} else if (test_and_clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+		sc_add_ltk(smp);
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2262,7 +2291,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	u8 a[7], b[7], *local_addr, *remote_addr;
 	u8 io_cap[3], r[16], e[16];
-	u8 key_type, auth;
 	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -2298,19 +2326,17 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (memcmp(check->e, e, 16))
 		return SMP_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED;
 
-	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags))
-		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG;
-	else
-		key_type = SMP_LTK_P256;
+	if (!hcon->out) {
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags)) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+			return 0;
+		}
 
-	if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS)
-		auth = 1;
-	else
-		auth = 0;
+		/* Slave sends DHKey check as response to master */
+		sc_dhkey_check(smp);
+	}
 
-	smp->ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-			       key_type, auth, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
-			       0, 0);
+	sc_add_ltk(smp);
 
 	if (hcon->out) {
 		hci_le_start_enc(hcon, 0, 0, smp->tk);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1408bb6efb04da3efdc998df1bc032c1d86d1842 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2014 22:45:57 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add dummy handler for LE SC keypress notification

Since we don not actively try to clear the keypress notification bit we
might get these PDUs. To avoid failing the pairing process add a simple
dummy handler for these for now.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 9a4ce4581475..918ce036cb91 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -2346,6 +2346,16 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int smp_cmd_keypress_notify(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+				   struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_keypress_notify *kp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+	BT_DBG("value 0x%02x", kp->value);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
@@ -2438,6 +2448,10 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		reason = smp_cmd_dhkey_check(conn, skb);
 		break;
 
+	case SMP_CMD_KEYPRESS_NOTIFY:
+		reason = smp_cmd_keypress_notify(conn, skb);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
 		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 70157ef5391819a55bb4186c901ac873231fb6ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 15:22:59 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Use debug keys for SMP when HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS is set

The HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS flag is intended to force our side to always use
debug keys for pairing. This means both BR/EDR SSP as well as SMP with
LE Secure Connections. This patch updates the SMP code to use the debug
keys instead of generating a random local key pair when the flag is set.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 918ce036cb91..779160485a50 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1585,18 +1585,27 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
+
 	BT_DBG("");
 
-	while (true) {
-		/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
-		if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
-			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+	if (test_bit(HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+		memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+		memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+	} else {
+		while (true) {
+			/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
+			if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+				return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-		/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that we didn't
-		 * accidentially generate a debug key.
-		 */
-		if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
-			break;
+			/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+			 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+			 */
+			if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+				break;
+		}
 	}
 
 	BT_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ef8efe4bf8b5fe1a9342ae964c428aed1be7863b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 15:12:32 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add skeleton for BR/EDR SMP channel

This patch adds the very basic code for creating and destroying SMP
L2CAP channels for BR/EDR connections.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |  1 +
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h    |  2 +
 net/bluetooth/smp.c              | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index 42f9362a83c1..f39e65096b1f 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ struct hci_dev {
 	__u32			req_result;
 
 	void			*smp_data;
+	void			*smp_bredr_data;
 
 	struct discovery_state	discovery;
 	struct hci_conn_hash	conn_hash;
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index d71dc3579354..eee3ef530e79 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ struct l2cap_conninfo {
 #define L2CAP_FC_ATT		0x10
 #define L2CAP_FC_SIG_LE		0x20
 #define L2CAP_FC_SMP_LE		0x40
+#define L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR	0x80
 
 /* L2CAP Control Field bit masks */
 #define L2CAP_CTRL_SAR			0xC000
@@ -255,6 +256,7 @@ struct l2cap_conn_rsp {
 #define L2CAP_CID_ATT		0x0004
 #define L2CAP_CID_LE_SIGNALING	0x0005
 #define L2CAP_CID_SMP		0x0006
+#define L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR	0x0007
 #define L2CAP_CID_DYN_START	0x0040
 #define L2CAP_CID_DYN_END	0xffff
 #define L2CAP_CID_LE_DYN_END	0x007f
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 779160485a50..135e725119c5 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -2504,6 +2504,9 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 
 	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK)
+		return;
+
 	if (!smp)
 		return;
 
@@ -2527,10 +2530,14 @@ static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 
 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = chan->conn->hcon;
 	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
 	if (err) {
 		struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
@@ -2627,34 +2634,40 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
 	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
 };
 
-int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 
-	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
+		tfm_aes = NULL;
+		goto create_chan;
+	}
 
 	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
-		int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
 		BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
-		return err;
+		return ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(tfm_aes));
 	}
 
+create_chan:
 	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
 	if (!chan) {
 		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
 	chan->data = tfm_aes;
 
-	l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+	l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
 
 	l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
 
 	bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
-	chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP)
+		chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+	else
+		chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
 	chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
 	chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
 	chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
@@ -2663,20 +2676,14 @@ int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 	/* Set correct nesting level for a parent/listening channel */
 	atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_PARENT);
 
-	hdev->smp_data = chan;
-
-	return 0;
+	return chan;
 }
 
-void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
-	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
-
-	if (!chan)
-		return;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 
-	BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan);
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
 	tfm_aes = chan->data;
 	if (tfm_aes) {
@@ -2684,6 +2691,52 @@ void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
 	}
 
-	hdev->smp_data = NULL;
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 }
+
+int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
+
+	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+	if (IS_ERR(chan))
+		return PTR_ERR(chan);
+
+	hdev->smp_data = chan;
+
+	if (!lmp_sc_capable(hdev) &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	chan = smp_add_cid(hdev, L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR);
+	if (IS_ERR(chan)) {
+		int err = PTR_ERR(chan);
+		chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	hdev->smp_bredr_data = chan;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+
+	if (hdev->smp_bredr_data) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_bredr_data;
+		hdev->smp_bredr_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+
+	if (hdev->smp_data) {
+		chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+		smp_del_chan(chan);
+	}
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b5ae344d4c0f69ae6526565b55d52b64bc127087 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2014 12:34:26 +0300
Subject: Bluetooth: Add full SMP BR/EDR support

When doing SMP over BR/EDR some of the routines can be shared with the
LE functionality whereas others needs to be split into their own BR/EDR
specific branches. This patch implements the split of BR/EDR specific
SMP code from the LE-only code, making sure SMP over BR/EDR works as
specified.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |   4 +
 net/bluetooth/smp.c        | 230 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 43349ed4c249..a8da7ea9c2c0 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -6967,6 +6967,10 @@ static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon)
 	    test_bit(HCI_HS_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
 		conn->local_fixed_chan |= L2CAP_FC_A2MP;
 
+	if (bredr_sc_enabled(hcon->hdev) &&
+	    test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+		conn->local_fixed_chan |= L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR;
+
 	mutex_init(&conn->ident_lock);
 	mutex_init(&conn->chan_lock);
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 135e725119c5..2c6edf1b6669 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -915,11 +915,13 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
 		/* Now that user space can be considered to know the
 		 * identity address track the connection based on it
-		 * from now on.
+		 * from now on (assuming this is an LE link).
 		 */
-		bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
-		hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
-		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK) {
+			bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
+			hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
+			queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+		}
 
 		/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
 		 * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
@@ -938,10 +940,20 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
-	 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
-	 */
-	persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		if (hcon->key_type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+			persistent = false;
+		else
+			persistent = !test_bit(HCI_CONN_FLUSH_KEY,
+					       &hcon->flags);
+	} else {
+		/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
+		 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
+		 */
+		persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) &
+				SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+	}
+
 
 	if (smp->csrk) {
 		smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
@@ -1057,6 +1069,35 @@ static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
 }
 
+static void sc_generate_ltk(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	/* These constants are as specified in the core specification.
+	 * In ASCII they spell out to 'tmp2' and 'brle'.
+	 */
+	const u8 tmp2[4] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
+	const u8 brle[4] = { 0x65, 0x6c, 0x72, 0x62 };
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = smp->conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct link_key *key;
+
+	key = hci_find_link_key(hdev, &hcon->dst);
+	if (!key) {
+		BT_ERR("%s No Link Key found to generate LTK", hdev->name);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, tmp2, smp->tk))
+		return;
+
+	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, brle, smp->tk))
+		return;
+
+	sc_add_ltk(smp);
+}
+
 static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
@@ -1086,8 +1127,10 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	}
 
 	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
-		if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY)
+		if (hcon->type == LE_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY))
 			sc_generate_link_key(smp);
+		if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
+			sc_generate_ltk(smp);
 
 		/* Clear the keys which are generated but not distributed */
 		*keydist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
@@ -1493,6 +1536,46 @@ unlock:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
+				    struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+				    struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
+	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+	}
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
+		remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
+		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+
+	if (!rsp) {
+		memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
+
+		req->init_key_dist   = local_dist;
+		req->resp_key_dist   = remote_dist;
+		req->max_key_size    = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+		smp->remote_key_dist = remote_dist;
+
+		return;
+	}
+
+	memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	rsp->max_key_size    = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+	rsp->init_key_dist   = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
+	rsp->resp_key_dist   = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
+
+	smp->remote_key_dist = rsp->init_key_dist;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
@@ -1529,6 +1612,31 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
+	/* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
+	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
+		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags))
+			return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
+
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+		build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, req, &rsp);
+
+		key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+		if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+			return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+
+		smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+		memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
 
 	if (rsp.auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC)
@@ -1644,6 +1752,22 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
+	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+	/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
+	 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
+	 */
+	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
+
+	/* For BR/EDR this means we're done and can start phase 3 */
+	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
+		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_SC) && (auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
 	else if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
@@ -1661,9 +1785,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
 
-	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
-	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
-
 	/* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared
 	 * some bits that we had enabled in our request.
 	 */
@@ -2373,11 +2494,6 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	__u8 code, reason;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) {
-		kfree_skb(skb);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	if (skb->len < 1)
 		return -EILSEQ;
 
@@ -2496,6 +2612,74 @@ static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
 }
 
+static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing req;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
+
+	/* Only new pairings are interesting */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_NEW_LINK_KEY, &hcon->flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if we're not encrypted */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
+	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
+		return;
+
+	/* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_LESC, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
+	if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon))
+		return;
+
+	/* Remote must support SMP fixed chan for BR/EDR */
+	if (!(conn->remote_fixed_chan & L2CAP_FC_SMP_BREDR))
+		return;
+
+	/* Don't bother if SMP is already ongoing */
+	if (chan->data)
+		return;
+
+	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp) {
+		BT_ERR("%s unable to create SMP context for BR/EDR",
+		       hdev->name);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+	BT_DBG("%s starting SMP over BR/EDR", hdev->name);
+
+	/* Prepare and send the BR/EDR SMP Pairing Request */
+	build_bredr_pairing_cmd(smp, &req, NULL);
+
+	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &req, sizeof(req));
+
+	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(req), &req);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+}
+
 static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
@@ -2504,8 +2688,10 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 
 	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
-	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK)
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
+		bredr_pairing(chan);
 		return;
+	}
 
 	if (!smp)
 		return;
@@ -2521,23 +2707,23 @@ static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
 	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
 	conn->smp = chan;
 	l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
+
+	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK && test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+		bredr_pairing(chan);
 }
 
 static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct hci_conn *hcon = chan->conn->hcon;
 	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
-	if (hcon->type == ACL_LINK)
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
 	err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
 	if (err) {
 		struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 903b71c78d56af56a5f4d53a8dbef8032d1949bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 16:59:18 -0700
Subject: Bluetooth: Add SC-only mode support for SMP

When Secure Connections-only mode is enabled we should reject any
pairing command that does not have Secure Connections set in the
authentication requirements. This patch adds the appropriate logic for
this to the command handlers of Pairing Request/Response and Security
Request.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 2c6edf1b6669..589e015c5125 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1608,6 +1608,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
 		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
 	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
@@ -1752,6 +1755,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
 	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
 	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
 
@@ -2008,6 +2014,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
 	if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
 		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
 	else
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 02b05bd8b0a632e9a26795bced8f19ca6a5f7079 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Oct 2014 21:19:10 +0100
Subject: Bluetooth: Set SMP OOB flag if OOB data is available

If we have OOB data available for the remote device in question we
should set the OOB flag appropriately in the SMP pairing request or
response.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 589e015c5125..0c2214a41816 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
 	SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
 	SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
+	SMP_FLAG_OOB,
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
@@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
-	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
+	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
 
 	if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
 		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
@@ -578,19 +579,37 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
 		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
-		if ((authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC) &&
-		    test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+	    (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
+		struct oob_data *oob_data;
+		u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+		if (test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
 			local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
 			remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
 		}
+
+		if (hcon->dst_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
+			bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+		else
+			bdaddr_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
+
+		oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
+						    bdaddr_type);
+		if (oob_data) {
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags);
+			oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
+			memcpy(smp->rrnd, oob_data->rand256, 16);
+			memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
+		}
+
 	} else {
 		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_SC;
 	}
 
 	if (rsp == NULL) {
 		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
-		req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+		req->oob_flag = oob_flag;
 		req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 		req->init_key_dist = local_dist;
 		req->resp_key_dist = remote_dist;
@@ -601,7 +620,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	}
 
 	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
-	rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+	rsp->oob_flag = oob_flag;
 	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & remote_dist;
 	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & local_dist;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a29b073351ffdda0ce9745f3bd98f5a513c523d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 15:17:05 +0100
Subject: Bluetooth: Add basic LE SC OOB support for remote OOB data

This patch adds basic OOB pairing support when we've received the remote
OOB data. This includes tracking the remote r value (in smp->rr) as well
as doing the appropriate f4() call when needed. Previously the OOB rand
would have been stored in smp->rrnd however these are actually two
independent values so we need separate variables for them. Na/Nb in the
spec maps to smp->prnd/rrnd and ra/rb maps to smp->rr with smp->pr to
come once local OOB data is supported.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 0c2214a41816..059a3da08ad7 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	u8		rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
 	u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
 	u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
+	u8		rr[16];
 	u8		enc_key_size;
 	u8		remote_key_dist;
 	bdaddr_t	id_addr;
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 		if (oob_data) {
 			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags);
 			oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
-			memcpy(smp->rrnd, oob_data->rand256, 16);
+			memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
 			memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
 		}
 
@@ -1334,6 +1335,9 @@ static void sc_dhkey_check(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
 		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
 
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+		memcpy(r, smp->rr, 16);
+
 	smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, r, io_cap,
 	       local_addr, remote_addr, check.e);
 
@@ -1910,6 +1914,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
 		return smp_random(smp);
 
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+		if (!hcon->out)
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+		goto mackey_and_ltk;
+	}
+
 	/* Passkey entry has special treatment */
 	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
 		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
@@ -1940,12 +1952,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		nb   = smp->prnd;
 	}
 
+mackey_and_ltk:
 	/* Generate MacKey and LTK */
 	err = sc_mackey_and_ltk(smp, smp->mackey, smp->tk);
 	if (err)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
+	if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
 		if (hcon->out) {
 			sc_dhkey_check(smp);
 			SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
@@ -2314,6 +2327,9 @@ static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
 	u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags))
+		return REQ_OOB;
+
 	/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
 	 * which are needed as inputs to some crypto functions. To get
 	 * the "struct smp_cmd_pairing" from them we need to skip the
@@ -2412,6 +2428,24 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
 	}
 
+	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
+			     smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+		if (err)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+		if (hcon->out)
+			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
+				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
+
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (hcon->out)
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c7a3d57db67ce7524c72ecb33f82c099f270a109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 22:03:16 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Introduce SMP_DBG macro for low-level debuging

The various inputs & outputs of the crypto functions as well as the
values of the ECDH keys can be considered security sensitive. They
should therefore not end up in dmesg by mistake. This patch introduces a
new SMP_DBG macro which requires explicit compilation with -DDEBUG to be
enabled. All crypto related data logs now use this macro instead of
BT_DBG.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 059a3da08ad7..13b40e8af95e 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -32,6 +32,18 @@
 #include "ecc.h"
 #include "smp.h"
 
+/* Low-level debug macros to be used for stuff that we don't want
+ * accidentially in dmesg, i.e. the values of the various crypto keys
+ * and the inputs & outputs of crypto functions.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+				 ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+#define SMP_DBG(fmt, ...) no_printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: " fmt, __func__, \
+				    ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
 #define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code)	set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
 
 /* Keys which are not distributed with Secure Connections */
@@ -154,8 +166,8 @@ static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
 	swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
 	swap_buf(m, msg_msb, len);
 
-	BT_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
-	BT_DBG("key %16phN", k);
+	SMP_DBG("msg (len %zu) %*phN", len, (int) len, m);
+	SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
 
 	err = crypto_hash_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
 	if (err) {
@@ -179,7 +191,7 @@ static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
 
 	swap_buf(mac_msb, mac, 16);
 
-	BT_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
+	SMP_DBG("mac %16phN", mac);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -190,9 +202,9 @@ static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 	u8 m[65];
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("u %32phN", u);
-	BT_DBG("v %32phN", v);
-	BT_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
+	SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+	SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+	SMP_DBG("x %16phN z %02x", x, z);
 
 	m[0] = z;
 	memcpy(m + 1, v, 32);
@@ -202,7 +214,7 @@ static int smp_f4(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	BT_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -223,15 +235,15 @@ static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16],
 	u8 m[53], t[16];
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("w %32phN", w);
-	BT_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
-	BT_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
+	SMP_DBG("w %32phN", w);
+	SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+	SMP_DBG("a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", a1, a2);
 
 	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, salt, w, 32, t);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	BT_DBG("t %16phN", t);
+	SMP_DBG("t %16phN", t);
 
 	memcpy(m, length, 2);
 	memcpy(m + 2, a2, 7);
@@ -246,7 +258,7 @@ static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16],
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	BT_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
+	SMP_DBG("mackey %16phN", mackey);
 
 	m[52] = 1; /* Counter */
 
@@ -254,7 +266,7 @@ static int smp_f5(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, u8 w[32], u8 n1[16], u8 n2[16],
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	BT_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
+	SMP_DBG("ltk %16phN", ltk);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -267,9 +279,9 @@ static int smp_f6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
 	u8 m[65];
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("w %16phN", w);
-	BT_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
-	BT_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
+	SMP_DBG("w %16phN", w);
+	SMP_DBG("n1 %16phN n2 %16phN", n1, n2);
+	SMP_DBG("r %16phN io_cap %3phN a1 %7phN a2 %7phN", r, io_cap, a1, a2);
 
 	memcpy(m, a2, 7);
 	memcpy(m + 7, a1, 7);
@@ -293,9 +305,9 @@ static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 	u8 m[80], tmp[16];
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("u %32phN", u);
-	BT_DBG("v %32phN", v);
-	BT_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
+	SMP_DBG("u %32phN", u);
+	SMP_DBG("v %32phN", v);
+	SMP_DBG("x %16phN y %16phN", x, y);
 
 	memcpy(m, y, 16);
 	memcpy(m + 16, v, 32);
@@ -308,7 +320,7 @@ static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 	*val = get_unaligned_le32(tmp);
 	*val %= 1000000;
 
-	BT_DBG("val %06u", *val);
+	SMP_DBG("val %06u", *val);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -357,13 +369,13 @@ static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
 {
 	int err;
 
-	BT_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
+	SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
 
 	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	BT_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -1742,9 +1754,9 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		}
 	}
 
-	BT_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
-	BT_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]);
-	BT_DBG("Local Private Key:  %32phN", smp->local_sk);
+	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]);
+	SMP_DBG("Local Private Key:  %32phN", smp->local_sk);
 
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
 
@@ -2390,13 +2402,13 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			return err;
 	}
 
-	BT_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
-	BT_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]);
+	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
+	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]);
 
 	if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	BT_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
+	SMP_DBG("DHKey %32phN", smp->dhkey);
 
 	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cd0827976205f842cc722f48a1427c9b77c3ca28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 13:37:41 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Fix missing const declarations in SMP functions

Several SMP functions take read-only data. This patch fixes the
declaration of these parameters to use the const specifier as
appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
 net/bluetooth/smp.h |  5 +++--
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 13b40e8af95e..f845dbf2e677 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -380,7 +380,8 @@ static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
+static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
+		  const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
 {
 	u8 _res[16];
 	int err;
@@ -406,7 +407,8 @@ static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
 	return 0;
 }
 
-bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
+		     const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
@@ -427,7 +429,7 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
 	return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
 }
 
-int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
 	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
@@ -452,9 +454,9 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
-		  u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat,
-		  bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+		  const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
+		  const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
 {
 	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
 	int err;
@@ -493,8 +495,8 @@ static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16],
-		  u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+		  const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
 {
 	int err;
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index f955d6b7ceb2..3296bf42ae80 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -185,8 +185,9 @@ bool smp_sufficient_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 sec_level,
 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level);
 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey);
 
-bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
-int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa);
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
+		     const bdaddr_t *bdaddr);
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa);
 
 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev);
 void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 06edf8deb55dbdcda2177da31d75ac79ccdc5841 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 13:39:23 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Organize SMP crypto functions to logical sections

This patch organizes the various SMP crypto functions so that the LE SC
functions appear in one section and the legacy SMP functions in a
separate one.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index f845dbf2e677..1d1c33d5d1dc 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -141,6 +141,10 @@ static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
 		dst[len - 1 - i] = src[i];
 }
 
+/* The following functions map to the LE SC SMP crypto functions
+ * AES-CMAC, f4, f5, f6, g2 and h6.
+ */
+
 static int aes_cmac(struct crypto_hash *tfm, const u8 k[16], const u8 *m,
 		    size_t len, u8 mac[16])
 {
@@ -325,6 +329,26 @@ static int smp_g2(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 u[32], const u8 v[32],
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
+		  const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
+{
+	int err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
+
+	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* The following functions map to the legacy SMP crypto functions e, c1,
+ * s1 and ah.
+ */
+
 static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 {
 	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
@@ -364,18 +388,59 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int smp_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac, const u8 w[16],
-		  const u8 key_id[4], u8 res[16])
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+		  const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
+		  const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
 {
+	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
 	int err;
 
-	SMP_DBG("w %16phN key_id %4phN", w, key_id);
+	memset(p1, 0, 16);
 
-	err = aes_cmac(tfm_cmac, w, key_id, 4, res);
-	if (err)
+	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
+	p1[0] = _iat;
+	p1[1] = _rat;
+	memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
+	memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
+
+	/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
+	memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
+	memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
+	memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
+
+	/* res = r XOR p1 */
+	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
+
+	/* res = e(k, res) */
+	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
+	if (err) {
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 		return err;
+	}
 
-	SMP_DBG("res %16phN", res);
+	/* res = res XOR p2 */
+	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
+
+	/* res = e(k, res) */
+	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+		  const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
+	memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
+	memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
+
+	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
+	if (err)
+		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -454,63 +519,6 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
-		  const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
-		  const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
-{
-	u8 p1[16], p2[16];
-	int err;
-
-	memset(p1, 0, 16);
-
-	/* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
-	p1[0] = _iat;
-	p1[1] = _rat;
-	memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7);
-	memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7);
-
-	/* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
-	memcpy(p2, ra, 6);
-	memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6);
-	memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4);
-
-	/* res = r XOR p1 */
-	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
-
-	/* res = e(k, res) */
-	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
-	if (err) {
-		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
-		return err;
-	}
-
-	/* res = res XOR p2 */
-	u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
-
-	/* res = e(k, res) */
-	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
-	if (err)
-		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
-
-	return err;
-}
-
-static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
-		  const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
-{
-	int err;
-
-	/* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
-	memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
-	memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
-
-	err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
-	if (err)
-		BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
-
-	return err;
-}
-
 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 923e24143efe654553cabdb08f369d3789413147 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 12:43:39 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Fix SMP debug key handling

We need to keep debug keys around at least until the point that they are
used - otherwise e.g. slave role behavior wouldn't work as there'd be no
key to be looked up. The correct behavior should therefore be to return
any stored keys but when we clean up the SMP context to remove the key
from the hdev list if keeping debug keys around hasn't been requestsed.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 10 +---------
 net/bluetooth/smp.c      | 15 +++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
index c8123f04a33c..f0018562b028 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c
@@ -3246,15 +3246,7 @@ struct smp_ltk *hci_find_ltk(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr,
 		if (addr_type != k->bdaddr_type || bacmp(bdaddr, &k->bdaddr))
 			continue;
 
-		if (smp_ltk_is_sc(k)) {
-			if (k->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
-			    !test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags))
-				continue;
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-			return k;
-		}
-
-		if (ltk_role(k->type) == role) {
+		if (smp_ltk_is_sc(k) || ltk_role(k->type) == role) {
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			return k;
 		}
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 1d1c33d5d1dc..a7b973b867c8 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -670,6 +670,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	bool complete;
 
 	BUG_ON(!smp);
@@ -677,7 +678,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
 
 	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
-	mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
+	mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
 
 	kfree(smp->csrk);
 	kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
@@ -686,6 +687,16 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
 	crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
 
+	/* Ensure that we don't leave any debug key around if debug key
+	 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
+	 */
+	if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
+		kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
+		smp->ltk = NULL;
+	}
+
 	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
 	if (!complete) {
 		if (smp->ltk) {
@@ -706,7 +717,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	chan->data = NULL;
 	kfree(smp);
-	hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
+	hci_conn_drop(hcon);
 }
 
 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7f376cd6dc1c9bfd14514c70765e6900a961c4b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 16:07:13 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Fix minor coding style issue in smp.c

The convention for checking for NULL pointers is !ptr and not
ptr == NULL. This patch fixes such an occurrence in smp.c.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index a7b973b867c8..7435940456ee 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
 	uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
 	int err;
 
-	if (tfm == NULL) {
+	if (!tfm) {
 		BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 580039e838a7efaee0048b0857d1bb5582327aa5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 16:26:37 +0200
Subject: Bluetooth: Fix false-positive "uninitialized" compiler warning
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Some gcc versions don't seem to be able to properly track the flow of
the smp_cmd_pairing_random() function and end up causing the following
types of (false-positive) warnings:

 smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘nb’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
   err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
 smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘na’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
   err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
       ^
 smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘pkbx’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
   err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);
       ^
 smp.c:1995:6: warning: ‘pkax’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
   err = smp_g2(smp->tfm_cmac, pkax, pkbx, na, nb, &passkey);

This patch fixes the issue by moving the pkax/pkbx and na/nb
initialization earlier in the function.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 7435940456ee..96bf16dcd9e9 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -1947,6 +1947,18 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
 		return smp_random(smp);
 
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		pkax = smp->local_pk;
+		pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
+		na   = smp->prnd;
+		nb   = smp->rrnd;
+	} else {
+		pkax = smp->remote_pk;
+		pkbx = smp->local_pk;
+		na   = smp->rrnd;
+		nb   = smp->prnd;
+	}
+
 	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
 		if (!hcon->out)
 			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
@@ -1969,20 +1981,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 		if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, cfm, 16))
 			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
-
-		pkax = smp->local_pk;
-		pkbx = smp->remote_pk;
-		na   = smp->prnd;
-		nb   = smp->rrnd;
 	} else {
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
-
-		pkax = smp->remote_pk;
-		pkbx = smp->local_pk;
-		na   = smp->rrnd;
-		nb   = smp->prnd;
 	}
 
 mackey_and_ltk:
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c0371da6047abd261bc483c744dbc7d81a116172 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 10:42:55 -0500
Subject: put iov_iter into msghdr

Note that the code _using_ ->msg_iter at that point will be very
unhappy with anything other than unshifted iovec-backed iov_iter.
We still need to convert users to proper primitives.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 crypto/algif_hash.c            |  4 ++--
 crypto/algif_skcipher.c        |  4 ++--
 drivers/net/macvtap.c          |  8 ++------
 drivers/net/tun.c              |  8 ++------
 drivers/vhost/net.c            |  8 +++-----
 fs/afs/rxrpc.c                 | 14 ++++++--------
 include/linux/skbuff.h         | 16 ++++++++++------
 include/linux/socket.h         |  3 +--
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h  |  2 +-
 include/net/udplite.h          |  3 ++-
 net/atm/common.c               |  5 +----
 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c        |  6 +++---
 net/bluetooth/a2mp.c           |  3 +--
 net/bluetooth/smp.c            |  3 +--
 net/caif/caif_socket.c         |  2 +-
 net/compat.c                   | 10 ++++++----
 net/ipv4/ip_output.c           |  6 ++++--
 net/ipv4/ping.c                |  3 ++-
 net/ipv4/raw.c                 |  3 ++-
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                 |  6 +++---
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c          |  2 +-
 net/ipv6/ping.c                |  3 ++-
 net/ipv6/raw.c                 |  3 ++-
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c       |  2 +-
 net/packet/af_packet.c         |  7 ++-----
 net/rds/recv.c                 |  7 ++++---
 net/rds/send.c                 |  4 +---
 net/rxrpc/ar-output.c          |  8 +++-----
 net/sctp/socket.c              |  5 +----
 net/socket.c                   | 27 ++++++++++++---------------
 net/tipc/msg.c                 |  4 ++--
 net/unix/af_unix.c             | 10 ++--------
 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c |  3 ++-
 33 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c
index 35c93ff11f35..83cd2cc49c9f 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
 	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
 	struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
 	unsigned long iovlen;
-	struct iovec *iov;
+	const struct iovec *iov;
 	long copied = 0;
 	int err;
 
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int hash_sendmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
 
 	ctx->more = 0;
 
-	for (iov = msg->msg_iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iovlen; iovlen > 0;
+	for (iov = msg->msg_iter.iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iter.nr_segs; iovlen > 0;
 	     iovlen--, iov++) {
 		unsigned long seglen = iov->iov_len;
 		char __user *from = iov->iov_base;
diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
index c3b482bee208..4f45dab24648 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c
@@ -429,13 +429,13 @@ static int skcipher_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
 	struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
 	unsigned long iovlen;
-	struct iovec *iov;
+	const struct iovec *iov;
 	int err = -EAGAIN;
 	int used;
 	long copied = 0;
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
-	for (iov = msg->msg_iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iovlen; iovlen > 0;
+	for (iov = msg->msg_iter.iov, iovlen = msg->msg_iter.nr_segs; iovlen > 0;
 	     iovlen--, iov++) {
 		unsigned long seglen = iov->iov_len;
 		char __user *from = iov->iov_base;
diff --git a/drivers/net/macvtap.c b/drivers/net/macvtap.c
index ba1e5db2152e..2c157cced81f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macvtap.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macvtap.c
@@ -1095,9 +1095,7 @@ static int macvtap_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 			   struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len)
 {
 	struct macvtap_queue *q = container_of(sock, struct macvtap_queue, sock);
-	struct iov_iter from;
-	iov_iter_init(&from, WRITE, m->msg_iov, m->msg_iovlen, total_len);
-	return macvtap_get_user(q, m, &from, m->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	return macvtap_get_user(q, m, &m->msg_iter, m->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 }
 
 static int macvtap_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
@@ -1105,12 +1103,10 @@ static int macvtap_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 			   int flags)
 {
 	struct macvtap_queue *q = container_of(sock, struct macvtap_queue, sock);
-	struct iov_iter to;
 	int ret;
 	if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	iov_iter_init(&to, READ, m->msg_iov, m->msg_iovlen, total_len);
-	ret = macvtap_do_read(q, &to, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	ret = macvtap_do_read(q, &m->msg_iter, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 	if (ret > total_len) {
 		m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
 		ret = flags & MSG_TRUNC ? ret : total_len;
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index 9c58286b8a42..f3e992ed87ac 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -1449,13 +1449,11 @@ static int tun_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 	int ret;
 	struct tun_file *tfile = container_of(sock, struct tun_file, socket);
 	struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
-	struct iov_iter from;
 
 	if (!tun)
 		return -EBADFD;
 
-	iov_iter_init(&from, WRITE, m->msg_iov, m->msg_iovlen, total_len);
-	ret = tun_get_user(tun, tfile, m->msg_control, &from,
+	ret = tun_get_user(tun, tfile, m->msg_control, &m->msg_iter,
 			   m->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 	tun_put(tun);
 	return ret;
@@ -1467,7 +1465,6 @@ static int tun_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 {
 	struct tun_file *tfile = container_of(sock, struct tun_file, socket);
 	struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
-	struct iov_iter to;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!tun)
@@ -1482,8 +1479,7 @@ static int tun_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 					 SOL_PACKET, TUN_TX_TIMESTAMP);
 		goto out;
 	}
-	iov_iter_init(&to, READ, m->msg_iov, m->msg_iovlen, total_len);
-	ret = tun_do_read(tun, tfile, &to, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	ret = tun_do_read(tun, tfile, &m->msg_iter, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 	if (ret > total_len) {
 		m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
 		ret = flags & MSG_TRUNC ? ret : total_len;
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c
index 8dae2f724a35..9f06e70a2631 100644
--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c
+++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
@@ -342,7 +342,6 @@ static void handle_tx(struct vhost_net *net)
 		.msg_namelen = 0,
 		.msg_control = NULL,
 		.msg_controllen = 0,
-		.msg_iov = vq->iov,
 		.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
 	};
 	size_t len, total_len = 0;
@@ -396,8 +395,8 @@ static void handle_tx(struct vhost_net *net)
 		}
 		/* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */
 		s = move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, hdr_size, out);
-		msg.msg_iovlen = out;
 		len = iov_length(vq->iov, out);
+		iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, vq->iov, out, len);
 		/* Sanity check */
 		if (!len) {
 			vq_err(vq, "Unexpected header len for TX: "
@@ -562,7 +561,6 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
 		.msg_namelen = 0,
 		.msg_control = NULL, /* FIXME: get and handle RX aux data. */
 		.msg_controllen = 0,
-		.msg_iov = vq->iov,
 		.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
 	};
 	struct virtio_net_hdr_mrg_rxbuf hdr = {
@@ -600,7 +598,7 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
 			break;
 		/* On overrun, truncate and discard */
 		if (unlikely(headcount > UIO_MAXIOV)) {
-			msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+			iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, vq->iov, 1, 1);
 			err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
 						 1, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
 			pr_debug("Discarded rx packet: len %zd\n", sock_len);
@@ -626,7 +624,7 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
 			/* Copy the header for use in VIRTIO_NET_F_MRG_RXBUF:
 			 * needed because recvmsg can modify msg_iov. */
 			copy_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, sock_hlen, in);
-		msg.msg_iovlen = in;
+		iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, vq->iov, in, sock_len);
 		err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
 					 sock_len, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
 		/* Userspace might have consumed the packet meanwhile:
diff --git a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
index 03a3beb17004..06e14bfb3496 100644
--- a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
+++ b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
@@ -306,8 +306,8 @@ static int afs_send_pages(struct afs_call *call, struct msghdr *msg,
 
 			_debug("- range %u-%u%s",
 			       offset, to, msg->msg_flags ? " [more]" : "");
-			msg->msg_iov = (struct iovec *) iov;
-			msg->msg_iovlen = 1;
+			iov_iter_init(&msg->msg_iter, WRITE,
+				      (struct iovec *) iov, 1, to - offset);
 
 			/* have to change the state *before* sending the last
 			 * packet as RxRPC might give us the reply before it
@@ -384,8 +384,8 @@ int afs_make_call(struct in_addr *addr, struct afs_call *call, gfp_t gfp,
 
 	msg.msg_name		= NULL;
 	msg.msg_namelen		= 0;
-	msg.msg_iov		= (struct iovec *) iov;
-	msg.msg_iovlen		= 1;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *)iov, 1,
+		      call->request_size);
 	msg.msg_control		= NULL;
 	msg.msg_controllen	= 0;
 	msg.msg_flags		= (call->send_pages ? MSG_MORE : 0);
@@ -778,8 +778,7 @@ void afs_send_empty_reply(struct afs_call *call)
 	iov[0].iov_len		= 0;
 	msg.msg_name		= NULL;
 	msg.msg_namelen		= 0;
-	msg.msg_iov		= iov;
-	msg.msg_iovlen		= 0;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iov, 0, 0);	/* WTF? */
 	msg.msg_control		= NULL;
 	msg.msg_controllen	= 0;
 	msg.msg_flags		= 0;
@@ -815,8 +814,7 @@ void afs_send_simple_reply(struct afs_call *call, const void *buf, size_t len)
 	iov[0].iov_len		= len;
 	msg.msg_name		= NULL;
 	msg.msg_namelen		= 0;
-	msg.msg_iov		= iov;
-	msg.msg_iovlen		= 1;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iov, 1, len);
 	msg.msg_control		= NULL;
 	msg.msg_controllen	= 0;
 	msg.msg_flags		= 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index ef64cec42804..52cf1bdac0d8 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -2646,22 +2646,24 @@ unsigned int datagram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
 			   struct poll_table_struct *wait);
 int skb_copy_datagram_iovec(const struct sk_buff *from, int offset,
 			    struct iovec *to, int size);
+int skb_copy_datagram_iter(const struct sk_buff *from, int offset,
+			   struct iov_iter *to, int size);
 static inline int skb_copy_datagram_msg(const struct sk_buff *from, int offset,
 					struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
-	return skb_copy_datagram_iovec(from, offset, msg->msg_iov, size);
+	/* XXX: stripping const */
+	return skb_copy_datagram_iovec(from, offset, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, size);
 }
 int skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(struct sk_buff *skb, int hlen,
 				     struct iovec *iov);
 static inline int skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, int hlen,
 			    struct msghdr *msg)
 {
-	return skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, hlen, msg->msg_iov);
+	/* XXX: stripping const */
+	return skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, hlen, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov);
 }
 int skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset,
 				 struct iov_iter *from, int len);
-int skb_copy_datagram_iter(const struct sk_buff *from, int offset,
-			   struct iov_iter *to, int size);
 int zerocopy_sg_from_iter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct iov_iter *frm);
 void skb_free_datagram(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 void skb_free_datagram_locked(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
@@ -2689,12 +2691,14 @@ int skb_vlan_push(struct sk_buff *skb, __be16 vlan_proto, u16 vlan_tci);
 
 static inline int memcpy_from_msg(void *data, struct msghdr *msg, int len)
 {
-	return memcpy_fromiovec(data, msg->msg_iov, len);
+	/* XXX: stripping const */
+	return memcpy_fromiovec(data, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, len);
 }
 
 static inline int memcpy_to_msg(struct msghdr *msg, void *data, int len)
 {
-	return memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, data, len);
+	/* XXX: stripping const */
+	return memcpy_toiovec((struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, data, len);
 }
 
 struct skb_checksum_ops {
diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h
index de5222832be4..048d6d6eed6d 100644
--- a/include/linux/socket.h
+++ b/include/linux/socket.h
@@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ struct linger {
 struct msghdr {
 	void		*msg_name;	/* ptr to socket address structure */
 	int		msg_namelen;	/* size of socket address structure */
-	struct iovec	*msg_iov;	/* scatter/gather array */
-	__kernel_size_t	msg_iovlen;	/* # elements in msg_iov */
+	struct iov_iter	msg_iter;	/* data */
 	void		*msg_control;	/* ancillary data */
 	__kernel_size_t	msg_controllen;	/* ancillary data buffer length */
 	unsigned int	msg_flags;	/* flags on received message */
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index 4e23674d3649..bca6fc0a3196 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
 	/* Following is safe since for compiler definitions of kvec and
 	 * iovec are identical, yielding the same in-core layout and alignment
 	 */
-	struct kvec *vec = (struct kvec *)msg->msg_iov;
+	struct kvec *vec = (struct kvec *)msg->msg_iter.iov;
 
 	while (len > 0) {
 		if (vec->iov_len) {
diff --git a/include/net/udplite.h b/include/net/udplite.h
index d5baaba65b46..ae7c8d1fbcad 100644
--- a/include/net/udplite.h
+++ b/include/net/udplite.h
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ static __inline__ int udplite_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int  offset,
 				      int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct msghdr *msg = from;
-	return memcpy_fromiovecend(to, msg->msg_iov, offset, len);
+	/* XXX: stripping const */
+	return memcpy_fromiovecend(to, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, offset, len);
 }
 
 /* Designate sk as UDP-Lite socket */
diff --git a/net/atm/common.c b/net/atm/common.c
index f59112944c91..b84057e41bd6 100644
--- a/net/atm/common.c
+++ b/net/atm/common.c
@@ -577,9 +577,6 @@ int vcc_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m,
 	struct atm_vcc *vcc;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	int eff, error;
-	struct iov_iter from;
-
-	iov_iter_init(&from, WRITE, m->msg_iov, m->msg_iovlen, size);
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 	if (sock->state != SS_CONNECTED) {
@@ -634,7 +631,7 @@ int vcc_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m,
 		goto out;
 	skb->dev = NULL; /* for paths shared with net_device interfaces */
 	ATM_SKB(skb)->atm_options = vcc->atm_options;
-	if (copy_from_iter(skb_put(skb, size), size, &from) != size) {
+	if (copy_from_iter(skb_put(skb, size), size, &m->msg_iter) != size) {
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		error = -EFAULT;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c b/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c
index bdcaefd2db12..d8c67a5e7a02 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c
@@ -537,12 +537,12 @@ static int send_pkt(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 */
 	chan->data = skb;
 
-	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
-	msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv;
-	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
 	iv.iov_base = skb->data;
 	iv.iov_len = skb->len;
 
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *) &iv, 1, skb->len);
+
 	err = l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, skb->len);
 	if (err > 0) {
 		netdev->stats.tx_bytes += err;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c b/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c
index 5dcade511fdb..716d2a388858 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c
@@ -60,8 +60,7 @@ void a2mp_send(struct amp_mgr *mgr, u8 code, u8 ident, u16 len, void *data)
 
 	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 
-	msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv;
-	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *)&iv, 1, total_len);
 
 	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, total_len);
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 069b76e03b57..21f555b4df17 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -268,8 +268,7 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 
 	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 
-	msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv;
-	msg.msg_iovlen = 2;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *)iv, 2, 1 + len);
 
 	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
 
diff --git a/net/caif/caif_socket.c b/net/caif/caif_socket.c
index ac618b0b8a4f..769b185fefbd 100644
--- a/net/caif/caif_socket.c
+++ b/net/caif/caif_socket.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static int caif_seqpkt_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
 		goto err;
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (unlikely(msg->msg_iov->iov_base == NULL))
+	if (unlikely(msg->msg_iter.iov->iov_base == NULL))
 		goto err;
 	noblock = msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
 
diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
index 062f157d2a6b..3236b4167a32 100644
--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -37,13 +37,14 @@ ssize_t get_compat_msghdr(struct msghdr *kmsg,
 			  struct iovec **iov)
 {
 	compat_uptr_t uaddr, uiov, tmp3;
+	compat_size_t nr_segs;
 	ssize_t err;
 
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, umsg, sizeof(*umsg)) ||
 	    __get_user(uaddr, &umsg->msg_name) ||
 	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_namelen, &umsg->msg_namelen) ||
 	    __get_user(uiov, &umsg->msg_iov) ||
-	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_iovlen, &umsg->msg_iovlen) ||
+	    __get_user(nr_segs, &umsg->msg_iovlen) ||
 	    __get_user(tmp3, &umsg->msg_control) ||
 	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_controllen, &umsg->msg_controllen) ||
 	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_flags, &umsg->msg_flags))
@@ -68,14 +69,15 @@ ssize_t get_compat_msghdr(struct msghdr *kmsg,
 		kmsg->msg_namelen = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (kmsg->msg_iovlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
+	if (nr_segs > UIO_MAXIOV)
 		return -EMSGSIZE;
 
 	err = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(save_addr ? READ : WRITE,
-					   compat_ptr(uiov), kmsg->msg_iovlen,
+					   compat_ptr(uiov), nr_segs,
 					   UIO_FASTIOV, *iov, iov);
 	if (err >= 0)
-		kmsg->msg_iov = *iov;
+		iov_iter_init(&kmsg->msg_iter, save_addr ? READ : WRITE,
+			      *iov, nr_segs, err);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
index cdedcf144463..b50861b22b6b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
@@ -755,11 +755,13 @@ ip_generic_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk
 	struct msghdr *msg = from;
 
 	if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
-		if (memcpy_fromiovecend(to, msg->msg_iov, offset, len) < 0)
+		/* XXX: stripping const */
+		if (memcpy_fromiovecend(to, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, offset, len) < 0)
 			return -EFAULT;
 	} else {
 		__wsum csum = 0;
-		if (csum_partial_copy_fromiovecend(to, msg->msg_iov, offset, len, &csum) < 0)
+		/* XXX: stripping const */
+		if (csum_partial_copy_fromiovecend(to, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, offset, len, &csum) < 0)
 			return -EFAULT;
 		skb->csum = csum_block_add(skb->csum, csum, odd);
 	}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index 8dd4ae0424fc..c0d82f78d364 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -811,7 +811,8 @@ back_from_confirm:
 	pfh.icmph.checksum = 0;
 	pfh.icmph.un.echo.id = inet->inet_sport;
 	pfh.icmph.un.echo.sequence = user_icmph.un.echo.sequence;
-	pfh.iov = msg->msg_iov;
+	/* XXX: stripping const */
+	pfh.iov = (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov;
 	pfh.wcheck = 0;
 	pfh.family = AF_INET;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index 5d83bd2fcedb..0bb68df5055d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -625,7 +625,8 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 back_from_confirm:
 
 	if (inet->hdrincl)
-		err = raw_send_hdrinc(sk, &fl4, msg->msg_iov, len,
+		/* XXX: stripping const */
+		err = raw_send_hdrinc(sk, &fl4, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, len,
 				      &rt, msg->msg_flags);
 
 	 else {
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 4a96f3730170..54ba6209eea9 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ static int tcp_sendmsg_fastopen(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 int tcp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 		size_t size)
 {
-	struct iovec *iov;
+	const struct iovec *iov;
 	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	int iovlen, flags, err, copied = 0;
@@ -1136,8 +1136,8 @@ int tcp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 	mss_now = tcp_send_mss(sk, &size_goal, flags);
 
 	/* Ok commence sending. */
-	iovlen = msg->msg_iovlen;
-	iov = msg->msg_iov;
+	iovlen = msg->msg_iter.nr_segs;
+	iov = msg->msg_iter.iov;
 	copied = 0;
 
 	err = -EPIPE;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index f5bd4bd3f7e6..3e225b03eb95 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -3050,7 +3050,7 @@ static int tcp_send_syn_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *syn)
 	syn_data->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
 	memcpy(syn_data->cb, syn->cb, sizeof(syn->cb));
 	if (unlikely(memcpy_fromiovecend(skb_put(syn_data, space),
-					 fo->data->msg_iov, 0, space))) {
+					 fo->data->msg_iter.iov, 0, space))) {
 		kfree_skb(syn_data);
 		goto fallback;
 	}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ping.c b/net/ipv6/ping.c
index 5b7a1ed2aba9..2d3148378a1f 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ping.c
@@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ int ping_v6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 	pfh.icmph.checksum = 0;
 	pfh.icmph.un.echo.id = inet->inet_sport;
 	pfh.icmph.un.echo.sequence = user_icmph.icmp6_sequence;
-	pfh.iov = msg->msg_iov;
+	/* XXX: stripping const */
+	pfh.iov = (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov;
 	pfh.wcheck = 0;
 	pfh.family = AF_INET6;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
index 11a9283fda51..ee25631f8c29 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
@@ -886,7 +886,8 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
 
 back_from_confirm:
 	if (inet->hdrincl)
-		err = rawv6_send_hdrinc(sk, msg->msg_iov, len, &fl6, &dst, msg->msg_flags);
+		/* XXX: stripping const */
+		err = rawv6_send_hdrinc(sk, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, len, &fl6, &dst, msg->msg_flags);
 	else {
 		lock_sock(sk);
 		err = ip6_append_data(sk, raw6_getfrag, &rfv,
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 63aa5c8acf12..cc9bcf008b03 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -2305,7 +2305,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
 	}
 
 	if (netlink_tx_is_mmaped(sk) &&
-	    msg->msg_iov->iov_base == NULL) {
+	    msg->msg_iter.iov->iov_base == NULL) {
 		err = netlink_mmap_sendmsg(sk, msg, dst_portid, dst_group,
 					   siocb);
 		goto out;
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index efa844501136..ed2e620b61df 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -2408,11 +2408,8 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 	unsigned short gso_type = 0;
 	int hlen, tlen;
 	int extra_len = 0;
-	struct iov_iter from;
 	ssize_t n;
 
-	iov_iter_init(&from, WRITE, msg->msg_iov, msg->msg_iovlen, len);
-
 	/*
 	 *	Get and verify the address.
 	 */
@@ -2451,7 +2448,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 		len -= vnet_hdr_len;
 
 		err = -EFAULT;
-		n = copy_from_iter(&vnet_hdr, vnet_hdr_len, &from);
+		n = copy_from_iter(&vnet_hdr, vnet_hdr_len, &msg->msg_iter);
 		if (n != vnet_hdr_len)
 			goto out_unlock;
 
@@ -2522,7 +2519,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 	}
 
 	/* Returns -EFAULT on error */
-	err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, offset, &from, len);
+	err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, offset, &msg->msg_iter, len);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free;
 
diff --git a/net/rds/recv.c b/net/rds/recv.c
index 47d7b1029b33..f9ec1acd801c 100644
--- a/net/rds/recv.c
+++ b/net/rds/recv.c
@@ -404,7 +404,6 @@ int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	int ret = 0, nonblock = msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
 	DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, sin, msg->msg_name);
 	struct rds_incoming *inc = NULL;
-	struct iov_iter to;
 
 	/* udp_recvmsg()->sock_recvtimeo() gets away without locking too.. */
 	timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
@@ -415,6 +414,7 @@ int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		goto out;
 
 	while (1) {
+		struct iov_iter save;
 		/* If there are pending notifications, do those - and nothing else */
 		if (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue)) {
 			ret = rds_notify_queue_get(rs, msg);
@@ -450,8 +450,8 @@ int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 		rdsdebug("copying inc %p from %pI4:%u to user\n", inc,
 			 &inc->i_conn->c_faddr,
 			 ntohs(inc->i_hdr.h_sport));
-		iov_iter_init(&to, READ, msg->msg_iov, msg->msg_iovlen, size);
-		ret = inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_copy_to_user(inc, &to);
+		save = msg->msg_iter;
+		ret = inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_copy_to_user(inc, &msg->msg_iter);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			break;
 
@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 			rds_inc_put(inc);
 			inc = NULL;
 			rds_stats_inc(s_recv_deliver_raced);
+			msg->msg_iter = save;
 			continue;
 		}
 
diff --git a/net/rds/send.c b/net/rds/send.c
index 4de62ead1c71..40a5629a0a13 100644
--- a/net/rds/send.c
+++ b/net/rds/send.c
@@ -934,9 +934,7 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	int queued = 0, allocated_mr = 0;
 	int nonblock = msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
 	long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, nonblock);
-	struct iov_iter from;
 
-	iov_iter_init(&from, WRITE, msg->msg_iov, msg->msg_iovlen, payload_len);
 	/* Mirror Linux UDP mirror of BSD error message compatibility */
 	/* XXX: Perhaps MSG_MORE someday */
 	if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)) {
@@ -984,7 +982,7 @@ int rds_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		ret = rds_message_copy_from_user(rm, &from);
+		ret = rds_message_copy_from_user(rm, &msg->msg_iter);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 	}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c
index 0b4b9a79f5ab..86e0f10aa2c0 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c
@@ -531,14 +531,12 @@ static int rxrpc_send_data(struct kiocb *iocb,
 	struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
 	unsigned char __user *from;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
-	struct iovec *iov;
+	const struct iovec *iov;
 	struct sock *sk = &rx->sk;
 	long timeo;
 	bool more;
 	int ret, ioc, segment, copied;
 
-	_enter(",,,{%zu},%zu", msg->msg_iovlen, len);
-
 	timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
 
 	/* this should be in poll */
@@ -547,8 +545,8 @@ static int rxrpc_send_data(struct kiocb *iocb,
 	if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
 		return -EPIPE;
 
-	iov = msg->msg_iov;
-	ioc = msg->msg_iovlen - 1;
+	iov = msg->msg_iter.iov;
+	ioc = msg->msg_iter.nr_segs - 1;
 	from = iov->iov_base;
 	segment = iov->iov_len;
 	iov++;
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index 0397ac9fd98c..c92f96cda699 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -1609,9 +1609,6 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
 	__u16 sinfo_flags = 0;
 	long timeo;
 	int err;
-	struct iov_iter from;
-
-	iov_iter_init(&from, WRITE, msg->msg_iov, msg->msg_iovlen, msg_len);
 
 	err = 0;
 	sp = sctp_sk(sk);
@@ -1950,7 +1947,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
 	}
 
 	/* Break the message into multiple chunks of maximum size. */
-	datamsg = sctp_datamsg_from_user(asoc, sinfo, &from);
+	datamsg = sctp_datamsg_from_user(asoc, sinfo, &msg->msg_iter);
 	if (IS_ERR(datamsg)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(datamsg);
 		goto out_free;
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index f676ac4a3701..8809afccf7fa 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -689,8 +689,7 @@ int kernel_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	 * the following is safe, since for compiler definitions of kvec and
 	 * iovec are identical, yielding the same in-core layout and alignment
 	 */
-	msg->msg_iov = (struct iovec *)vec;
-	msg->msg_iovlen = num;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg->msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *)vec, num, size);
 	result = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
 	set_fs(oldfs);
 	return result;
@@ -853,7 +852,7 @@ int kernel_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	 * the following is safe, since for compiler definitions of kvec and
 	 * iovec are identical, yielding the same in-core layout and alignment
 	 */
-	msg->msg_iov = (struct iovec *)vec, msg->msg_iovlen = num;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg->msg_iter, READ, (struct iovec *)vec, num, size);
 	result = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags);
 	set_fs(oldfs);
 	return result;
@@ -913,8 +912,7 @@ static ssize_t do_sock_read(struct msghdr *msg, struct kiocb *iocb,
 	msg->msg_namelen = 0;
 	msg->msg_control = NULL;
 	msg->msg_controllen = 0;
-	msg->msg_iov = (struct iovec *)iov;
-	msg->msg_iovlen = nr_segs;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg->msg_iter, READ, iov, nr_segs, size);
 	msg->msg_flags = (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0;
 
 	return __sock_recvmsg(iocb, sock, msg, size, msg->msg_flags);
@@ -953,8 +951,7 @@ static ssize_t do_sock_write(struct msghdr *msg, struct kiocb *iocb,
 	msg->msg_namelen = 0;
 	msg->msg_control = NULL;
 	msg->msg_controllen = 0;
-	msg->msg_iov = (struct iovec *)iov;
-	msg->msg_iovlen = nr_segs;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg->msg_iter, WRITE, iov, nr_segs, size);
 	msg->msg_flags = (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0;
 	if (sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET)
 		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
@@ -1798,8 +1795,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
 	iov.iov_base = buff;
 	iov.iov_len = len;
 	msg.msg_name = NULL;
-	msg.msg_iov = &iov;
-	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, len);
 	msg.msg_control = NULL;
 	msg.msg_controllen = 0;
 	msg.msg_namelen = 0;
@@ -1856,10 +1852,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
 
 	msg.msg_control = NULL;
 	msg.msg_controllen = 0;
-	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
-	msg.msg_iov = &iov;
 	iov.iov_len = size;
 	iov.iov_base = ubuf;
+	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, READ, &iov, 1, size);
 	/* Save some cycles and don't copy the address if not needed */
 	msg.msg_name = addr ? (struct sockaddr *)&address : NULL;
 	/* We assume all kernel code knows the size of sockaddr_storage */
@@ -1993,13 +1988,14 @@ static ssize_t copy_msghdr_from_user(struct msghdr *kmsg,
 {
 	struct sockaddr __user *uaddr;
 	struct iovec __user *uiov;
+	size_t nr_segs;
 	ssize_t err;
 
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, umsg, sizeof(*umsg)) ||
 	    __get_user(uaddr, &umsg->msg_name) ||
 	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_namelen, &umsg->msg_namelen) ||
 	    __get_user(uiov, &umsg->msg_iov) ||
-	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_iovlen, &umsg->msg_iovlen) ||
+	    __get_user(nr_segs, &umsg->msg_iovlen) ||
 	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_control, &umsg->msg_control) ||
 	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_controllen, &umsg->msg_controllen) ||
 	    __get_user(kmsg->msg_flags, &umsg->msg_flags))
@@ -2029,14 +2025,15 @@ static ssize_t copy_msghdr_from_user(struct msghdr *kmsg,
 		kmsg->msg_namelen = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (kmsg->msg_iovlen > UIO_MAXIOV)
+	if (nr_segs > UIO_MAXIOV)
 		return -EMSGSIZE;
 
 	err = rw_copy_check_uvector(save_addr ? READ : WRITE,
-				    uiov, kmsg->msg_iovlen,
+				    uiov, nr_segs,
 				    UIO_FASTIOV, *iov, iov);
 	if (err >= 0)
-		kmsg->msg_iov = *iov;
+		iov_iter_init(&kmsg->msg_iter, save_addr ? READ : WRITE,
+			      *iov, nr_segs, err);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/tipc/msg.c b/net/tipc/msg.c
index 5b0659791c07..a687b30a699c 100644
--- a/net/tipc/msg.c
+++ b/net/tipc/msg.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ int tipc_msg_build(struct tipc_msg *mhdr, struct msghdr *m, int offset,
 		__skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
 		skb_copy_to_linear_data(skb, mhdr, mhsz);
 		pktpos = skb->data + mhsz;
-		if (!dsz || !memcpy_fromiovecend(pktpos, m->msg_iov, offset,
+		if (!dsz || !memcpy_fromiovecend(pktpos, m->msg_iter.iov, offset,
 						 dsz))
 			return dsz;
 		rc = -EFAULT;
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int tipc_msg_build(struct tipc_msg *mhdr, struct msghdr *m, int offset,
 		if (drem < pktrem)
 			pktrem = drem;
 
-		if (memcpy_fromiovecend(pktpos, m->msg_iov, offset, pktrem)) {
+		if (memcpy_fromiovecend(pktpos, m->msg_iter.iov, offset, pktrem)) {
 			rc = -EFAULT;
 			goto error;
 		}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 4450d6226602..8e1b10274b02 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1459,9 +1459,6 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
 	struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
 	int max_level;
 	int data_len = 0;
-	struct iov_iter from;
-
-	iov_iter_init(&from, WRITE, msg->msg_iov, msg->msg_iovlen, len);
 
 	if (NULL == siocb->scm)
 		siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
@@ -1519,7 +1516,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
 	skb_put(skb, len - data_len);
 	skb->data_len = data_len;
 	skb->len = len;
-	err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &from, len);
+	err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, len);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_free;
 
@@ -1641,9 +1638,6 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
 	bool fds_sent = false;
 	int max_level;
 	int data_len;
-	struct iov_iter from;
-
-	iov_iter_init(&from, WRITE, msg->msg_iov, msg->msg_iovlen, len);
 
 	if (NULL == siocb->scm)
 		siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
@@ -1700,7 +1694,7 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
 		skb_put(skb, size - data_len);
 		skb->data_len = data_len;
 		skb->len = size;
-		err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &from, size);
+		err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, 0, &msg->msg_iter, size);
 		if (err) {
 			kfree_skb(skb);
 			goto out_err;
diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
index 20a0ba3bfff6..02d2e5229240 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
@@ -1850,7 +1850,8 @@ static ssize_t vmci_transport_stream_enqueue(
 	struct msghdr *msg,
 	size_t len)
 {
-	return vmci_qpair_enquev(vmci_trans(vsk)->qpair, msg->msg_iov, len, 0);
+	/* XXX: stripping const */
+	return vmci_qpair_enquev(vmci_trans(vsk)->qpair, (struct iovec *)msg->msg_iter.iov, len, 0);
 }
 
 static s64 vmci_transport_stream_has_data(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 17836394e578b8d6475ecdb309ad1356bbcf37a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 17:07:38 -0500
Subject: first fruits - kill l2cap ->memcpy_fromiovec()

Just use copy_from_iter().  That's what this method is trying to do
in all cases, in a very convoluted fashion.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 29 -----------------------------
 net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c       |  3 +--
 net/bluetooth/a2mp.c          |  3 +--
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c    |  7 +++----
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c    |  8 --------
 net/bluetooth/smp.c           |  4 +---
 6 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

(limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')

diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
index bca6fc0a3196..692f786bebe2 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h
@@ -606,10 +606,6 @@ struct l2cap_ops {
 	struct sk_buff		*(*alloc_skb) (struct l2cap_chan *chan,
 					       unsigned long hdr_len,
 					       unsigned long len, int nb);
-	int			(*memcpy_fromiovec) (struct l2cap_chan *chan,
-						     unsigned char *kdata,
-						     struct msghdr *msg,
-						     int len);
 };
 
 struct l2cap_conn {
@@ -903,31 +899,6 @@ static inline long l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
-						 unsigned char *kdata,
-						 struct msghdr *msg,
-						 int len)
-{
-	/* Following is safe since for compiler definitions of kvec and
-	 * iovec are identical, yielding the same in-core layout and alignment
-	 */
-	struct kvec *vec = (struct kvec *)msg->msg_iter.iov;
-
-	while (len > 0) {
-		if (vec->iov_len) {
-			int copy = min_t(unsigned int, len, vec->iov_len);
-			memcpy(kdata, vec->iov_base, copy);
-			len -= copy;
-			kdata += copy;
-			vec->iov_base += copy;
-			vec->iov_len -= copy;
-		}
-		vec++;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 extern bool disable_ertm;
 
 int l2cap_init_sockets(void);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c b/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c
index d8c67a5e7a02..76617be1e797 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static int send_pkt(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	iv.iov_len = skb->len;
 
 	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
-	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *) &iv, 1, skb->len);
+	iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, &iv, 1, skb->len);
 
 	err = l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, skb->len);
 	if (err > 0) {
@@ -1050,7 +1050,6 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops bt_6lowpan_chan_ops = {
 	.suspend		= chan_suspend_cb,
 	.get_sndtimeo		= chan_get_sndtimeo_cb,
 	.alloc_skb		= chan_alloc_skb_cb,
-	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
 
 	.teardown		= l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
 	.defer			= l2cap_chan_no_defer,
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c b/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c
index 716d2a388858..cedfbda15dad 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void a2mp_send(struct amp_mgr *mgr, u8 code, u8 ident, u16 len, void *data)
 
 	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 
-	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *)&iv, 1, total_len);
+	iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, &iv, 1, total_len);
 
 	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, total_len);
 
@@ -719,7 +719,6 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops a2mp_chan_ops = {
 	.resume = l2cap_chan_no_resume,
 	.set_shutdown = l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
 	.get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
-	.memcpy_fromiovec = l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
 };
 
 static struct l2cap_chan *a2mp_chan_open(struct l2cap_conn *conn, bool locked)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 5201d6167acb..1754040d00a8 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -2096,8 +2096,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_skbuff_fromiovec(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
 	struct sk_buff **frag;
 	int sent = 0;
 
-	if (chan->ops->memcpy_fromiovec(chan, skb_put(skb, count),
-					msg, count))
+	if (copy_from_iter(skb_put(skb, count), count, &msg->msg_iter) != count)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	sent += count;
@@ -2117,8 +2116,8 @@ static inline int l2cap_skbuff_fromiovec(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
 
 		*frag = tmp;
 
-		if (chan->ops->memcpy_fromiovec(chan, skb_put(*frag, count),
-						msg, count))
+		if (copy_from_iter(skb_put(*frag, count), count,
+				   &msg->msg_iter) != count)
 			return -EFAULT;
 
 		sent += count;
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index 205b298d9efb..f65caf41953f 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -1336,13 +1336,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *l2cap_sock_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
 	return skb;
 }
 
-static int l2cap_sock_memcpy_fromiovec_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
-					  unsigned char *kdata,
-					  struct msghdr *msg, int len)
-{
-	return memcpy_from_msg(kdata, msg, len);
-}
-
 static void l2cap_sock_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = chan->data;
@@ -1427,7 +1420,6 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops l2cap_chan_ops = {
 	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_sock_set_shutdown_cb,
 	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_sock_get_sndtimeo_cb,
 	.alloc_skb		= l2cap_sock_alloc_skb_cb,
-	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_sock_memcpy_fromiovec_cb,
 };
 
 static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 21f555b4df17..de7dc7581ff0 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 
 	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 
-	iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *)iv, 2, 1 + len);
+	iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len);
 
 	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
 
@@ -1629,7 +1629,6 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
 	.suspend		= l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
 	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
 	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
-	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
 };
 
 static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
@@ -1678,7 +1677,6 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
 	.resume			= l2cap_chan_no_resume,
 	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
 	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
-	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
 };
 
 int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3